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The United States -xperience with antitrust and  original objectives, and the regulators were
with directive regu.ation in the rail, trucking,  captured by the regulated.  For rail and trucking
airline, and telephony sectors offers useful  regulation, the regulatory outcome probably was
lessons for developing countries. The experi-  worse than it would have been under laissez-
ence highlights the realities both oe market  faire.
failure and of the difficulties of implementing
regulation to control it - and reveals tihat  Bradburd and Ross recommend the follow-
imperfect regulation may be no better than  ing hierarchy of regulatory responses to imper-
imperfect competition.  fect competition in LDCs:
Antitrust measures to regulate price fixing  *  First, ensure that domestic markets are open
and to require approval for mergers above some  to import competition to the maxinmum  leasible
threshold level of industrial concentration are  extenlt.
straightforward to implement and have provided
some gains in economic welfare. The regulation  *  Second, in cases of nontradables and when
of price discrimination, restrictive vertical  f'ree  access to imports is impossible, adopt
practices, and predatory pricing is administra-  streamlined antitrust policies that minimiize  the
tively more difficult, and the potential gains are  need for discretionary judgments.
less clearly evident.  In many situations, import
competition can be an efficient altemative.  *  Third, consider direct regulation of natural
monopolies as a last resort, but only in an
Direct regulation of rail, trucking, airline,  cconomically import,anlt  sector and only if'
and telephony was frequently inefficient, the  designed to minimize the likclilhold of rcgula-
regulatory apparatus often lost sight of its  tory misdirection.
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I.1 Introduction
In recent  years  the  market  has  come back  into  vogue  as an
allocative  mechanism:  government  regulation  of economic  activity  is not
automatically  assumed  to  be welfare  enhancing,  and  direct  government  provision
of goods  and services  faces  a hostility  once reserved  for  private  monopolies. 1
In the  industrialized  countries,  the  movement  to deregulate  economic  activity
gained  political  momentum  in  the  mid-1570's,  and  by the  mid-1980's  a large
number  of previously  regulated  sectors  of these  economies  were either  totally
or largely  deregulated. A similar  trend  is gaining  momentum  among  developing
countries:  parastatals  are  being  privatized,  and  efforts  are  being  made to
eliminate  price  maxima  and  minima,  to reduce  or eliminate  domestic  and
international  barriers  to the  entry  of new firms,  and  to eliminate  government-
created  distortions  in the  pattern  of import  and  export  activity.
The  movement  to the  market  in industrialized  countries  and  LDCs
has several  causes. Regulatory  systems  designed  to improve  allocative
efficiency  have in  many cases  failed  to do so,  either  because  they  were poorly
conceived  and  designed  to begin  with,  because  they  were "captured"  and  altered
so that  they served  the  interest  of the  regulated  entities  or regulators
rather  than  the  general  polity,  ov because  they  were inflexible  in the face  of
exogenous  changes  in  market  conditions. In effect,  regulatory  systems  whose
goals  were to  promote  efficiency,  equity  and flexibility  are  now  being
1 Button  and  Swann (1989,  p. 1) describe  this as  a procees  of "economic
disengagement,'  which they  argue  is currently  occurring  worldwide.-2-
abandoned  to  promote  these  very same  enis.
Those  who created  the  regulatory  institutions  currently  being
dismantled  focused  their  attention  on "market  failures"  and  tended  to  be very
optimistic  about  the  extent  to  which  regulation  would  be  welfare  enhancing.
This  was  naive.  Those  riding  the  current  wave of deregulation  must be wary of
focusing  their  attention  on 'regulatory  failures'  and  of naively  assuming  that
all  deregulation  will be welfare  enhancing.
To create  sound  public  policies  we must recognize  the realities  of
both  market  failure  and the  difficulties  of implementing  regulation  to control
it and  give  due consideration  to the  costs  of each. A careful  evaluation  of
the  industrialized  countries'  experience  with regulation  and deregulation  may
provide  valuable  lessons  for  LDCs  who  are  considering  what regulatory  path to
follow,  helping  them to avoid  the  creation  of regulatory  institutions  that,
once  established,  are resistant  to change  even if  they  are  obviously  flawed.
The  purpose  of this study  is to perform  such  an evaluation.  But  before  turning
to the  empirical  record,  it is  helpful  to delineate  conceptually  how
regulatory  practice  can  be viewed  as the  outcome  of the interaction  between
market  and regulatLry  failure.-3-
1.?  Regulation  as a Response  to  Market  Failure 2
The reasons  why  markets  might fail  to allocate  resources
efficiently  from a social  perspective  are  well known  to economists  and  other
public  policy  specialists.  These  include,  but  are  not limited  to,  the
existence  of imperfect  information,  positive  and  negative  externalities,
monopoly  and  oligopoly,  and constantly  declining  costs  in the relevant  range
of production.  In principle,  regulation  can  limit  the  welfare losses  from  many
of these  market  failures; the  focus  in this  paper is  on regulation  as a
response  to the  welfare  losses  associated  with imperfectly  competitive
markets.
As we use  the term  eregulation,"  we mean it to apply  to  antitrust
regulation,  that  is,  the  establishment  and  enforcement  of laws  governing  the
nature  of firms'  competitive  behavior  and  the  market  structures  within  which
that  competitive  behavior  takes  place,  and  also  to "directive  rngulation,r
situations  under  which the  regulatory  bodv itself  sets  prices,  output  levels.
quality,  and other  variables  that  are  ordinarily  determined  by management.
This  definition  raises  an interesting  question:  If the  market
outcome  is  viewed  as  non-optimal,  why not  use  economic  incentives  such  as
taxes  and subsidies  to induce  firms  to  move toward  the  social  optimum,  or
2 Regulation  can also  function  largely  or purely  as a redistributive
mechanism. As analyzed  later  in the  paper,  this  may  be viewed  as occurring  as
one  of the  legitimate  functions  of government  or as a response  to rent  seeking
activities  by interest  groups,  although  the  formal  distinction  is  not clear.
In any  event,  it is not  possible  to accurately  interpret  the  industrialized
countries'  regulatory  experience  without  giving  this  purpose  of regulation  its
due  weight.-4-
altmrnatively,  why not  have direct  public  provision  of the  goods  in question;
why use this sort  of halfway  house  between  the two?  Stiglitz  and Sappington
(1987)  argue  that  with  perff..t  information,  th re is  no  difference  between  the
three  approaches: If the  government  wished  a particular  outcome  to occur,  it
could  either  induce  the  firm  to accomplish  it by a combination  of taxes  and
subsidies,  order  the firm  to accomplish  it through  regulation,  or accomplish
it itself  after  nationalizing  the  firm.  In  practice,  information  is  never
perfect,  making  it difficult  to set  taxes  and subsidies  at the  correct  level
to achieve  a desiree  outcome.  Further,  principal-agent  problems  imply  that the
interests  of those  who  manage  publicly-owned  firms  for  the  government  are  not
likely  to be congruent  with those  of the  government.  With antitrust  or
directive  regulation,  the  government  need  not  attempt  to control  all  aspects
of  the  functioning  of the  regulated  entity,  just those  directly  related  to its
primary  objectives.
Given  the  decision  to regulate,  why is antitrust  employed  to
regulate  activity  in some  industries  and directive  regu:lation  (or
nationalization)  in others? Hany  different  industriat1-d  countries  have
chosen  the same  mode of regulation  for  particular  industries,  sLggesting  that
regulatory  efficiency  considerations  or some  other  rational  criteria  govern
the choice  of regulatory  instrument  for  each  industry. Let  us consider  this
hypothesis.
The  disadvantage  of  antitrust  regulation  relative  to directive
regulation  or nationalization  is that,  at least  in principle,  the  government
has less  control  over  the  market  outcome;  the  offsetting  advantage  is that
business  activity  and decisions  are left  in  the  hands  of private  enterprises,-5-
with government  involvement  only  occurring  when firm  behavior  or  market
structure  violates  some  pre-established  limits. This  greatly  reduces  the
informational  and administrative  requirements  of regulation  relative  to  more
interventionist  approaches,  and  also  preserves  more of the  profit-oriented
incentives  for  production  efficiency  than  do  most other  regulatory  approaches.
In the ideal,  antitrust  would  operate  so as to define  clearly--and  rationally-
-what  business  behavior  is  permissible  and  what is not,  and  businesses  would
then  pursue  their  own  objectives  subject  to constraints  imposed  by antitrust.
Under  conditions  of unregulated  natural  monopoly  (in  the  absence
of  perfect  price  discrimination),  an efficient  market  equilibrium,  with price
equal  to  marginal  cost,  will  not occur:  a profit-maximizing  monopolist  would
not  choose  to produce  the socially  optimal  output  level,  and even  if it did,
it could  not sustain  it  because  price  would  be below  average  cost.  However,
antitrust  cannot  be the  regulatory  solution:  a monopolist  violates  no laws
against  conspiring  with rivals  in setting  the  profit  maximizing  output.
Structural  antitrust  approaches  such  as dissolution  are  unsatisfactory  because
they  necessitate  inefficient  production.  By Lontrast,  in  principle  directive
regulation  can  help ensure  that  the  regulated  monopolist  does  produce  the
output  level  at  which  marginal  cost  equals  price,  or one  close  to it. 3
3 Typically,  this  can  only  be sustained  if the  government  provides  a
subsidy  to cover  the  firm's  losses,  or if a regulated  Drice  discrimination
scheme  is installed  under  which  differences  in  consumma.s'  willingness  to  pay
and/or  elasticities  of demand  are  exploited  so as to satisfy  the  revenue
requirements.  (Baumol  and  Bradford,  1970).
This in turn  creates  another  difficulty. Once  these  differences  in
prices  exist,  it  may be possible  for  entrants  to "skim  the  cream,"  profitably
offering  the regulated  service  only  to those  customers  designated  As  high-
price  customers  under  the  regulated  pricing  scheme. In this situation,  the
regulated  natural  monopolist  may be in an unsustainable  position,  unable  to
survive  by charging  the  same  price  to all  customers  but also  unable  to sustain
necessary  price  differences  among  customers  because  of competition  from  cream1.3  Regulator Inefficiency  and  Reguatory Failure
Our discussion  to this  point  has focused  on regulation  as a
potential  way of limiting  the  market  failures  associated  with imperfect
competition.  However,  just  as there  are  market  failures,  there  are  also
failures  of the  regulatory  response  to  market  failure.
In analyzing  regulatory  imperfections,  we find it  useful  to make a
distinction  between  "regulatory  inefficiency"  and "regulatory  failure."
'Regulatory  inefficiency'  represents  departures  from  the  Pareto  optimum  at
which  marginal  social  costs  of the remaining  market  ineffi-Aency  are  equal  to
the  marginal  social  costs  imposed  by the regulation  intended  to remedy  that
market  inefficiency. Such  regulatory  inefficiency  can result  from  producing
the  wrong  amount  of regulation  or failing  to produce  it in the least  costly
manner. We define  "reg'Alatory  failure'  as occurring  when regulatory  actions
of government  intended  to address  a  market  failure  lead  to an outcome  inferior
to that  which  would  have  been  obtained  under  laissez-faire. 4 Sufficient
regulatory  inefficiency  will result  in regulatory  failure.
skimming  rivals. This  may  necessitate  regulatory  restrictions  on entry  as
well as  pricing  regulation. See  Myer and  Tye (1988)  for  a  very lucid
discussion  of this issue.
4  A regulatory  outcome  could  be inferior  to a laissez-falre  outcome
either  because  the leparture  from  Pareto  optimality  is  greater  or because  the
net benefits  of regulation,  including  regulatory  costs,  are  negative.
Although  they  do not fit  neatly  into  the  standard  Paretian  framework,
undesirable  consequences  of a distributional  or other  nature  may also
influence  the relative  merits  of the laissez-faire  and  regulatory  outcomes.-7-
Avoiding  regulatory  failure  is an obvious  policy  objective 5;
however,  this  is a de  minimus  objectivet  policy  planners  bhould  strive  to
construct  institutions  and  mechanisms  of regulation  that  will minimize
regulatory  inefficiency.  Along  with ensuring  that  regulation  is provided  in
the least  costly  manner,  this  will require  balancing  the social  costs  of
market  failures  with the  costs  of efforts  to rectify  them.  This  in turn
requires  a clear  understanding  of regulatory  imperfections,  their  causes  and
their  consequences.
When regulation  is 'misdirected"  --  that  is,  it does  not function
just as policy-makers  intended  --  it can  be either  because  ttie  regilated
entities  "capture"  the regulatory  apparatus  and  turn it  to their  own
advantage,  or because  something  else  occurs  to  misdirect  the  original
regulation.  If sound  regulatory  policies  are  to be implemented  in LDCs,  it is
necessary  that  we understand  how and  why  misdirection  occurs. 6 Let us define
regulatory  "capture"  as a situation  in  which the  regulators  adopt  the
regulated  entities'  objectives  as their  own. 7 This  can  occur  at the  very
inception  of regulation,  as argued  by Peltzman  (1976),  or over  time,  as in
Bernstein's  (1955)  "life-cycle  hypothesis,"  as a regulatory  agency  created  to
promote  the  public  interest  changes  its  objective  to that  of promoting  the
interests  of those  it regulates.  We define  regulatory  "misdirection"  to  be any
5  Regulatory  failure  nevertheless :curs  with frequency. See  Krueger
(1990)  for  examples.
6 The  discussion  that follows  is  not  meant  to be exhaustive,  but  only to
cover  some  of the  more frequent  causes  of regulatory  problems.
7  Obviously,  in the  real  world the  relative  weighting  of benefits  to the
regulated  entities,  their  customers,  rivals,  and/or  potential  rivals  lies
along  a continuum. A dominant  weight  for  the  utility  of the regulated
entities  would in  our  view suffice  to define  "capture."situation  in  whicli  the  regulatory  apparatus  does  not function  as  originally
intended  in the  enabling  legislation. This subsumes  situations  in  which the
re%ulators  deliberately  pursue  the  objectives  of the  regulated  entities;
situations  ir  which the  regulitors'  actions  work to thE  benefit  of the
regulated  entities,  even though  that  is not  the regulators'  intent;  and
situations  in  which the  regulation  benefits  no group  but the  regult.ors
themselves.  In  principle,  capture  could  be prevented  if (non-corrupt)
legislators  could  employ  ir,corruptible  agents  to implement  regulatory
policies;  this  would  not suffice  to  avoid  misdirection.
T.3.1  Regu.ratory  Capture
A regulatory  body  might  adopt  the  regulated  producers'  objectives
as its  oin  because  the regulated  producers  are  able  to exert  greater  political
leverage  than  the  other  regulation-affected  groups,  or because  the  staffing  of
the regulatory  body comes  to be dominated  by fermer  regulated  producers  who
mainta.n  their  producer-welfare  orientation.
In theory,  the  possibility  of any  government  regulatory  action
(including  inaction)  that  may  benefit  or  harm any  group  creates  incentives  for
the  development  of interest  groups  that  will attempt  to ensure  government
policies  favorable  to their  interests. 8 Interest  groups  representing
8  Many  modern  political-economic  theories  of regulation  (and  of
government  generally)  tend  to  view government  activity  or its  absence  as the
outcome  of the  competition  between  different  interest  groups  for  access  to the
political  process  and its  redistributive  power. Examples  of such  models  are
Stigler  (1971),  Becker  (1983),  Peltzman  (1976),  and  Owen  and  Brauetigam
(1978).  These  theories  differ  in their  details  and  emphases,  but all  these
regulatory  theories  share  a similar  spirit  in  being 'self-interest"  based
theories  rather  than "public  interest"  based.-9-
producers,  consumers  and labor  interests  are  all  theoretical  possibilities;  in
practice,  producer  interest  groups  are  likely  to be  more politically
effective.
Regulatory  benefits  and  costs  are  frequently  concentrated  for
producers  and  diffuse  for  consumers. (Labor  is somewhere  in  between.) The
costs  involved  in organizing  and  maintaining  the  functioning  of an interest
group  can  be large  and  typically  increase  with the  number  of  members in  the
group. As a result,  while  it  may be common  for  producers  to find  it
worthwhile  to form  a politically  active  interest  group,  or even to  undertake
political  activity  individually,  consumers  would rarely  find  the  expected
benefits  of interest  group  activity  to exceed  the  expected  costs. 9 As a
consequence,  producer  interest  groups  may be  more effective  in pursuing
political  means  to economic  ends  than  are  consumer  interest  groups. 10
As for  staffing,  former  regulated  producers  may come to dominate
the staffing  of the  regulatory  body  when regulators  require,  or are believed
to require,  very specialized  knowledge  concerning  either  the regulatory
apparatus  or the  regulated  industry. Often,  the  only individuals  possessing
this  knowledge  are themselves  regulated  producers,  and this  leads  to the
9  Mancur  Olson (1965)  provides  an excellent  discussion  of the
determinants  of group  participation  in the  political  process.
10  In the  U.S.,  congressional  committee  membership  is responsive  to the
particular  concerns  of the individual  congresspersons.  As a result,  House  and
Senate  members  who  have a strong  interest  in some  regulatory  activity  are  more
likely  to serve  on the  committee  with oversight  responsibility  for  that
activity. If the senators  and  congresspersons  are  producer-oriented  for  the
reasons  outlined  above,  this  will be reflected  both in legislation  aiad  in the
activities  of the regulators  who rely  on their  oversight  committees  for
support  and appropriations.  (See  Weingast,  1981,  and Shepsle,  1978.)- 10  -
'revolving  door problem"  under  which  government  draws  its  regulators  from  the
regulated  producers,  who as regulators  then  acquire  skills  making  them  still
more  valuable  in the  substantially-more-remunerative  regulated  sector,  to
which  domain  they  return  armed  with both in-government  contacts  and  deep
knowledge  of regulatory  procedures. The revolving  door  makes  it  more likely
that  regulators  drawn  from  the ranks  of producers  will retain  their  interest
in the  welfare  of the  regulated  group.
I.3.2  Regulatory  Misdirection  W:thout  Capture
Regulatory  misdirection  can  also  occur  in the  absence  of capture.
Here  we highlight  four  sources  of  misdirection:  information  asymmetries
between  regulators  and those  affected  by regulation,  whether  producers  or
consumers;  regulatory  rigidities  that  grow  out  of the tendency  for  producers
and consumers  to develop  "property  rights'  in particular  regulatory  outcomes;
the  unintended  consequences  of  what we call 'regulatory  fitefighting,"
reacting  to  unanticipated  side  effects  of previous  regulatory  sctions;  and  the
pursuit  of self-interest  by those  responsible  for  regulation.
To begin  with information  asymmetry,  traditional  regulatory
agencies  suffer  from  an information  disadvantage  vis-a-vis  the  entities  they
must regulate. Producersll  have far  better  knowledge  of their  average  and
marginal  costs,  of recent  and  pending  technological  advances,  and  of their  own
degree  of  managerial  slack  than  do their  regulators. By  manipulating
11  Information  asymmetry  is not  confined  to the  relation  between
regulators  and  producers;  it  may occur  with consumer  or labor  groups  as  well,
sometimes  with similar  consequences.- 11 -
information-access  to their  advantage,  they  are able  to distort  the  regulatory
process  so as to redistribute  surplus  to themselves.  (Owen  and Braeutigam,
1978,  p.4)
Rigidities  are a second  cause  of regulatory  misdirection.
Economic  conditions  change,  and  if regulatory  systems  cannot  adjust  in
response,  the consequences  can  be  very costly  for society. Unfortunately,
several  forces  operate  to create  barriers  to regulatory  change.
Firms  and  other  economic  entities  make investment  decisions  and
otherwise  commit  resources  against  the  backdrop  of a variety  of social
institutions,  including  regulatory  systems,  and  they  may suffer  losses  if
these  institutions  change. If for  any  reason  the  government  hesitates  to
alter  regulatory  institutions  because  doing  so  will impose  those  losses,  then
establishing  a regulatory  system  effectively  creates  property  rights  that  make
it  difficult  to  alter  the regulatory  status  quo. 12
These  property  rights  in the  regulatory  status  quo  can  be
particularly  troublesome  in situations  in  which,  in the  absence  of regulation,
exogenous  economic  changes  would  dictate  the  disappearance  of some  existing
producers  or impose  substantial  losses  on them. 13 Owen and  Braeutigam  (1978)
12  Gary Becker  has argued  (1983)  that  there  will be a political  bias in
favor  of  maintaining  the status  quo  because  it  may be necessary  to compensate
groups  for  losses  they suffer  due  to changes  in government  policies. Becker's
model  assumes  a context  of competing  interest  groups  that  vie for  government
favors,  but  this is clearly  not  a necessary  condition.
1  Note that if  regulated  entities  have  been sold  at some  point,  their
profits  would  have  been capitalized  in the  purchase  price;  consequently,  any
worsening  of economic  conditions  in the  market  actually  imposes  "losses"  on
the  new  owners.- 12 -
argue  that  the stress  on procedural  fairness  within  regulatory  bodies
encourages  regulatory  outcomes  that  appear  distributionally  fair,  and  economic
survival  is one  obvious  index  of fairness. 14 Consequently,  when efficiency
might dictate  exit of firms,  regulators  are  prone  to intervene  to  prevent  this
from  occurring,  even if it is  very costly  to do so.
We would argue  that  this  rigidity  will be most severe  if
regulation  has at some  point  significantly  constrained  the  profitability  of
producers 15: producers  can in effect  argue  that if  they are  not allowed  to
exploit  their  market  position  when it is strong,  they  are entitled  to
compensating  protection  when it is  weak.  Further,  because  there  is  no  way of
determining  how regulated  firms  would  have fared  if regulation  had never
occurred,  regulators  cannot  detenmine  a Ofairw  level  of compensating
protection  from  market  changes. Thus,  regulation  may be resistant  to change
even  under  very dynamic  market  conditions.
Just as regulated  producers  may appear  to have regulatory  property
rights  protecting  their  survival  and  perhaps  even  their  market  position  and
profits,  customers  too  may be  viewed  as having  an entitlement  to the  existing
level  and quality  of service  and  in some  cases  even  prices:  they  too  have  made
14  Regulatory  powers  can  be abused,  and  in a  world of imperfect
information,  non-survival  of the  regulated  entities  might  signal  abuse  of
regulatory  powers  including,  but  not limited  to,  effectively  expropriatory
behavior. Survival  is  clearly  an imperfect  signal: regulatory  entities  can
survive  in the  presence  of regulatory  abuse  and fail  in its  absence,  as  when
external  circumstances  cause  firms  to fail  or  when efficient  regulation
dictates  that regulated  entities  exit the  market. Regulated  entities'
survival  nevertheless  plays  a signalling  functioning,  and  as such  it affects
regulatory  behavior.
15  This  is  not at all  unlikely,  especially  in light  of Bernstein's
regulatory  life-cycle  hypothesis.- 13 -
investments  based  on the  existing  regulatory  institutions. This  may add to
the  pressures  for rigidity. 16
Reacting  and  re-reacting  to unanticipated  side  effects  of
regulation,  or "regulatory  firefighting,'  is our  third  cause  of regulatory
misdirection. These  unanticipated  side  effects  spring  from  two  sources.
First,  regulatory  systems  are  almast  always  constructed  on the  basis  of
inadequate  information.  Second,  regulation  often  seems  to be devised  on the
assumption  that  regulated  entities  and  their  customers  and  competitors  will
respond  passively  to regulation,  whereas  profit  maximizing  behavior  generally
requires  that  they invest  resources  to  mitigate  regulation's  impact.  In both
cases,  the  result  is often 'creeping  regulation,"  a situation  in  which  more
and  more complex,  costly  and far-reaching  regulations  are  required  to  achieve
the  original  regulatory  goal.
Our final  source  of regulatory  misdirection  is  pursuit  of self-
interest  on the  part of those  charged  with regulation. 17 Regulatory  bodies  can
be difficult  to monitor:  regulatory  objectives  are  often  unclear;  there  is no
convincing  counterfact  to the  current  situation;  unanticipated  changes  in
enogenous  conditions  occur  that  make optimal  regulation  a  moving  target;  and
obtaining  the  information  necessary  for  an accurate  assessment  of regulatory
16 Owen and  Braeutigam  argue  that  even though  both  producers  and
consumers  in regulated  industries  develop  property  rights  in the  status  quo,
producers  are better  able to strategically  bend the  regulatory  system  to their
advantage.
17  As Krueger  (1990,  p. 13)  very nicely  puts it, "One  must ask  why
economists  were ever  comfortable  with the  simultaneous  beliefs  that
individuals  in the  private  sector  act  in their  self-interest  while  those  in
the  public  sector  are  motivated  by a Benthamite  vision  of social  justice."- 14  -
performance  is time  consuming  and  costly,  leading  to an information  asymmetry
between  regulators  and those  with oversight  responsibility.
Regulator  self-interested  behavior  can take  many forms. One of
these  is  corruption. Given  the  political  will, safeguards  against  this  can  be
established,  although  it  may be costly  to do so.  It is  much  more difficult  to
deter  the  other  forms  of self-interested  behavior  that  commonly  arise  in
bureaucratic  organizations. One such  behavior  is resistance  to  necessary
change. It is  not only  producers  and  consumers  in regulated  industries  who
develop  property  rights  in the  regulatory  status  quo,  but regulators  as  well.
Regulators  typically  have  a substantial  human  capital  investment  in the
current  set  of regulatory  institutions;  in  consequence,  as individuals  and  as
a group,  they  are  likely  to resist  change  because  it threatens  to
significantly  reduce  the  value  of that  capital.
I.4:  Learning  from  the  Regulatory  Experience  of Industrialized  Countries
Evaluation  of the regulatory  experience  of industrialized
countries  provides  an opportunity  for  exploring  how the  tension  between  market
and regulatory  experience  has resolved  itself  in practice,  and  what lessons
might  be relevant  to developing  countries  seeking  to devise  regulatory
policies  of their  own. Further,  the substantial  differences  in the  regulatory
approaches  of the industrialized  countries  suggest  that  inter-country
comparisons  might  be of great  value  in determining  what works  and  what does
not.  Unfortunately,  there  are so  many institutional  differences  among  these
countries--legal,  political,  economic  and  cultural--that  such  inter-country
comparisons  tend to  devolve  into  a comparison  of incommensurables.- 15 -
Fortunately  there  is  an alternative. The  United  States  and
several  other  industrialized  countries  have in recent  years  deregulated
significant  sectors  of their  economies  that  were at one time  heavily
egulated. This  provides  us an opportunity  to examine  and evaluate  how  well
regulation  has functioned  within  countries  by analyzing  both the  historical
development  of regulatory  systems  and  the  effects  of their  dismantling. In
effect,  the  deregulatory  movement  of the  last  decade  has  provided  us  with a
natural  experiment  with  which  we can increase  our  understanding  of the
regulatory  process,  free  of  many of complications  of inter-country
comparisons.
For  the  most  part,  we will focus  our attention  on regulation  and
deregulation  in the  United  States,  with some  attention  to the  U.K. and
Canadian  experience. The  next section  of this  paper  will evaluate  the  U.S.
experience  with antitrust  as a general  method  of regulating  monopoly  and
oligopoly  and promoting  competition,  and sugGest  some  lessons  for  developing
countries  that  follow  from  the  U.S. experience.  The  third  section  will analyze
that  country's  experience  with what  we will call "directive  regulation,"  in
which the  government  actually  intervenes  in the setting  of price  and/or  output
or entry  conditions.1 8 The  analysis  of directive  regulation  (and  deregulation)
will largely  employ  a "case  study"  approach,  analyzing  the  regulatory
experience  of the following  industriest  rail  transport,  motor transport,
18  "Directive  regulation"  corresponds  to  what is generally  called  simply
"regulation"  in the  economics  literature. The semantic  difficulty  is that
antitrust  enforcement  is no less  a form  of regulation,  and  we therefore  choose
to use the  terms  antitrust  regulation  and  directive  regulation  to refer  to
these  two  subcategories  of regulatory  activity.- 16  -
airline  transport,  and telecommunications.  The  final  section  will draw on the
various  strands  of the empirical  analysis  to  present  a  framework  for  efficient
regulatory  policy  in  developing  countries.  In  developing  this  framework,
particular  attention  will be given  to the  likelihood  that  developing  countries
are likely  both to  be more vulnerable  to  problems  of  monopoly  or oligopoly
than their  industrialized  country  counterparts,  and  more constrained  in the
availability  of the resources  and  personnel  needed  to gather  and process  the
information  required  for  the  efficient  operation  of a regulatory  system.
II:  ANTITRUST  REGULATION  IN  INDUSTRIALIZED  COUNTRIES
This section  consists  of two  parts. The first  is  a general
discussion  of antitrust  regulation  and  the  forms  it  can take. We discuss  the
relative  advantages  of orienting  antitrust  toward  influencing  market  structure
or toward  preventing  abusive  conduct. We then  discuss  the  primary  methods
available  for  influencing  market  structure  and  what forms  of conduct  might  be
proscribed. Following  this,  we consider  enforcement  issues:  whether  to  use
the  general  judiciary  or a specialized  agency  to enforce  antitrust  statutes;
whether  or  not the "reasonableness"  of specific  business  practices  (or  their
effects)  should  affect  their  permissibility;  and  what should  be the  penalties
for  antitrust  infractions.
The second  part of this  section  provides  an assessment  of
industrialized  countries'  experience  with antitrust  (focusing  on the  U.S.)  and
the  lessons  and recommendations  for  LDC  regulatory  policy  that  can  be culled
from that  experience. Our  discussion  of antitrust  issues  relies  heavily  on
Scherer  and  Ross (1990)  and  Martin (1988).- 17 -
11.1  General  Discussion
II.  1.1  Antitrust  Focust  Structure  or Abusive  Conduct
A structural  antitrust  approach  may take  the  form  of regulation  of
mergers,  establishment  of market-share  ceilings,  or dissolution  of firms  with
monopoly  or near-monopoly  positions.  Regulation  of abusive  conduct  is
naturally  concerned  with price fixing  and  other  activities  that directly
affect  the  vigor  of competition;  however,  it  may  also be concerned  with forms
of conduct--including  predatory  pricing,  vertical  restraints  that limit  entry,
and  price  discrimination--that  affect  competition  indirectly  because  they  may
lead  to the  development  of  monopoly. The two  approaches  need  not be  mutually
exclusive,  although  clearly,  sufficiently  vigorous  pursuit  of either  would
make the  other  redundant.
United  States  antitrust  policy,  while certainly  not ignoring
abusive  conduct,  has historically 19 shown  a greater  concern  with  market
19  Passage  of the  Sherman  Antitrust  Act of 1890  mar'  s the  beginning
of federal  antitrust  legislation  in the  United  States.  Though  its language
is  vague,  the  Sherman  Act  was designed  to prohibit  agreements  to fix  prices  or
otherwise  restrain  trade  through  combinations  or conspiracies,  and to prevent
"monopolization'  of industries,  wnere  monopolization  may be interpreted  to
mean extra-normal  efforts  to establish  a dominant  market  share  in  a market.
(Actually,  Congressional  !ntent  in  using  the  term "monopolize"  has  never  been
clear  and the  judicial  interpretation  has  varied  considerably  over  time
(Scherer  and  Ross,  1990).
Various  weaknesses  in the  Sherman  Act and in the  economic  sophistication
of the  federal  judiciary  led  to the  passage  in 1914  of the  Clayton  Act and  the
Federal  Trade  Commission  Act, the  latter  establishing  the  Federal  Trade
.o  mission,  an independent  commission  whose  primary  purpose  was to initiate
and  administratively  adjudicate  certain  kinds  of antitrust  cases. The  Federal
Trade  Co-mission  and  the  Antitrust  Division  of the  U.S.  Justice  Department
divide  responsibility  for  antitrust  enforcement  at the  Federal  level.- 18 -
structure--not  only  the  existence  or evolution  of monopoly,  but  more
generally,  the  number  and size  distribution  of firms--than  has  been the  case
in the  European  countries,  where  antitrust  treatment  of  monopoly  has focused
on the regulation  or abusive  conduct.
One advantage  of the  structural  approach  is that  if  monopolies
(and  tight  oligopolies)  are  prevented  from  developing,  it is  not necessary  to
constantly  monitor  firm  behavior  to determine  if some  illegal  abusive  conduct
is occurring. Neither  is it  necessary  to  monitor  firms  to  determine  if  they
have developed  a legal  counterpart  to legally  proscribed  behavior. Monitoring
always  involves  some  costs,  but it  can  be particularly  costly  in situations
where there  is gteat  information  asymmetry  between  firms  and their  would-be
Antitrust  enforcement  also takes  place  at the state  level  in the  U.S..
If  the Sherman  Act  could  be described  is being  in  part concerned  with
the  abuse  of existing  monopoly  or oligopoly  power (Section  I) and in  part  with
efforts  to increase  monopoly  power (Section  II), the  Clayton  Act and the  FTC
Act  might  best be described  as primarily  concerned  with behavior  that  would
lead  to the  creation  of such  power. Each of the  Acts made  unlawful  several
kinds  of business  practices,  including  a  variety  of vertical  business
relations  as  well as "unfair"  business  practices  that firms  might  use  to
eliminate  actual  or potential  rivals. The  Clayton  Act and  FTC  Act also  gave
the government  some  authority  to block  mergers  between  firms  that  would  terd
to create  a monopoly.
In the  decades  that  followed,  new  antitrust  legislation  has essentially
taken  the  form  of amendments  to the  original  legislation. These  amendments
were designed  to close  loopholes  that  arose  because  of unanticipated  judicial
interpretation  of the  Sherman,  Clayton,  and  FTC  Acts,  or because  businesses
developed  new  modes  of behavior  not anticipated  when the  Acts  were passed.
In the  U.S.,  federal  antitrust  cases  brought  by the  Justice
Department's  Antitrust  Division  are  tried  in the federal  courts;  the  decisions
of the  FTC  may be appealed  there  as  well.  There  have  been substantial  shifts
over time in the  views  of judges  and  antitrust  enforcement  personnel  toward  a
variety  of business  practices,  in  part for  ideological  reasons  and in  part
because  of changes  in economists'  views  of these  practices. As a consequence,
the  vigor  of antitrust  activity  in the  U.S.  has  waxed  and  waned,  and  certain
business  practices  viewed  with hostility  in some  periods  have  been viewed
sympathetically  in  others. It is therefore  difficult  to present  a concise
history  of U.S. antitrust  policies. The interested  reader  should  consult
Scherer  and  Ross (1990)  and  Martin  (1988).- 19  -
regulators. As Scherer  and  Ross (1990)  point  out, the  U.K. and  West German
experiences  with abuse-oriented  approaches  to  monopoly  suggest  that
determining  whether  or not  prices  are excessive,  and  what price level  is
reasonable,  calls  for  judgments  in  which  the  antitruet  enforcers  invariably
operate  at an information  disadvantage  vis-a-vis  those  whose prices  they  seek
to control. This  information  asymmetry  is common  in industrialized  countries;
it is likely  to  be the  rule in  LDCs.
The advantages  do not  lie  entirely  with the structural  approach
however. Constraining  the  development  of  monopoly  and  oligopoly  implies
limiting  the size  of firms  within  markets,  and  depending  upon  how this is
accomplished,  it carries  the  potential  of limiting  scale  economies,  slowing
innovative  activity,  and discouraging  active  rivalry.
A  judicious  mixture  of the  two  approaches  might  be superior  to
relying  on either  in isolation. Relatively  modest  structural  measures  can
substantially  reduce  the  monitoring  costs  that  accompany  a conduct  approach,
and  the latter  can  be resorted  to  when structure-based  antitrust  efforts  would
carry  unacceptably  high costs  in  terms  of foregone  scale  economies  and/or
technological  progress.20
Regulating  Structure
20  If large  firm size  or oligopolistic  market  structure  causes
innovative  activity  to increase  relative  to the levels  that  would  exist  in
more perfectly  competitive  market  structures,  society  might be better  off
accepting  greater  static  inefficiency  in return  for faster  technological
change. Industrial  organization  economists  refer  to this  as the  trade-off
between  static  and dynamic  efficiency.- 20 -
A monopolist  is unlikely  to  produce  the  competitive  equIlibrium
output,  and  even if conduct-oriented  antitrust  can  deter  firms  in highly
concentrated  markets  from  colluding  with each  other,  the recognition  of mutual
interdependence  that  characterizes  oligopolistic  markets  is likely  to lead
each  firm  to act independently  to avoid  price  rivalry. 21 As a consequence,
avoiding  the  development  of monopoly  or  high  market  concentration  is the  major
concern  of structure-oriented  antitrust  regulation.  Several  instruments
exist  for  regulating  market  structure. One is  placing  ceilings  on each firma'
permissible  market  share;  a second  is dissolution  of firms  with  monopoly  or
near-monopoly  market  positions;  and  a third  is to regulate  mergers  to prevent
individual  market  shares  or the  level  of market  concentration  from  exceeding
some  maximum  permissible  level.
Placing  upper  limits  on a firm's  permissible  market  share  may
require  sacrificing  static  scale  economies; 22 further,  to the  extent  that
large  size  is associated  with technological  change,  it  may  mean sacrificing
dynamic  efficiencies  as well.  In addition,  if there  is a ceiling  on a firm's
permissible  market  share,  price  and/or  other  forms  of rivalLy  directed  toward
increasing  market  share  will have less  of a payoff,  especially  as firms
approach  the  ceiling. Thus,  this  policy  has the  potential  to frustrate  the
21  Oligopolists  "recognize  their  mutual  interdependence"  in the  sense
that each  realizes  that  its  actions  will affect  its  rivals,  that its  rivals
will respond  to its  actions,  and  that  it  will be affected  by those  responses
in turn.  Thus,  in  a highly  concentrated  market,  each firm  may conclude  that
any  price  cutting  that it initiates  will be quickly  matched  by rivals,  and
that  profits  in the  new equilibritun  will be lower  that  at present. Such
reasoning  can lead  to the  avoidance  of price  rivalry  even in the  complete
absence  of any collusive  behavior.
22  See  Scherer  and  Ross,  1990,  p. 676  for  a discussion  of the
monopoly\scale  economies  tradeoff.- 21 -
very competitive  behavior  it is  meant  to encourage.
Dissolution  of firms  with commanding  market  shares  carries  all the
disadvantages  of market  share  ceilings  and  carries  additional  disadvantages  as
well.  Because  it significantly  disrupts  the functioning  of the firm,
dissolution  is likely  to result  in production  inefficiencies  and  transaction
cost increases  that  may persist  for  some  time.  Further,  such  non-marginal
intervention  may be associated  with greater  enforcement  costs. 23
Regulating  merger  activity  is another  method  of  preventing
monopoly  and  tight  oligopoly  market  structures  from  developing. Though  it
still  carries  risks  of thwarting  attainment  of static  and dynamic
efficiencies,  it is not  as disruptive  as dissolution  or as discouraging  of
rivalry  as market  share  ceilings. It is  consequently  a  more attractive
option. The  disadvantages  of  market  share  ceilings  and dissolution  have led
to their  being  used sparingly  in the  United  States,  while  regulation  of merger
activity  continues  to play a significant  role  in antitrust  regulation.
Regulating  Conduct
The  types  of conduct  that  might  reasonably  be the  subject  of
antitrust  enforcement  fall  into several  broad  categories:  an incumbent
monopolist's  exploitation  of its  power;  agreements  between  competitors  to
restrain  rivalry;  acts  designed  to eliminate  competitors;  and  acts designed  to
23 The  U.S. Justice  Department  case against  IBM initiated  in 1969 and
dropped  in 1932 is a good  case in  point. The total  cost  of the  case is
unknown,  but estimates  run  into  the  hundreds  of millions  of dollars.- 22 -
prevent  or hinder  entry  of new firms  into  an incumbent's  market.
Firms  may exploit  existing  monopoly  power  by restricting  output
and  elevating  price;  this  is the "classic"  monopoly  behavior  that  leads  to
welfare  losses. But  monopolists  may also  exploit  their  market  position  by
engaging  in price  or quality  discrimination  (Phlips,  1983;  Srinagesh  and
Bradburd,  1989),  or by tying  sales  of products  for  which  they  have rivals  to
the  sales  of those  where they  have a  monopoly  position  (Adams  and  Yellen,
1976).
If there  is  no firm  with a  monopoly  position,  the  monopoly
equilibrium,  or one  close  to it,  will only  occur  if the  firms  in the  market
avoid  active  price  rivalry. Under  certain  conditions,  generally  involving
small  numbers  of firms,  this  may occur  without  any  collusion  between  rival
firms,  simply  as a consequence  of firms'  recognition  of  mutual
interdependence;  in such  situations,  conduct-oriented  antitrust  is  powerless.
A monopoly-like  equilibrium  may also  be attained  through
agreements  between  competitors,  however,  and  these  can  be proscribed  under
antitrust  regulation. Such  agreements  might include,  but  not  necessarily  be
limited  to,  price  fixing  agreements,  agreements  to "divide  the  market"  along
geographic  or product  attribute  lines,  agreements  regulating  the  nature  and
extent  of advertising  or product  quality,  and  agreements  to merge  or otherwise
join together  the  management  of competing  firms.
The  monopoly  behavior  described  above  concerns  either  a firm
acting  alone  or in  cooperation  with its  rivals. But incumbent  firms  can  also- 23 -
act  to restrain  competitive  forces  by attempting  to eliminate  their  existing
rivals  or preventing  new ones  from  entering  their  market,  and these  actions
too  may  be prohibited  or regulated. Acts designed  to eliminate  competitors
would  include  predatory  pricing,  'unfair  business  practices"  such  as
attempting  to sabotage  rivals'  business  operations  or reputations,  refusing  to
deal  with customers  who buy rivals'  products,  and  other  practices  that  go
beyond  the "normal"  bounds  or rivalry. There  are some  forms  of behavior  whose
intent  is  ambiguous,  for  example,  pricing  a product  aggressively  in order  to
move down  a learning  curve (Spence,  1981,  Ross,  1986);  the  latter  clearly
offers  an opportunity  for  misapplied  antitrust  enforcement.
Incumbent  firms  may try  to deter  new entry  through  limit  pricing
strategies,  threats  of aggressive  post-entry  behavior,  product  differentiation
strategies,  attempts  at  vertical  foreclosure,  and  other  means.  They can  also
use the  political  process  to erect  barriers  to potential  entry.
Interestingly,  while  modern  theoretical  contributions  in industAial
organization,  particularly  applications  of game  theory,  have circumscribed  the
conditions  under  which  economists  believe  firms  can  effectively  deter  entry  C
through  their  own actions 24, political  economic  research,  including  the  rent-
24  The  literature  on strategic  entry  deterrence  has grown  increasingly
sophisticated  over  time,  largely  due  to the  contributions  of  modern  game
theory  (Tirole,  1988,  Chapter  8; Scherer  and  Ross,  1990,  Chapter  10,  and cites
therein). This  has  made our  analyses  of firm  behavior  richer,  but  also  much
more complicated  and  qualified;  static  limit  pricing,  which  once seemed  quite
straightforward  in intent  and  effect  (Modigliani,  1958)  is a good case  in
point.  The static  limit  pricing  model  assumes  that  an incumbent  firm
threatens  to  maintain  the  limit-price  output  even if entry  occurs,  thus  making
entry  unprofitable  and effectively  discouraging  it.  However,  absent  some
"commitment"  to rivalry,  if entry  actually  occurs,  it  will be  more profitable
to accommodate  it than to carry  out  the  threat. Such  a threat  is therefore
not sub-game  perfect  and is  not credible. As a result,  it  would  not  deter
entry.- 24 -
seeking  and  DUP 25 literatures  (Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan,  1980;  Anderson,  1989;
Rowley,  Tollison  and  Tullock,  1988),  has increasingly  recognized  the  power  of
firms  to protect  their  profits  through  poltical means (Demsetz,  1979).
With the  exception  of non-collusive  rivalry  avoidance 26, it is
feasible  to forbid  all  of the  behavior  described  above.  From  a policy
perspective,  it is important  to determine  if doing  so  would  actually  be
welfare  increasing. History  can  be a helpful  guide  here,  and following  our
discussion  of enforcement  alternatives,  we will review  the  U.S. (and  to a
limited  extent  the  U.K.)  antitrust  experience.
II.1.2 Enforcement  Issues:
Enforcement  by General  Judiciary  or Specialized  Agency
Countries  may differ  in  whom they  choose  to  make responsible  for
enforcing  their  antitrust  statutes  and  adjudicating  cases. The two  broad
choices  are  an independent  agency  (or  'commission")  and the  general  judiciary.
In  many European  countries,  there  is an independent  commission  that regulates
abuses  of  monopoly  power (Scherer  and  Ross,  1990). Both approaches  are  used
at the  federal  level  in the  United  States,  because  the  Federal  Trade
25  'DUP'  activities  are "directly  unproductive,  activities  (Bhagwati  and
Srinivasan,  1980). DUP  activities  and rent-seeking  activities  correspond  to
the  same  behavior;  the  former  term  appears  more frequently  in the  trade
literature.
26 The line  between  collusive  and  non-collusive  parallel  action  is
actually  not an exact  one;  in the  United  States,  judicial  interpretation  of
what does  and  does  not constitute  collusive  behavior  has  varied  over time.
(Martin,  1988,  pp.  125-29).- 25 -
Commission  and the  Antitrust  Division  of the  Department  of Justice  share  the
responsibility  for  antitrust  enforcement.
The  general  judiciary  and  independent  commission  approaches  each
have different  strengths  and  weaknesses. There  are two  great  advantages  of
the  independent  commission  approach. The first  is that  such independent
commissions  may be expected  to  have (or  develop)  both a commitment  to and
competence  in issues  of antitrust  and  monopoly. In  contrast,  there  is  no
particular  reason  to  believe  that  the  typical  judge  will be able  to evaluate
competently  the issues  involved  in antitrust  litigation,  and  the  U.S.
experience  in this regard  is  not particularly  encouraging  (American  Bar
Association,  1989(A),  p. S-33,  Scherer  and  Ross,  1990,  pp. 336-337). The
second  is that  handling  abusive  conduct  problems  administratively  rather  than
through  the  general  judiciary  may save  both  time  and litigative  resources.
The  disadvantage  of the  independent  commission  approach  is that
this regulatory  efficiency  may  come  at the  expense  of protecting  appeal
rights. There  is consequently  a danger  of independent  commissions'  power
being  subverted  to serve  private  or politically  partisan  ends. 27 In the  case
of the  general  judiciary  approach,  there  is less  danger  of power  being
subverted  in this  way.  First,  if the  general  judiciary  system  incorporates
rights  of appeal,  that  is itself  a safeguard. Second,  if the  judges  (and  in
some  cases,  juries)  that  try  the  cases  are  chosen  from  a  wide pool,  it is  much
more difficult  to conspiratorially  subver,L  he regulatory  process  than  when
27  The  U.K.  has accepted  the  risks  involved  in this  tradeoff  by
choosing  to limit  defendants'  appeal  opportunities;  in the  U.S.,  defendants  in
cases  brought  before  the  administrative  law  judges  of the  FTC retain  their
right  of appeal  to the  general  federal  judiciary.- 26 -
adjudicative  decisions  are  made administratively  within  an independent
commission.
For  better  or worse,  both independent  commissions  and the  general
judiciary,  to the  extent  that  they  depend  upon  the  executive  or legislative
branches  for  continuing  appropriations,  authority,  or appointment  of
personnel,  may be subject  to  executive  or congressional  influence. 28 This too
must be considered  in creating  regulatory  institutions.  While  such  oversight
can serve  to prevent  abuse  of regulatory  power,  it is also  an instrument  that
can be exploited  for  the  purpose  of capturing  or protecting  economic  rents. 29
The  need  to make good  judgments,  to  make them  with relatively  low
transaction  costs,  the  likely  information  asymmetries  between  the  enforcement
agency  and the  regulated  firms,  and the  generally  weak condition  of legal
systems  in  LDCs,  lead  us to recommend  in  LDCs  a enecialized  agency  approach
along  the lines  of the  U.K.  Monopolies  Commission.3 0
The limits  on the right  of appeal  that inhere  in such  an approach
are  a problem  that  we recognize. It is tempting  to recommend  that  the right
of appeal  to the  general  judiciary  be protected;  however,  even if such  appeals
28  This  threat  of outside  influence  can  be reduced  if regulators  are
granted  lifetime  tenure  or if  regulatory  agencies  are self-financing  through
penalty  revenues. Both of these  carry  some  significant  risks.
29  The  American  Bar  Association  Section  of  Antitrust  Law evaluation  of
the  Federal  Trade  Commission  (1989A)  discusses  this  problem  at some  length.
30  The  U.S. policy  of having  two  separate  enforcement  agencies  is
almost  certainly  ill-advised  for  LDCs.  Resources  are  wasted  in  duplicated
effort,  and  an uncertain  division  of responsibilities  can  allow  problems  to
fall  between  the  cracks.- 27 -
are limited  to  matters  of procedure  (e.g.  capricious  or arbitrary  decision
making)  rather  than  fact,  resolution  of the  appeal  would in  many cases
necessitate  an attempt  to evaluate  the  reasonableness  of the  original
decision,  and this  would  present  us  with many of the  weaknesses  of the  general
judiciary  that  we originally  wished  to avoid. Presumably,  if the  agency
displays  a persistent  pattern  of abusing  its  power,  corrective  action  will be
taken.
The  enforcement  agency  needs  to  be able  to impose  penalties  in
appropriate  circumstances  if it is to deter  anti-competitive  behavior. Given
our  choice  of investing  an independent  agency  with antitrust  enforcement
powers,  and the  reduction  in safeguards  against  abuse  of power  that  accompany
that  choice,  we recommend  that  penalties  for  antitrust  violations  be limited
to fines.
Reasonableness  as  an  Antitrust Defense
Independent  of choosing  its  agent  of antitrust  enforcement  and its
antitrust  focus,  a country  must decide  whether  to determine  guilt  in antitrust
cases  on the  basis  of a "per  se"  rule  or a "rule  of reason."
Under  a "per  se"  rule,  guilt  is  determined  on the  basis  of  whether
or not the  proscribed  act in question  can  be proved  to  have  been committed,
whatever  the  actual  consequences  of that  act.  Under  a "rule  of reason,"  in
contrast,  the reasons  why the  contested  action  was initiated  and its  effect  on
rivals  and on consumers  are  all  taken  into  account  in determining  whether  or
not a violation  of the  law  has occurred  and  what  remedy,  if  any,  will be- 28 -
applied.  (See  Scherer  and  Ross,  1990,  p. 317-339  for  a detailed  discussion  of
these  issues. We draw  extensively  on their  analysis.)
There  are several  advantages  to a per se rule  in antitrust.
First,  firms  face  less  uncertainty  regarding  what is illegal  than  under  a rule
of reason. Second,  if the  behavior  defined  to be illegal  per se is  almost
never  in the  public  interest,  a  per se rule  avoids  the losses  associated  with
erroneous  judicial  approval  of restrictive  practices  under  a rule  of reason.
The  third  and greatest  advantage  of a per se rule  is that it  very
substantially  reduces  adjudication  and  enforcement  costs (Martin,  p. 155).  It
is extremely  costly  and  complicated  to determine  why an act  was committed  and
what its  present  and  future  effects  will be,  and  doing  so greatly  strains  the
limits  of judicial  economic  expertise. In the  event  that  a  particular
restrictive  practice  is ruled  'reasonable.,  in some  circumstances  the  court
must  be prepared  to  monitor  behavior  in the  future  to ensure  that today's
reasonable  practice  remains  reasonable  in the  future. (See  Scherer  and  Ross,
1990,  p. 336,  and  their  discussion  of this issue  in the  context  of the  1927
Trenton  Potteries  Case.)
All of this  may seem  to suggest  that  a per  se rule is always
optimal. However,  there  is one  disadvantage  to a  per se rule:  there  are  some
circumstances  in  which  apparently  restrictive  practices  can  be  welfare
increasing, 31 and  a per se rule  does  not permit  the flexibility  needed  in
31  Among  these  might  be aggressive  pricing  to exploit  learning  economies
and  vertical  restrictions  that  have the  effect  of reducing  transaction  costs.
Another,  less  persuasive,  might  be price  fixing  agreements  in  high fixed  cost
industries  subject  to highly  cyclical  demand. For a discussion  of the  latter,
see  Scherer  and Ross,  1990,  pp. 303-306.- 29 -
these  cases. Optimally,  legislators  will  weigh  expected  costs  and  benefits  in
choosing  which rule  to adopt. As the  U.S. experience  shows,  it is  possible  to
adopt  a per se rule  for  some  practices  and  a rule  of reason  for  others.
Antitrust  Penalties  and Relief
In the  United  States,  some  antitrust  violations  are treated  as
civil  cases  and some,  price  fixing  for  example,  may be tried  as criminal
cases.  In  publicly  brought  civil  cases,  if  a violation  is found  to  have
occurred,  the  remedy  is injunctive  relief,  in the  form  of a cease  and  desist
order,  a requirement  that  the  defendant  undergo  divestiture,  or even,  in some
cases,  dissolution. In criminal  cases,  penalties  may  be fines  or
incarceration  of guilty  individuals. Clearly,  if  all  penalties  for  antitrust
infractions  are  fines,  there  is a danger  that firms  may  come to treat  them  as
a  business  expense. If so,  in  deciding  whether  or not to  commit  some  action,
the  corporation  will calculate  the  action's  expected  benefit,  taking  into
account  the  probability  of being  caught  and  fined  as  well as the  size  of the
fine. As Posner  (1976)  and  Landes  (1983)  have demonstrated,  for  risk  neutral
firms,  an effective  deterrent  fine  must  be equal  to or larger  than  the
expected  gain  from the (undetected)  illegal  action  divided  by the  probability
of being  caught  and  punished. 32
If  the  resources  devoted  to antitrust  enforcement  are  not  great,
32  This  assumes  that if  caught,  the  convicted  firm  retains  its ill-
gotten  gains.  If it  must forfeit  them,  the  effective  deterrent  penalty  is
reduced  to (p)/(l-p)  multiplied  by the  expected  gain  from  undetected  illegal
activity,  where UpU  is the  probability  of being  unpunished.- 30 -
or if for  some  other  reason 33, the  probability  of punishment  is small,  the
effective  deterrent  fine  can  become  extremely  large,  particularly  if  the
illegal  action  is quite  profitable. For  a variety  of reasons,  such  large
fines  are rarely  imposed  in the  United  States  (Gallo  et al., 1985).  In
situations  where  this is the  case,  fines  alone  may  not be an effective
deterrent.
The  threat  of a jail  sentence  for individuals  convicted  of
antitrust  violations  is  another  method  of deterrence, 34 and one  that  can be
quite  powerful,  particularly  when it is combined  with personal  and  corporate
fines. It can  provide  employees  of corporations  more of an incentive  to
refuse  to engage  in illegal  acts,  not  only  because  of the stigma  of jail
sentences  and fear  of personal  financial  losses,  but  also  because  jail
sentences  clearly  define  the  punished  offense  as  being  criminal  and  not  merely
"business  as usual"  (Gilbert  Geis,  1968).
The  disadvantage  of a jail  sentence  as an antitrust  deterrent  is
that it is  a harsh  punishment,  and  one  that  could  be abused  for  political
purposes. Consequently,  one  would  want to use  this form  of deterrence,  if at
all,  only in  cases  where  the  prohibited  action  was  one that  could  be defined
simply  and  unambiguously,  and  was one that  was illegal  per se.  This form  of
punishment  might  be appropriate  for  price  fixing  for  example,  but certainly
not for  price  discrimination.  It is  also  clear  that  this  method  of deterrence
33 These  might include  very stringent  evidentiary  standards  for
conviction  or opportunities  for  successful  bribery.
34  Jail sentences  for  individuals  convicted  of price  fixing  have  become
more common  in recent  years (Scherer  and  Ross,  pp.  325-27).- 31 -
has some  serious  disadvantages  in situations  in  which the  rights  of appeal  are
abridged.35
II.2  The  U.S.  Antitrust  Experiences  Lessons  for  LDCs
The antitrust  experience  of the  United  States  and  European
countries  provides  two  kinds  of information  that  can  be very useful  in the
formulation  of LDC  antitrust  policy  decisions. The  first  of these  concerns
the importance  of market  forces,  including  import  competition,  relative  to
regulatory  forces;  the  second  has to  do  with which  specific  antitrust
regulatory  procedures  and policies  appear  most likely  to be  welfare  enhancing.
We discuss  these  in  turn.
II.2.1 The Importance  of Domestic  and  International  Competition
As we will discuss  below,  antitrust  activity  has almost  certainly
reduced  to some  extent  firms'  ability  to exploit  their  monopoly  power.
35  We have  not discussed  private  antitrust  remedies,  in particular
the  ability  of private  individuals  to sue  for  damages  consequent  to antitrust
violations. The advantage  of private  remedies  is that  they  provide  an
incentive  for  antitrust  enforcement  even if the  public  effort  is for  some
reason  compromised. The  disadvantage  is that single  damages  may be
insufficient  to encourage  private  litigation,  the  outcome  of  which is
uncertain,  and  multiple  damages  can  encourage  frivolous  or strategic  suits
whose  primary  purpose  is extracting  a settlement  or weakening  a rival  through
litigation.
The resource  costs  of litigation  and  the  danger  of frivolous  or
strategic  suits  argue  against  allowing  private  antitrust  suits. At the  same
time,  allowing  private  suits  does  provide  some  protection  for firms  that  might
otherwise  be  without  it,  as  well as a  mechanism  for redress. We recommend  a
compromise  position  in  which  private  suits  for  damages  consequent  to antitrust
violations  are  permitted,  with the  defendant,  if found  liable,  paying  single
damages  to the successful  plaintiff  and  single  damages  to the  government  as
well.  This policy  is similar  to  one suggested  in Salop  and  White (1986).- 32 -
However,  the importance  of  market  forces  such  as rivalry  between  incumbents,
potential  and  actual  entry,  and significantly,  import  competition,  in
constraining  monopoly  and  oligopoly  behavior  cannot  be overestimated.
Antitrust  only comes  into  play  when the  natural  competitive  forces  in  markets
are in some  way blunted;  we should  not assume  that  absent  antitrust,  the
market  equilibrium  will be the  monopoly  equilibrium  or even  close  to it.
There  are  of course  situations--generally  those  where the  size  of
the  domestic  market  and the  structure  of costs  dictate  the  existence  of a
tight  oligopoly--in  which a  monopoly-like  equilibrium  will obtain  in the
absence  of antitrust  activity;  in some  of these  situations  non-collusive
recognition  of  mutual  interdependence  makes  even  antitrust  laws impotent
unless  the  enforcement  agencies  are  willing  to pursue  radical  policies  of
restructuring  that  may threaten  economies  of scale  and scope.  But  even  here,
the  market  force  of import  competition  may operate  to introduce  active
rivalry.36
The  U.S. experience  in the  automobile,  steel,  and other  industries
demonstrates  that in domestic  markets  characterized  by tight  oligopoly,  import
competition  may be a very potent  force 37. Competition  from  abroad  has forced
U.S. companies  to increase  quality,  to reduce  inefficiency,  to accelerate  the
pace of product  and  product  innovation,  and  to price  products  more
aggressively;  it  has had  a similar  effect  in other  countries. With
improvements  in infrastructure,  and  with today's  global  market  outlook  of
36  This issue  is discussed  'n Spiller  (1986B,  p.30).
37 For example,  see  the  articles  on the steel  industry  and the  automobile
induetry  in  Walter  Adams (1990).- 33 -
producers,  imports  will play  an increasingly  important  role in reducing  firms'
ability  to exploit  monopoly  positions  in domestic  markets.
Opening  LDCs'  domestic  markets  to import  competition  will limit
the  monopoly  power  of domestic  firms  in the  home  market 38; it  will limit  the
power  of foreign  multinationals  that  have attained  & position  in the  home
market;  it  will reduce  the  ability  and incentive  of firms  to use the  power  of
the state  to capture  rents 39; and  very importantly,  as  we will discuss  further
below,  it  may permit  governments  to effectively  regulate  imperfectly
competitive  markets  without  creating  a  cumbersome,  expensive  and  potentially
burdensome  antitrust  regulatory  apparatus.
Import  competition  will not suffice  to  make all  markets
effectively  competitive. Foreign  firms  too  can  be parties  to collusive
agreements,  and  when these  involve  domestic  firms,  regulation  may be
necessary,  as it  may be in  cases  of domestic  *non-tradeables.0  There  may  also
be situations,  preferably  few,  in  which  political  circumstances  prevent  LDCs
from  eliminating  import  protection. To the  extent  that  they  can  be welfare
enhancing  and effective,  antitrust  and  other  regulatory  mechanisms  should  be
implemented  to deal  with these  situations. But in  presenting  our
recommendations  for  these  regulatory  mechanisms  in LDCs,  we assume  that  they
function  within  a domestic  market  that is,  to the  greatest  extent  possible,
38  We implicitly  assume  here that  the  importing  sector  itself  is  not
monopolized;  the  benefits  of open  markets  could  be severely  attenuated  if it
were.  The government  should  take steps  to ensure  that there  are  no artificial
barriers  to entry  into  this  market.
39  This  has obvious  economic  benefits,  but it  has a  clear  political
benefit  as  well.- 34 -
open to import  competition.
II.2.2  Evaluation  of Antitrust  Regulation
The  most obvious  problem  that  arises  in evaluating  the  overall
success  of the  U.S. antitrust  effort  is that  we do not  have a convincing
counterfactual  with  which  to compare  the  U.S. experience. Absent  antitrust,
would  consolidations  through  (unregulated)  merger  activity  have created
monopolies  in  most industries? Would  predatory  practices,  price
discrimination  and/or  vertical  foreclosure  have  been  used to eliminate
existing  competitors  and  discourage  potential  ones?  Would  firms  in
oligopolistically  structured  markets  have succeeded  in  crafting  durable
agreements  to avoid  rivalry? If, in the  absence  of antitrust  regulation,  the
average  level  of market  concentration  were higher,  would static  economies  of
scale,  size,  or scope,  or dynamic  economies,  have  been such  as to actually
increase  total  surplus  relative  to the  regulated  outcome? These  are important
questions  the  answers  to  which  can  be only  most crudely  approximated.
A second  problem  arises  because  the  U.S. antitrust  effort has had
at least  two  objectives:  1)  promoting  allocative  efficienicy;  and
2) maintaining  a viable  role  for  small  business  in  the  U.S.  economy (Martin,
1988,  pp. 255, 387,  514-16). These  two  objectives  are  not infrequently
inconsistent, 40 but there  is  no legislative  (or  judicial)  statement  of the
U.S.  marginal  rate  of substitution  between  them.  It is impossible  to evaluate
40  In the famous  1962  Brown  Shoe  case,  the  Court  stated  in its ruling
that  when the  two  objectives  conflict,  Congress'  intent  was tu choose  to
pursue  the  viability  of small  locally-owned  businesses  even at the  cost  of
economic  efficiency  (Har-in,  pp. 251-254).- 35  -
accurately  the success  of a program  whose  objectives  are  ambiguous. These
problems  make an overall  assessment  of  whether  antitrust  has  been  welfare
enhancing  practically  impossible. 41 But  we can  assess  ixdividual  aspects  of
antitrust  activity,  and in the  process,  provide  some  guidance  to  policy
planaers  in LDCs.
Regulating  Price  Firing
Most,  though  not all,  economists  would  probably  agree  that
antitrust  enforcement  of laws  prohibiting  price-fixing  has on balance  been
welfare.  4.  - Asing,  even if  estimates  of the  actual  size  of the  welfare  gain
would  vary  grti.ly. This  is because  there  are  very few situations  in  which
price  fixing  is  welfare  enhancing 42 and  because  the  conflicting  objectives
that  have occasionally  misdirected  U.S.  antitrust  efforts  have  not  materially
affected  price-fixing  regulation.
If the  U.S.  experience  is a good indicator,  regulation  of price-
fixing  is likely  to be  welfare  enhancing  in  LDCs,  particularly  if enforcement
is focused  on sectors  in  which import  competition  is  weak.  Further,  it
generally  has the  advantage  of promoting  distributional  equity  (Scherer  and
Ross,  1990,  pp. 679-81).
41  Experts'  views  of antitrust  and its  effects  vary greatly. Robert
Bork (1978)  is quite  negative  about  antitrust  while the  American  Bar
Association  analyses  of antitrust.  enforcement  by the  Justice  Department  and
the  FTC (1939  A  and  B)  were in the  whole  positive.
42  A possible  exception  might  be the  case  of stabilization  cartels  in
industries  with large  fixed  investments,  designed  to prevent  ruinous
competition. The  dangers  of ruinous  competition  are  easily  exaggerated
however.-36  -
Assuming  that  regulation  of price-fixing 43 is  well-advised,
employing  a per se rule  in adjudication  of price-fixing  complaints  is likely
to be preferable  to a rule  of reason. As we indicated  above,  there  are few
situations  in  which  price  fixing  is  welfare  enhancing. At the same  time,
having  a per se rule  reduces  direct  litigation  costs  substantially  and  greatly
lessens  the  need for  technically  trained  economists  and  economically
sophisticated  jurists. A per se rule  also  reduces  uncertainty  regarding  what
is and  is not  illegal,  making  it easier  to impose  substantial  penalties  for
violations  of the law  if they  are  needed  for  deterrence.
Regulating  Mergers
Regulation  of merger  activity  in the  U.S. has  probably  been less
successful  than  that  involving  price  fixing. There  has been  a great  decline
in  U.S. regulation  of  merger  activity  in -. ucent  years,  and  this  probably
reflects  some  disenchar,tment  with this form  of regulatory  activity: 44 fewer
horizontal  mergers  are  challenged,  and  regulation  of conglomerate  and  vertical
mergers  has largely  been  abandoned.
43  We view behavior  such  as output  restriction  agreements  and  agreements
to "divide  the  market"  as coming  under  the  umbrella  of 'price-fixing."
44  In the  context  of a rather  different  argument,  Adams  and Brock,  1989,
detail  how few  antitrust  merger  cases  have been  brought  in recent  years.  It
is  possible  to argue  that  this  does  not reflect  regulatory  disenchantment  so
much as the impact  of regulation  in  discouraging  firms  from  even  considering
mergers  that  might attract  antitrust  attention. However,  the  number  of
mergers  that  have occurred,  and  the  fact  that  many have been  horizontal
mergers  involving  large  firms,  suggests  that  this alternative  explanation  is
not correct  (Adams  and  Brock,  1989).- 37 _
Few  would  argue  that  merger  regulation  has not affected  the
average  level  of  market  concentration  in the  U.S. economy  (Dewey,  1974),  but
some  mergers  have undoubtedly  been  prohibited  that  would  have been  welfare
enhancing,  and  others  that  probably  should  not  have been  allowed,  have  been,
either  because  of regulators'  economic  biases,  because  of politically
motivated  congressional  or executive  inte!rference  in the  antitrust  enforcement
process,  or  because  regulators  erred  in estimating  post-merger  economies  of
scale  or scope. 45 Unfortunately,  the  errors  do  not cancel  out.
Regulation  of vertical  and  conglomerate  mergers  is  not likely  to
be welfare  enhancing  in  LDCs;  regulation  of  horizontal  mergers  may be in  many
circumstances.  As is  apparent  from  some  of the  merger  activity  that followed
passage  of the  Sherman  Act in the  U.S.,  horizontal  mergers  may act as  an
effective  alternative  to price  fixing  agreements  and therefore  may require
regulation. However,  things  here are  more complicated  than  in the  case of
price-fixing. Regulating  agencies  in LDCs  must be sensitive  to the gains  in
static  and  dynamic  efficiency  that  may accompany  horizontal  mergers,
particularly  in cases  where there  appear  to be significant  opportunities  for
exploiting  economies  of scale  through  merger,  or  where large  size is  necessary
for  product  and process  innovation. 46 These  considerations  may play a greater
role in  developing  countries  where domestic  product  markets  are smaller  than
in some  of the  industrialized  countrien. The  fact  that  mergers  have  the
45  Some recent  mergers  that  created  regional  airline  monopolies  or
oligopolies  appear  to fall into  this  category  (Dempsey,  1990).
46  The  evidence  from industrialized  countries  on the relation  between
size  and  innovative  activity  suggests  that  the  relation  is  a complicated  one
and that  larger  firm  size  does  not  always  lead  to greater  innovative  activity.
(Scherer  and  Ross,  1990,  Chapter  17,  provides  an excellent  summary  oi the
empirical  studies  to date.)- 38 -
potential  to be either  welfare  increasing  or decreasing  implies  that  a rule  of
reason  should  govern  decisions  regarding  the legality  of  mergers.
Fortunately,  as the  U.S. experience  with the  Justice  Department  Merger
Guidelines  and  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  pre-merger  notification
requirements  demonstrates,  if regulation  of  horizontal  mergers  takes  the  form
of requiring  pre-merger  approval,  and  then  only  in cases  where the  proposed
merger  would  cause  post-merger  market  concentration  to exceed  some  pre-
determined  threshold,  the  costs  of  such  regulation  can  be relatively  modest.
Markets  in LDCs  tend  to be have  higher  levels  of domestic  market
concentration  than  those  in industrialized  countries;  consequently,  a fairly
high  threshold  --perhaps  a domestic  three-firm  concentration  ratio  of 80Z--
might  be needed  to avoid  having  to review  all  horizontal  mergers. Assuming
that  domestic  markets  are  open  to imports,  mergers  in  markets  for tradeables
should  generally  be permitted. In the  case  of  non-tradeables,  threshold-
exceeding  mergers  should  only  be permitted  when there  is a compelling  case  for
efficiency  gains.
Regulating  Price  Discrimination
The  cutback  in  U.S. antitrust  enforcement  is not  confined  to
merger  regulation:  the  level  of antitrust  activity  has declined  for  almost
every  potential  antitrust  offense  except  price-fixing  (Brett,  1985).  In large
part, 47, this reflects  the  profession's  weakening  confidence  in the  welfare
enhancing  effects  of antitrust  enforcement  directed  toward  other  forms  of
47  It probably  also reflects  antitrust  staff  cutbacks. See  American  Bar
Association,  1989 (A)  and (B),  passim.- 39  -
formerly  "suspect"  business  conduct. This  is  clearly  the  case in the  area  of
price  discrimination  (American  Bar  Association,  1989A  and  1989B).
There is  very little  to suggest  that  U.S. antitrust  regulation  of
price  discrimination  is  or has  ever  been  welfare  increasing  (Williamson,  1981;
Martin,  1988);  in fact,  quite  the  contrary  is true. Many economists  now
regard  the  overall  effect  of the  Robinson-Patman  amendment  to the  Clayton  Act,
the  primary  enabling  legislation  for  regulation  of  price  discrimination,  to be
anticompetitive  rather  than  procompetitive. 48
LDCs  would do  well to avoid  such regulation.  As is  well-known,
price  discrimination  can  be either  welfare  increasing  or decreasing,  depending
upon  the form  it takes  and  the spec'fic  conditions  of demand  and  supply  that
hold for  the  good  in question  (Jun-3i  Shih,  Chao-cheng  Mai and  Jung-chao  Liu,
1988;  Schmalensee,  1982A). And  when they  occur,  welfare  losses  that  may
result  from  price  discrimination  generally  tend to  be modest. On this  basis
alone,  LDCs seem  well-advised  to avoid  attempting  antitrust  regulation  of
price  discrimination  either  by a  Per se rule  or rule  of reason  approach.
A second  argument  against  pursuing  antitrust  regulation  of price
discrimination  is that it  is easily  susceptible  to  misdirection. In the
United  States,  no small  part  of the  antitrust  legislation  (and  enforcement)
effort  dealing  with price  discrimination  has been  directed  toward  protecting
48  Martin (1988,  pp.  394-96)  summarizes  the  major  arguments  and  provides
useful  references.- 40-
competitors--most  often  small  businesses--rather  than  competition. 49
Although  this  may  well have  been  part of the  Congressional  intent  in framing
antitrust  legislation,  it is doubtful  that it  has  been  welfare  enhancing.
Restrictive  Vertical  Practices
It is  more  difficult  to  draw  useful  lessons  from  the  U.S. and
European  antitrust  experiences  with respect  to restrictive  vertical  practices.
On the  one  hand,  recent  research  focusing  on industrialized
countries  suggests  that  efforts  to  economize  on transactions  costs  may play an
important  role  in determining  vertical  business  relations  (Caves  and  Bradburd,
1988)  and that  antitrust  legislation  there  may  have erred  in the  past in
generally  viewing  such  relations  inhospitably. 50 And in developing  countries,
where  capital  markets  and  other  elements  of social  infrastructure,  including
the  legal  system,  may operate  with greater  friction  than  in industrialized
countries,  companies  have even  greater  incentives  to  vertically  integrate  or
establish  non-arms-length  vertical  relationships  with upstream  suppliers  and
downstream  customers.
49  The Robinson-Patman  Amendment  to Section  2 of the  1914  Clayton  Act,
passed  in 1936,  almost  certainly  was passed  with the  aim  of protecting  small
grocery  stores  from  the  competition  of large  grocery  chains  that  were able  to
use their  buying  power  to obtain  grocery  items  from  suppliers  at lower  expense
(Scherer  and  Ross,  pp. 509-10).
50 See  Richard  Schmalensee,  "Antitrust  and  the  New Industrial  Economics'
and  Oliver  Williamson,  "Antitrust  Economics:  Where It's  Been;  Where It's
Going'  for  a discussion  of  how consideration  of transaction  costs  has  altered
perceptions  of optimal  antitrust  enforcement  in the  U.S..  See  also  American
Bar  Association,  1989 (A)  and (B).- 41 -
On the  other  hand,  there  are  characteristics  of LDCs that suggest
that  some regulation  might  be desirable. First,  in economies  that  are smaller
or  have less  well-developed  capital  markets,  vertical  integration  and  vertical
contractual  restrictions  may be  more potent  in limiting  entry.  Second,  LDCs
are  justifiably  concerned  with the  viability  of domestic  firms  competing  with
multinationals;  if domestic  firms  have  less favorable  access  to capital  or
technology  than  multinationals,  allowing  these  firms  greater  latitude  in
pursuing  vertical  strategies  in LDC  markets  may increase  the relative
disadvantage  of domestic  firms.
This  would seem  to suggest  that  a rule  of reason  is the
appropriate  approach  to regulating  vertical  integration  and  vertical  relations
betweeni  companies  in  developing  countries. Vertical  restraints  that  appear
sensible  in the  computer  industry  may be  unjustifiable  in the  market  for
ceramic  pots.  The  problem  with applying  a rule  or reason  in these  cases  is
that,  frequently,  only rather  sophisticated  analysis  can  determine  if a
particular  vertical  practice  is  welfare  enhancing 51. LDCs  are likely  to find
these  analyses  both costly  in their  use scarce  human  resources  and, because  of
the  necessary  complexity  of the  analyses,  vulnerable  to  misdirection.
On balance,  we would  recommend  minimal  antitrust  activity  relating
to vertical  practices,  restricting  only  those  actions,  such  as full-line
51 For  example,  whether  or not  vertical  integration  will be welfare
enhancing  is  a function  of the  values  of the  elasticities  of substitution
between  inputs  and demand  elasticities  for  final  products. Neither  of these
is  easy to  measure  with accuracy.  See  Scherer  and  Ross (1990),  p 524.- 4?  -
forcing 52, that  have the  greatest  potential  for limiting  entry.  Those
practices  proscribed  should  be governed  by a  per  se rule.
Predatory  Pricing
Predatory  pricing  may  be defined  as setting  price  at an
unprofitably  low  level  with the  immediate  intent  of destroying  or disciplining
a rival,  and the  ultimate  aim  of establishing  monopoly  pricing.
McGee (1958)  and  others  have argued  that  predatory  pricing  is  not
a significant  antitrust  concern  because  it is rarely  a firm's  profit
maximizing  strategy. In  part,  this  rests  on the  argument  that it is
unprofitable  to predatorily  cut  price  in order  to  eliminate  a particular  rival
if  another  rival  will emerge  as soon  as price  is elevated  to a profitable
level. Nevertheless,  predatory  pricing  does occur  on occasion  in
industrialized  countries,  and  might  be a more  potent  strategy  in economies  in
which  the  queue  of potential  entrants  is reduced  by constraintc  on access  to
capital. 53 This is  another  case  in  which  incumbent  domestic  firms  or
multinationals  may have  more power  than  one  would  wish.
Nevertheless,  regulation  of predatory  pricing  presents  something
of a dilemma. It appears  to be a good  candidate  for  regulation  because,  when
52  Full-line  forcing  refers  to a practice  under  which  a producer  of a
group  of related  products  requires  that  a customer  buy its  entire  line  of
products,  rather  than  allowing  it to  buy only  those  items  than  it finds
preferable  to other  sellers'  offerings.
53  Bork (1978)  argues  that  successful  predation  requires  imperfect
capital  markets. Bork is  wrong on this  count.  In  any event,  imperfect
capital  markets  are  probably  the  rule  in LDCs.- 43 -
it occurs,  it is not only injurious to competition but often violates general
standards  of fairness  as  well.  Unfortunately,  it is also  exceedingly
difficult  to separate  predatory  pricing  from  the  active  price  rivalry  that
should  be encouraged. Consequently,  misguided  regulatory  enforcement  can
easily  do  more harm than  good.
In theory,  predatory  pricing  can  be distinguished  from  vigorous
price  rivalry  by whether  or not price  is  below  marginal  cost.  Three  problems
(at  least)  emerge  in practice:  1. the  difficulties  of measuring  marginal  cost;
2. firms'  opportunities  for  strategic  responses  to such  regulation  that
artificially  distort  the fixed  cost-marginal  cost relation;  and  3. the
occasional  need for  firms  to sell  products  below  marginal  cost in  non-
predatory  situations  such  as eliminating  excess  inventories  or working  down  a
learning  curve.  (Martin,  1988,  pp. 408-38  provides  an excellent  discussion  of
the issues  surrounding  predatory  pricing  and  its  regulation.)
Some  theorists  (Baumol,  1979)  have suggested  looking  for  price
increases  after  the  period  of price  decreases  as evidence  of predatory  intent.
Regulation  based  on this  principle  would  clearly  require  costly  monitoring
activity.
On balance,  we favor  minimal  regulation  of predatory
pricing. This is in  part based  on our  expectation  that  it  would  be very
difficult  to regulate  predatory  pricing  in a  way that  actually  enhanced
welfare,  and in part  on our expectation  that  if import  competition  is
permitted,  there  will be very few  cases  in  which firms  will  find  predatior.  to
be an attractive  strategy.- 44 -
II.2.3 Overview
The  lessons  we draw from  the industrialized  countries'  experience,
Laken  together,  suggest  that  with the  exception  of regulating  price-fixing  and
setting  pre-merger  review  requirements  where  the  3-firm  concentration  ratio  is
above  some threshold  level,  antitrust  should  play a limited  role in  promoting
competitive  market  outcomes  in  LDCs.  This  is  quite  deliberate. Antitrust
enforcement  can  be costly. It can  divert  administrative  and other  scarce
skills  away from  more productive  uses.  Improperly  wielded,  it can lessen  the
competitive  vigor  of  markets,  hinder  achievement  of production  efficiencies,
or slow  the  pace  of technological  change. In most cases,  import  competition
can  be an efficient  alternative. Consequently,  antitrust  laws  should  only
exist  and be enforced  when normal  market  forces  do not operate  and  where such
laws  will deter  behavior  that  has the  potential  for  causing  significant
reductions  in consumer/producer  surplus  or significant  negative  distributional
consequences. These  are fairly  stringent  general  criteria. Nevertheless,  we
feel  they  are  appropriate,  not  only for  LDCs  but for  industrialized  countries
as  well.
III: DIRECTM  REGULATION
In the  next four subsections  we will analyze  four  cases  of
directive  regulation. These  serve  to illustrate  many of the regulatory
problems  discussed  in  Section  II above,  and  also  provide  valuable  lessons  for
developing  countries  considering  either  increasing  or decreasing  government
involvement  in their  economies. Each exemplifies  different  market- 45 -
imperfections,  regulatory  failures,  and  transition  to at least  a significantly
deregulated  state.
In each case,  we will describe  the  political  and  economic
conditions  that led  to the  demand  for  regulation,  the  successes  and failures
of the regulatory  apparatus  and  their  proximate  causes,  the  political  and
economic  conditions  that  led  to deregulation,  and  an evaluation  of the
experience  since  deregulation.
111.1  Rail Freight  Regulation  and  Deregulation
In this section  we will discuss  the  U.S. experience  with
regulation  and  deregulation  of rail freight  transport. We will argue  that
railroad  regulation  exemplifies  much of  what can  go wrong  with regulation:
railroads,  rail  workers  and shippers  all  developed  property  rights  in the
regulatory  status  quo, leading  to inflexibility;  'creeping  regulation'
occurred  as regulators,  trying  to  play catch-up  with exogenous  changes  in
technological  and economic  conditions,  were forced  to regulate  an ever-
widening  sphere  of economic  activity;  and regulatory  objectives  were poorly
articulated  and too  rarely  exposed  to searching  scrutiny. All of these
contributed  to regulatory  misdirection,  inefficiency  and  failure,  and created
pressures  for  deregulation.
We will argue  that  deregulation  of rail  freight  transport  has  been
welfare increasing,  but that  the  aftereffects  of regulation  have impaired  the
performance  of the  sector  in the  deregulated  era.- 46  -
Because  rail freight  regulation  embodies  so  many of the  pitfalls
of government  efforts  to directly  regulate  economic  activity,  it provides
ample  lessons  for  policy  planners  in  LDCs.  We discuss  these  in t'~ latter
part of this section.
Why  Regulate  Railroads?
Federal  railroad  regulation 54 began  with passage  of The  Act to
Regulate  Commerce  in  1887.  It applied  only to interstate  railroad  carriers,
but this  was virtually  the  entire  industry.  The  Act required  that carrier
rates  be just and  reasonable,  prohibited  personal  discrimination  between
shippers,  and established  the Interstate  Commerce  Commission  (ICC)  as the
enforcement  agency.
Economic  and  political  factors  both  played  roles  in ensuring
passage  of the  legislation. Railroad  transportation  is  characterized  by very
high fixed  costs  for  track  and  roadbeds,  very low  marginal  costs,  and
significant  economies  of density. 55 A monopolistic  supplier  of rail  services
54  This  history  of railroad  regulation  draws  heavily  on the  excellent
discussion  provided  in  Asch and  Seneca  (1989). Both freight  and  passenger
services  were ultimately  regulated;  however,  we will confine  our  discussion  to
rail  freight  transport.
55  As pointed  out  by Robert  G. Harris  (1977)  ,  "Economies  of Traffic
Density  in the  Rail Freight  Industry,*  Bell  Journal  of Economics,  8  Autumn
1977:  p. 557, the  distinction  between  economies  of scale  and  economies  of
density  is an important  one.  Economies  of scale  refer  to a long-run  average
cost  curve  that  declines  as the size  of the firm  increases,  while economies  of
density  refer  to effect  on average  costs  as output  increases  holding  the route
system  (miles  of rail  line  in the railroad  case)  constart. A small  firm  with
high traffic  density  may enjoy  lower  average  costs  than  a large  firm  with low
density.- 47 -
over  a  particular  route  has  substantial  monopoly  power  and  relatively  little
threat  from  (railroad)  competitive  entry.  At  the  same  time,  because  marginal
costs  are  so  low,  if  two  or  more  railroads  compete  on  the  same  route,  and
rivalry  begins  to  reduce  prices  to  levels  near  marginal  cost,  all  firms  might
experience  financial  crises  because  their  revenues  would  fail  to  cover  average
costs.56.
Abuse  of  monopoly  power  and  price  discrimination  led  to  political
pressure  for  railroad  regulation  from  the  grain  producing  states,  a  quite
powerful  group.  The  rail  industry's  vulnerability  to  price  wars  reduced
industry  opposition  to  such  regulation  (Nelson,  1975),  and  in  fact,  the
industry  may  even  have  viewed  regulation  as  a  promising  vehicle  for  cartel
behavior  (MacAvoy,  1965;  Kolko,  1965).
How  Well  Did  Regulatoan  Function?
By  1906,  amendments  to  the  original  legislation  had  given  the  ICC
the  power  to  prescribe  maximum  limits  for  rates  if  current  rates  were  found
unreasonable.  However,  the  ICC  could  not  set  the  actual  rate  or  a  minimum
rate.
As  one  of  a  series  of  actions  that  suggest  that  regulatory
misdirection  was  already  occurring,  the  ICC's  authority  was  subsequently
increased  substantially;  by  1920,  the  ICC  was  empowered  to  set  fair  and
56  This  was  a significant  impetus  for  price-fixing  agreements  between
railroads  in  the  early  days  of  rail  transportation.  See  Asch  and  Seneca,  p.
388.- 48 -
reasonable  rates  that should  yield  a fair  return  to railroads  and  also  had the
power  to set  actual  and  minimum  rates. Events  in the  1920's  and 1930's
revealed  that these  changes  signal  more than  a simple  increase  in tr.  ulatory
authority:  they  appear  to reflect  a fundamental  change  in the  relation  between
the  ICC  and the  railroads,  a change  that  sees  the ICC  beginning  to assume  some
responsibility  for  the  economic  welfare  of those  they regulated.
During  the  1920's,  the railroads  began  to face  competition  from
motor carriers  especially,  but  also from  water  carriers,  pipelines,  and to a
lesser  extent,  airlines. This  competitive  entry  hurt the rail  industry,  and
its  effects  were compounded  by the  Great  Depression  of the  1930's. For  a
variety  of reasons,  significant  among  them the  distress  of the rail  industry,
Congress  passed  the  Emergency  Transportation  Act  of 1933,  the  Motor  Carrier
Act of 1935 (MCA)  and  the  Transportation  Act of 1940,  which  together  establish
a legislative  basis  for  regulating  virtually  all transport  modes.
Here  we see  exemplified  the  regulatory  property  rights  problem  and
the "creeping  regulation  problem., Prices  were to  have been set  to ensure  a
'fair  return'  for railroads;  when the industry  fell  into  difficulty,  the
government  assumed  responsibility  for lts  survival,  even  though  the  railroads'
problems  were due  in large  part to factors  exogenous  to the  regulatory
apparatus. But in order  to  maintain  the  viability  of the  rail industry,  the
ICC  had to control  not only rail  transport  prices,  but those  of competing
transport  modes  as  well.
Is this  evidence  of regulatory  capture  as  well as regulatory
misdirection? Subsequent  events  suggest  not,  or if so,  that  the  capture  was- 49 -
transitory. In the  immediate  post-war  period,  the  ICC  had to decide  whether
to set  prices  for rail,  motor,  air,  etc. transport  on basis  of average
veriable  costs,  marginal  costs,  or 'fully  distributed  costs,*  FDC,  which
included  fixed  costs.  If competition  were strictly  intramodal,  all  the
various  transport  modes  would  no doubt  have  preferred  pricing  on the  basis  of
fully  distributed  costs,  but  with intermodal  competition  becoming  more
important,  and  given  the  cost  structures  of the  various  transport  modes,  the
railroads  stood  to gain from  a  marginal  cost approach  and the  motor  and  air
carriers  from  one  based  on FDC. 57 The ICC  decided  to set  prices  using fully
distributed  costs,  which  placed  rail  transport  at a price  disadvantage
relative  to other  transport  modes.  This  policy  played  a significant  role in
the  decline  of the  railroads  and  presumably  would  not  have been  adopted  by a
railroad-captured  ICC.
Earlier  we discussed  the  propensity  for  property  rights  in the
regulatory  status  quo  to be bestowed  not just  on producers,  but consumers  and
labor  as well.  This factor  also  played  an important  role  in railroad
regulation.
As a consequence  of competition  from  other  transportation  modes
and  exogenous  changes 58 in economic  conditions,  railroads  began  to find
significant  portions  of their  trackage  to  be unprofitable,  and in the  absence
57  With FDC,  the railroads  prices  would  have to be  much higher  than
those  of other  transport  modes,  and  they  would  be unable  to successfully
compete  for  traffic. With something  close  to  marginal  cost  pricing,  the
trucking  industry  would  have  been in  a similarly  difficult  position.
58 Rent  capture  by rail  workers  in the form  of supra-competitive  wages
and inefficient  work rules  also  played  a role in  making  routes  unprofitable.- 50-
of ICC regulation,  would  have abandoned  these  routes. However,  both rail
workers  and  the  communities  facing  loss  of service  were active  in  politicking
against  route  abandonment. Whatever  the  cause--the  political  force  of  workers
and  communities  or forces  strictly  internal  to the  ICC--the  ICC  policies
operated  so as create  extremely  high barriers  to  exit (Winston,  et al.,  1990,
p. 8).  The costs  of  .. his  were  borne  by railroads,  and to some  extent,  by
shippers.
The  financial  condition  of railroads  steadily  deteriorated: the
loss  of business  to other  transport  modes  meant  that the  railroads  had to
sacrifice  economies  of density  in  hauling  freight;  exit  barriers  forced  them
to expend  very significant  resources  to  maintain  unprofitable  trackage;  and
inefficiencies  due to regulation  and  union  workrules  elevated  costs. The  end
result  was the  near financial  collapse  of the  railroad  industry. Railroad
regulation  was clearly  failing.
Deregulation  of  Rail  Freight  Transport
Pressures  for  deregulation  of rail  transport  built  to a head
during  the 1970s. Several  factors  played  a role in this.  Foremost  was the
railroads'  financial  condition  which  made the  status  q'o  unsustainable. In
addition,  because  trucking  regulation  was a  necessary  prop to rail  regulation,
the  very strong  pressure  building  for  partial  or total  deregulation  of
trucking 59 meant that  the  elaborate  (though  inefficient)  railroad  regulatory
system  that  had developed  higgledy-piggledy  over the  years  would  probably
59  We will discuss  trucking  deregulation  below.- 51 -
unravel  because  rail  prices  would  be unsustainable.
Political  factors  were only slightly  less  important. During  the
1970s  there  was a general  ideological  movement  toward  less  government
intervention  in the  economy,  a  movement  that  was greatly  strengthened  by the
initial  success  of airline  deregulation  in  1978.  In addition,  it is likely
that the  cumulative  effect  of economic  analyses  very critical  of railroad
regulation  affected  public  thinking  and  legislative  attitudes  toward  rail
regulation  (Derthick  and  Quirk,  1985).
The  economic  and  political  pressures  for  deregulation  led  to
passage  of the  Staggers  Rail  Act of 1980 which  was intended  to increase  the
role  of competition  in setting  rates. The  Staggers  Rail  Act partially,  though
not  entirely,  deregulated  rail  transport. The  ICC  continues  to  monitor  rail
traffic  rates,  and  performs  rate  reasonableness  determinations;  however,  under
the  terms  of the  Act, it  may review  rates  only  if a railroad  has a dominant
market  position  and  if the  rate is  above  a certain  percentage  of  variable
costss  if the  rate is  below  a given  percentage,  the ICC  is  not empowered  to
review  it.  Further, commodity  movements  whose  prices  are  set  under
contract 60 are  exempt  from  regulation. 61 Built-ir.  flexibility  allows  rates  to
increase  with inflation  without  review. Very importantly,  the  bill  also  made
it easier  for railroads  to add  or abandon  rail  lines  (trackage)  and  to buy  and
sell  lines  (Asch  and Seneca,  p. 401).
60  Contracts  may involve  railroad  service  requirements  such as timely
delivery  and  use  of specified  types  of rolling  stock;  shipper  obligations
include  guaranteed  volume  and return  carriage.
61  This  is  an important  exemption. Currently,  more than  half of all
railroad  traffic  is shipped  under  a contract  rate (winston,  et al.,  p. 11).- 52 -
Effects  of  Rail  Freight  Deregulation
Many though  not  all  economists  view rail  deregulation  as a
success, 62 if a somewhat  qualified  one.  There  is concern  that  the successes
achieved  in the immediate  post-regulatory  period  may not  be enduring. Those
who do see  significant  deregulatory  gains  generally  view them  as coming  not
from  a general  lowering  of fares 63 but from  elimination  of an inefficient  rate
structure,  improvements  in railroad  operating  efficiency,  improvements  in
timeliness  and  reliability  of rail  service  (Winston  et al.,  pp. 25-29)  and
abandonment  of excess  capacity  (Friedlaender,  1981).
Overall,  shippers  appear  to have  gained  from  deregulation,
although  these  benefits  have not  come  from  lower  rates  but from improvements
in service. However,  there  hae clearly  been  some  redistribution  among
shippers,  and  some shippers  fared  worse  after  deregulation  (Asch  and Seneca,
pp. 404-5;  Winston  et al.,  p. 28).  Despite  fears,  relatively  few  communities
lost rail  service,  in part  because  of new  entry  from  private  haulers  and small
non-union  railroads  (Winston  et al.,  p. 40); those  that  did, still  had access
to truck  transport. Aggregate  gains  to shippers  are  certainly  not  huge; some
67  For  contrasting  views,  compare  T. Gale  Hoore,  'Rail  and  Trucking
Deregulation,"  1986,  and  K.D.  Bover,  'The  Costs  of Price  Regulation:  Lessons
from  Railroad  Deregulation,"  1987.
63  Essentially,  those  who continued  to ship  by rail  prior  to
deregulation  generally  had  a relatively  low  price  elasticity  for  rail
transport,  and  consequently,  welfare  losses  due to elevated  prices  were
modest.- 53 -
estimates  are  extremely  low  or even  negative  (Moore,  1986;  Boyer,  1987)64;
others  are  as large  as a few  billion  dollars  (Winston  et al.).
In contrast,  the  railroads  gained  greatly  from  deregulation.
First,  they  were able to adopt  more rational  pricing  policies,  lowering  rates
to meet  competition  on some  routes  and  commodities  and  raising  them  on others.
(Note  that  there  still  remains  some  ICC  pricing  regulation  in  monopoly
situations.) Second,  deregulation  allowed  the railroads  to increase
efficiency. In part,  this  was the  result  of rail  consolidations,  particularly
"end-to-end'  mergers,  which improve  service  time  and reliability  (Harris  and
Winston,  1983;  Winston  et al.,  1990). Also,  the  railroads  made greater  use  of
hub and  spoke  systems 65 (in  some  cases  involving  truck  transport  to  hubs
(HacDonald,  1989))  for  organizing  shipments  into "unit  trains'  that  allowed
them  to exploit  economies  of density  in hub-to-hub  travel  while  minimizing  the
trackage  necessary  to move feeder  traffic  to the  hubs.  In addition,  and
importantly,  the  railroads  increased  efficiency  by abandoning  excess  capacity,
in some  cases  by the  action  of individual  railroads  and in some  cases  as a
consequence  of railroad  mergers.
Deregulation  also  benefited  the railroads  because  it increased
64  According  to  Winston  et al., 1990,  one  reason  Boyer's  estimate  of
gains  to shippers  is lower  than  theirs  is that  Boyer  focused  on rates  and gave
insufficient  weight  to the  value  of improvements  in service.
65  In a 'hub  and  spoke'  transport  system,  the  total  area to be serviced
is  divided  into regions,  each  of  which  contains  a 'hub."  'Spokes"  are  the
transport  routes  connecting  the  hub  to the  surrounding  localities  in its
region. An item to  be transporx:ed  interregionally  from  point  A to  point  B is
sent first  to  A's regional  hub; th'ere  it is combined  with other  items  destined
for  B's region  and  transported  to B's  regional  hub.  Finally,  it is sent  via
spoke  to point  B.- 54 -
pressure  on the  powerful  railroad  labor  unions  to ease  workrule  constraints
that  had led  to great  inefficiencies  in the  use  of both labor  and  capital
prior  to deregulation. The  efficiency  gains  were not  captured  by the rail
workers. Deregulation  has  not  benefited  rail  workers  in the  short  run.  The
long run  evaluation  is less  clear:  on the  one  hand,  deregulation  may lead  to a
larger  long  run  equilibrium  size for  the  railroad  industry,  implying  a greater
demand  for  rail  workers;  on the  other  hand,  elimination  of featherbedding  and
other  labor-use  inefficiencies  following  deregulation  could  shrink  labor
demand. In addition,  rail  workers  may  also  experience  losses  if deregulation
causes  compensation  to iall  to the  competitive  level  or close  to it. 66
Railroad  employment  has fallen  from  482,731  in 1977  to 301,879  in 1985,  but
the  evidence  suggests  that  this  was not  the result  of deregulation  per se
(Winston  et al.,  p. 40)  but rather  the  result  of long-term  trends  affecting
rail  traffic  and labor  us.
Though  deregulation  has  been at least  a qualified  success  to date,
problems  have surfaced  in the  period  since  deregulation. These  problems  are
illuminating.
Many of the  problems  currently  plaguing  the  rail industry  can  be
grouped  under the  heading  of 'hysteresis  effects" 67 or 'regulatory  legacy
66  Note in this  regard  that  there  is no particular  reason  to affirm  that
rail  workers  are  entitled  to receive  more than  a competitive  level  of
compensation.
67  "Hysteresis"  refers  to  a situation  in  which the  relation  between  two
variables  is  a function  of the  path  by which  one  or both  of the  variables
reached  their  current  values. For  example,  the  relation  between  a person's
current  net  worth and  current  happiness  is almost  certainly  affected  by the
direction  from  which  net  worth reached  its  current  level.- 55 -
effects." An industry's  position  at any  given  time  is  not just a function  of
current  market  conditions,  but  of the  past  as  well; 68 thus,  an industry's
deregulatory  experience  may be profoundly  affected  by its  previous  experience
under  regulation.
The  railroads'  regulatory  legacy  has  dimmed  the  sector's  prospects
for  economic  health. Under  the regulatory  regime,  rail  workers  enjoyed
enormous  bargaining  power  which  they  utilized  to obtain  substantial  pay
premiums  as  well as union  workrules  that  increased  rail  worker  employment. 69
While  there  have  been some reductions  in  workrule-related  inefficiencies  in
the  period  since  deregulation  (Winston  et al.,  p. 40), rail  workers  have
strongly  resisted  reductions  in compensation  and  have succeeded  in blocking
many  workrule  reforms  that  would  have permitted  substantial  cost-savings
(Winston  et al.,  p. 12).  This  has had  the  effect  of weakening  the railroads'
competitive  position  relative  to  motor  transport.
A  second  problematic  regulatory  legacy  is that  the  railroads
remain  undercapitalized,  restricting  their  ability  to make the  investments
necessary  for  competitive  viability. 70 As discussed  above,  in the latter
stages  of regulation,  the railroads  experienced  a financial  crisis. They  were
forced  to underinvest  in track  maintenance  and  in  modern  rolling  stock. As
the  normally  highly  capital  intensive  railroad  industry  entered  the  era  of
68  Hysteresis  effects  on  market  conduct  are  discussed  in  Bradburd  and
Over,  1982.
69  Railroad  workrules  are  often  cited  as extreme  examples  of
featherbedding  and  efficiency-reducing  union  behavior. See  Hildebrand  (1979).
70  Railroads  are still  not  earning  a  normal  return  on capital  (Winston
et al.,  p. 43).- 56  -
inter-modal  competition  following  deregulation,  it  did so  with an outmoded  and
poorly  maintained  capital  stock  and  meager  financial  resources. Another
harmful  legacy  of the  railroads'  weak condition  prior  to and  following
deregulation  is  merger  activity  that  has increased  the  number  of rail  route
monopolies,71  mergers  that  probably  would  not have  been  permitted  absent  the
railroads'  weak financial  condition. 72
Barring  a change  in  circumstances  exogenous  to the  rail industry
such  as a large  increase  in energy  prices  or far  stricter  environmental
controls  on motor  emissions,  the financial  condition  of the railroads  will
remain  fragile,  discouraging  needed  investment  and  encouraging  rail
consolidations  that  will increase  the  extent  of route  monopoly. 7 3
71  There  were 73  Class  I railroads  in  1975 and  only 16 in 1988.  These
16 railroads  operated  822  of the  system  mileage  (Winston  et al.,  p. 11).  The
decline  in  the  number  of railroads  led  to elimination  of competition  on
individual  routes.
72  Although  rail  transport  must compete  with other  transport  modes,  the
relative  cost  advantage  of rail  transport  remains  great  for  shipment  of
commodities,  such  as coal  and  grain,  with low  value  by volume.
73  Economists  concerned  about  rail  monopoly  have suggested  an
alternative  market  structure  under  which  a private  firm  or parastatal  would
own  and  maintain  the  trackage,  functioning  as a common  carrier  for  operators
of rolling  stock. This  would  virtually  eliminate  the  possibility  of route
monopoly  by individual  railroads  and,  barring  collusive  behavior,  the  need to
regulate  rail  tariffs  (Winston  et al.,  1990).
There  are  disadvantages  of such  a system  however. A trackage  common
carrier  would itself  be a  monopoly,  constrained  only  by intermodal
competition. At present,  intenodal competition  would  not constrain  rail
pricing  for  all  commodities. !xi  addition,  given  the  mutual  dependence  of
trackage  and rolling  stock  investment  decisions,  the  coordination  failures  and
opportunism  problems  (Williamson,  1979;  1985)  inherent  in such  a vertically
dis-integrated  system  might  make lead  to underinvesutent  by both the  trackage
common  carrier  and the  owners  of rolling  stock.
If the  trackage  common  carrier  is a parastatal,  an additional  problem
arises  because  trackage  rationalization  and  optimal  provision  of services  are
likely  to require  unequal  investments  in trackage  improvement  across  routes  or
even route  abandonment. The  parastatal's  greater  susceptibility  to political
pressure  may  make this  infeasible.- 57  -
Lessons  from  Railroad  Regulation  and Deregulation
There  are some  clear  lessons  that  emerge  from  railroad  regulation
and  deregulation.  The first  and  foremost  is that  the  very existence  of a
particular  regulatory  system  must be periodically  questionedt  the  conditions
that  ostensibly  led  to railroad  regulation  in  the late  nineteenth  century
changed  dramatically  with the  advent  of  motor  and  air transport  and
improvements  in  water  transport,  yet regulation  continued  and even  expanded  in
scope. Regulation  is  particularly  problematic  when the regulated  industry
competes  with  competitive  industries. The  second  lesson  is that regulation
must have  clearly  articulated  goals.  In the  course  of just  a few  decades,
rail  regulation's  focus  changed  from  regulating  rail  freight  charges  in  order
to protect  shippers  from  monopolistic  exploitation  by railroads  to that  of
trying  to restrict  intermodal  shipping  competition  in a futile  effort  to
protect  all  those  it  had come  to regulate. The  metamorphosis  of railroad
regulation  occurred  in part  because  there  was  no periodic  review  of the
regulatory  goal  and the  role  of regulation  in  attainit.g  it.
A third  lesson,  one that  we have been  stressing,  is that
consumers,  producers  and labor  tend  to acquire  property  rights  in the
regulatory  status  quo,  making  it  very  difficult  to reform  regulatory  systems
even  when they  are  obviously  failing. These  regulatory  property  rights- 58 -
delayed  the advent  of deregulation  and  reduced  its  scope. 74 In light  of this,
regulatory  systems should be initiated only after the most careful analysis,
and  rarely  if  ever in circumstances  in  which the  competitive  environment  is
still  fluid. Regulation  is an inefficient  means  of compensating  those  injured
by changing  technological  and  other  market  conditions.
111.2  Motor  Carrier  Regulation  and  Deregulation
The  Motor  Carrier  Act of 1935 ("MCA"  henceforth)  brought
interstate  motor  carriage  under  the  regulatory  authority  of the ICC.  This
section  examines  the  causes  and  effects  of U.S. regulation  and  deregulation  of
motor  carriage,  or "trucking;"  it is  organized  in the  same  manner  as the
previous  section. Trucking  regulation,  like  rail  regulation,  is an example  of
,regulatory  failure'  in that  it led  to an outcome  worse than laissez-faire.
However,  the  causes  and consequences  of regulatorv  inefficiency  in the  two
sectors  are  not congruent,  and the  U.S. experience  with trucking  regulation
offers  additional  insights  for  the  design  of regulatory  institutions.
Why  Regulate  Trucking?
Motor  carriage  does  not appear  to be an obvious  candidate  for
regulation. There  are few  natural  barriers  to entry  or exit:  economies  of
scale  are  modest;  public  provision  of road  infrastructure  removes  any
74  Even now, the  rail  workers  union  is striving  to require  that short-
line  railroads  adopt  the  costly  and inefficient  union  work rules  that  have
hampered  the  larger  railroads,  and  midwestern  states  have sponsored
legislation  making  trackage  abandonment  more difficult  (Winston  et  al., p.
53).- 59 -
significant  sunk  costs  from  the shoulders  of potential  entrants;  and both
capital  and  expertise  requirements  for  entry  are  quite  low.  Therefore,  even
in small  numbers  cases,  entry  and the  threat  of entry  would  normally  prevent
monopoly  pricing. Why then  regulate?
In the  United  States,  trucking  appears  to have  been regulated
because  the  ICC  could  not successfully  regulate  rail  transport  without  also
regulating  the  competing  transport  modes:  trucking,  air  transport,  pipelines,
and  water transport. 75 Prior  to its regulation,  truck  transport  created
particularly  difficult  problems  for  the  ICC,  because  it  diverted  a significant
amount  of traffic,  including  some  of the  most profitable,  from the  railroads
(Owen  and  Braeutigam,  1978,  p. 166).76
Opposition  to trucking  regulation  was blunted  by the  economic
dislocations  of the  Great  Depression. There  is evidence  that  large  truckers
and shippers  actually  supported  regulation  because  they  hoped  it  would
75  The Emergency  Transportation  Act of 1933,  the  Motor  Carrier  Act of
1935 (MCA)  and  the Transportation  Act  of 1940  were all responses  to
competitive  entry  by other  transport  modes in the  1920's  and to the  effects  of
the  Great  Depression. Here  we focus  on the  MCA.  Asch and Seneca  (1989),  p.
393 ff.  provide  a useful  historical  summary  of this  material. We draw  on it
heavily  in the  material  that  follows.
76  As is frequently  the  case  in regulated  declining-cost  industries,  ICC
regulation  of railroads  incorporated  a pricing  scheme  under  which  differences
in consumers'  willingness  to  pay and/or  elasticities  of demand  were exploited
to satisfy  producer  revenue  requirements.  (See  Baumol  and  Bradford,  1970).
The  difficulty  is that  once  these  differences  in  prices  exist,  it  may be
possible  for  unregulated  firms  to Oskim  the  cream,'  profitably  offering  the
regulated  service  only  to those  customers  designated  as high-price  customers
under  the  regulated  pricing  scheme. In this  situation,  the  regulated  firms
may be in an unsustainable  position,  unable  to survive  by charging  the same
price to all  customers  but  also  unable  to sustain  necessary  price  differences
among  customers  because  of competition  from  cream  skimming  rivals. This
frequently  necessitates  regulatory  restrictions  on entry.- 60 -
stabilize  rates  (Friedlaender,  1969). Presumably,  those  bearing  the  costs  of
such regulation  were either  too  dispersed  to  effectively  oppose  it or  were
unable  to gauge  its  consequences  accurately. Agrarian  interests  did  not
oppose  trucking  regulation  because  agricultural  commodities  were specifically
exempted  from  ICC  trucking  regulation. Private  carriers  (firms  hauling  their
own  goods)  were also  exempted.
How  Vell  Did  Regulation  Function?
The  ICC  had  great  regulatory  power.  The  Motor Carrier  Act of 1935
established  categories  of carriers;  it gave  the  ICC the  authority  to regulate
entry  into trucking  by requiring  common  and contract  carriers  to obtain
operating  licenses  from  the  ICC;  and it also  gave  the ICC  the  authority  to set
maximum  and  minimum  rates  for  conmon  carriers  and  minimum  rates  for  contract
carriers.
ICC regulation  of trucking  was a dismal  failure. The regulatory
power  of the  ICC  was very  quickly  'captured*  by trucking  interests,  and
virtually  the  whole regulatory  apparatus  was structured  so as to produce
enormous  rents  for  a relatively  small  number  of large  trucking  firms  that  had
received  operating  licenses  at the  inception  of regulation,  and  to protect
those  rents  from  erosion  due to  competitive  entry.
ICC trucking  regulation  permitted  rates  to be set  by trucker
dominated  "rate-setting  boards,'  which  effectively  operated  as regional
cartels. Because  they  were  part of the regulatory  apparatus,  the rate-setting
boards  were Lmmune  from  antitrust  enforcement.- 61 -
ICC  procedures  also  acted  as effective  mechanisms  to enforce
cartel  pricing. Trucking  firms  wishing  to change  their  rates  had to file them
in advance  with the  ICC to .1low  competitors  the  opportunity  to protest,  and
the  majority  of protested  rates  were  withdrawn. This  had the  effect  of
eliminating  secret  price  cutting,  the  greatest  threat  to price-fixing
agreements. Even  if the ICC  did  not require  that  the  proposed  rate  be
withdrawn,  the  fact  that  all  competitors  could  match  a  price  cut  before  it
took  effect  clearly  removed  most  of the  incentive  for  cutting  price  in the
first  place (Breyer,  1982,  p. 225).
ICC  regulation  not  only  acted  to  help cartelize  existing  licensed
operators,  it  also erected  almost  insurmountable  barriers  to  new entry.  To
operate  legally,  all  trucking  firms  had to receive  an operating  license  from
the ICC.  Prior  to the  regulatory  reforms  of 1980,  potential  entrants  had  to
make a 'compelling  case'  that  permitting  their  entry  was in the  public
interest;  in effect,  entry  was "guilty  unless  proven  innocent.' Potential
entrants  had to establish  that  existing  service  was inadequate,  which  was
almost  impossible  to  do.  In addition,  under  ICC  regulations,  permission  for
entry  could  be denied  if existing  carriers  made  a case that  entry  would  harm
them  financially  or that they  themselves  would  offer  the  proposed  service
(Winston  et al., Chapter  2).
If a license  was granted  to an operator,  it  was for  a specific- 62 -
route  or a specific  commodity 7 7, making  it  difficult  for  truckers  to respond
flexibly  to changes  in  cost  and demand  conditions. Even  worse,  in one  of the
more Kafkaesque  aspects  of ICC regulation,  new entrants'  routes  were sometimes
deliberately  designed  to be inefficiently  circuitous  so as to  minimize  the
threat  to existing  carriers.
Even the  ICC  administrative  procedures  acted  to the  disadvantage
of small  firms  and\or  new  entrants. Prior  to regulatory  reform,  rate  cases,
entry  cases,  etc.  were  handlec  administratively  in a  manner  similar  to,  or
actually  within,  the  courts. This  was a time  consuming  process,  and
financially  costly  as  well,  because  it required  lawyers,  expert  witnesses,  and
other  trappings  of an adversarial  legal  system. One result  of this  was that
small  firms  found  adjudication  costs  to be a very real  barrier  to dealing  with
the  ICC,  and in  effect,  only  large  firms  had their  views  represented  (Asch  and
Seneca,  1989,  p. 399-400).
The  overall  effect  of trucking  regulation  was to elevate  both
costs  and  prices  substantially  above  competitive  levels  in the  regulated
sector. There  was substantial  static  inefficiency  in the  production  of motor
transport  services  and in  shipper  operations  due  to ICC-imposed  constraints  on
carrier  operations. In addition,  both truckers'  and shippers'  incentives  to
innovate  were stifled. Earlier,  we defined  'regulatory  capture"  as occurring
when the  regulators  adopt  the regulated  entities'  objectives  as their  own: ICC
regulation  appears  to follow  this  pattern.
77  Regular  route  carriers'  had to  actually  follow  a prescribed  route
from  origin  to destination. wIrregular  route  carriers'  could  carry  their
permitted  commodities  from  a prescribed  origin  to a prescribed  destination,
but could  choose  their  own route  (Winston  et a'L.,  Chapter  2).- 63  _
Deregulation  of  Trucking
We have already  discussed  the  general  political  and  econiomic
pressures  that  led  to deregulation  of rail  and trucking  carriage,  including  a
general  ideological  shift  favoring  less  government  regulation,  the
accumulating  weight  of economic  studies  critical  of regulation  and its
effects,  and the  financial  crisis  facing  the railroads.
In the  case  of trucking,  three  other  factors  probably  played  a
role  as  well.  One  was the  energy  inefficiencies  built  into  the  route  and
commodity  restrictions  that  governed  regulated  carriers:  in a period  of great
concern  for  energy  efficiency,  circuitous  routes  and  empty  backhauls  simply
were an embarrassment.  A second  was the  increasing  public  awareness  of the
unsavoriness  of the International  Brotherhood  of Teamsters'  leadership:
unionized  truckers  were strongly  opposed  to deregulation  (as  were the licensed
trucking  firms  themselves)  because  it threatened  the  economic  rents  in  which
they shared 78, and  they  were  a  large  and  well-organized  group  that  had  been
politically  effective  for  some  time;  however,  the  Teamsters'  reputation  at the
time  that  deregulation  became  a salient  issue  made it difficult  for  them  to
rally  public  or legislative  support. A  third  force  favoring  deregulation  was
the  fact  that independent  truckers, shippers,  and  utilities,  all supported
deregulation  (Asch  and  Seneca,  1989,  p. 402)  and  communicated  that to
78 See Thomas G. Moore, 1978, pp.  327-43.- 64  _
legislators.79
The  deregulatory  pressures  culminated  in  passage  of the  Motor
Carrier  Act of 1980,  a sweeping  reform  measure. The  Act substantially  reduced
licensing  barriers  to trucking  entry,  limited  collective  ratemaking
agreements,  and removed  many administrative  restrictions  on rate  setting.
Route  restrictions  were removed,  potential  entrants  no longer  had to prove
public  necessity  for  proposed  services,  and  permits  were to be issued  to
qualified  applicants  unless  there  was a compelling  reason  not to --the latter
a reversal  of the  previous  burden  of proof (Asch  and  Seneca,  1989,  p. 400).
In scm  ways, the  most striking  feature  of trucking  deregulation
is that it did  not occur  earlier. It is important  to  note that  the  ICC's
administrative  complexity  contributed  significantly  to the  delay  of regulatory
reform:  the  extraordinary  degree  of regulatory  misdirection  in the  ICC  was
disguised  by a complex  web of procedures  that  appeared  to guarantee
administrative  fairness  but nctually  protected  the  rents  of a small  group  of
trucking  firms.
Effects  of  Hotor  Carrier  Deregulation
Deregulation  of trucking  has  had some  predictable  effects.
Substantial  entry  has  occurred  (Winston  et  .P  l  . 'Qt  P?.  10-11)  A  the
rents  enjoyed  by labor  and  incumbent  firms  hav  :  (Moore,
79  Many of the shippers  and  utilities  had  a lut-g  vlnancial
interest  in deregulation  to  warrant  individual  political  -ity  on its
behalf.- 65 -
p. 32).  The  change  to a deregulated  environment,  combined  with the  severe
recession  in the  early  nineteen-eighties,  resulted  in a  large  number  of  motor
carrier  bankruptcies  and  mergers. The  extent  to  which  this  was a response  to
more  competitive  pricing  and  a  more vigorous  search  for  operating  efficiencies
rather  than  recession  cannot  be determined  exactly.
As might  be expected  in  a transition  from  a  largely  cost-based
pricing  system  to one in  which  both  demand  and supply  factors  play a role,
some shipping  rates  increased,  while  others  decreased. Competition  through
service/performance  began  to play  a more important  role  as  well, particularly
in the  less-than-truckload  sector. 80
Among  motor  carriers,  the  greatest  losers  were the less-than-
truckload  carriers. This  is  worthy  of note,  because  this  was the  sector
viewed  as most effectively  protected  from  competition  by ICC regulation  prior
to 1980.81
All in all,  deregulation  of  motor  freight  carriage  has led  to  very
significant  welfare  gains.  The  losses  incurred  by LTL  carriers  and  drivers
and  some shippers  were  more than  equalled by the  gains  received  by other
shippers  and  TL carriers. Economists'  estimates  of the total  annual  gain from
deregulation  differ,  but some  are  more than  $15  billion  (Winston  et al.,  p.
80  As the  name implies,  in the  less-than-truckload  sector,  truckers
transported  more than  one shippers'  merchandise  in a single  truck.
81  Even prior  to deregulation,  the  truckload  carriers  faced  substantial
competition  from  private  cirriers. The  TL carriers  were less  effective  at
preventing  rate  competiti. -rior  to deregulation  as  well (Winston  et al.,  pp.
35-37).- 66 -
41).
Lessons  from  Motor  Carriage  Regulation  and  Deregulationt
The clearest  lesson  that  emerges  from  the  above  review  is  that
regulation  of trucking  is socially  inefficient  and  should  not  be attempted  in
the  first  place. But  more general  lessons  also emerge  as to  how to proceed
(and  not  proceed)  with directive  regulation  in sectors  other  than  trucking
where  at least  in principle  such  intervention  offers  the  possiblity  of  welfare
benefits.
The second  lesson,  one that  bears  repeating,  is that  creeping
regulation"  is an ever-constant threat.  Motor  transport was not itself a
sector  in need of regulation;  it  was regulated  in order  to sustain  railroad
regulation. 82 If changes  in exogenous  circumstances  make attaining  some
primary  regulatory  goal difficult  or impracticable  in the  absence  of expanding
the regulatory  apparatus,  regulators'  first  instinct  has  been the  wrong  one--
to consider  regulatory  expansion  rather  than  to reconsider  the  primary  goal.
Suneet  laws  are a  valuable  component  of regulatory  schemes  in this  regard.
The  third  lesson  is a sobering  one.  Regulatory  entitlements  arise
in subtle  ways, and  once  present,  retard  any subsequent  efforts  at regulatory
reform  or deregulation. From their  inception,  regulations  should  be crafted
82 It is interesting  to note in  this regard  that  motor  transport
regulation  was first  initiated  in  the  U.K. for  very simila&  reasons  as it  was
in the U.S.t  rail regulation was not practicable without also regulating
competing  transport  modes,  even  thougl.  these  competing  modes  might  not
themselves  need regulation  (Fleming  and  Button,  1989,  p. 81).- 67 _
to discourage  the  creation  of these  property  rights  in the  regulatory  status
quo.  Motor freight  regulation  functioned  so as to create  and  protect
enormous  rents  for  those  LTL carriers  who had operating  licenses:  potential
entrants  could  be barred  from  receiving  a license  if their  entry  could  be
shown  to  harm an existing  carrier  financially,  which  entry  would be very
likely  to do.  But one  may ask:  Why did  the  ICC function  to protect  existing
licensees? This  was  not  necessary  for  the  protection  of the railroads  or for
attaining  the  other  articulated  regulatory  goals.  The  answer  may  be that  once
the regulations  were in place,  operating  licenses  became  valuable  properties
whose  worth  would  be diminished  if their  owners'  privileged  positions  were not
protected. The  original  licensees  obtained  a  windfall,  but  those  who
purchased  their  licenses  presumably  earned  only  a normal  return;  to allow
entry  at this  point  would destroy  the  value  of an investment  made in  good
faith, 83 and  this  could  easily  be viewed  as  violating  the  standards  of
administrative  fairness.84
The fourth lesson  is that because regulation has the potential to
confer  extremely  large  economic  rents  on various  groups,  the  very size  of
these  rents  can greatly  retard  the  process  of deregulation. If the  original
operating  licenses  were awarded  only for  a set  period,  or if the  regulators
regularly  sold,  auctioned  or gave  away  by lottery  such finite-duration
licenses  to operate,  rents  would  have  been lower  and  there  would  have been far
83 According  to estimates  by Moore (1986),  the  value  of a common
carrier's  operating  license  in 1975  was $398,000  in 1982  dollars;  by 1982  the
value  had fallen  to $15,000.
84  Note  how this  blurs  the  practical  distinction  between  regulatory
misdirection  and  regulatory  capture.- 68 -
less  political  resistance  to  deregulation. 85
The fifth  lesson  is that  enabling  legislation  must be very
carefully  crafted. Articulation  of objectives  that  are  conflicting  and\or
vague  statements  that  might  support  claims  to regulatory  entitlements  are a
sure  recipe  for  regulatory  misdirection. The  U.S. Transportation  Act of 1940,
which formed  part of the  basis  of ICC regulatory  policies,  is  an excellent
case  in point.  The  Act included  a Declaration  of National  Transportation
Policy,  which laid  out  the  following  rate-making  goals:  safe,  adequate,
economical  and  efficient  service;  fair  wages  and equitable  working  conditions;
and the  preservation  of the  inherent  advantage  of each  mode (Asch  and  Seneca,
p. 396).  It also condemned  destructive  competition. The  vagueness  and
inconsistency  of these  goals  played  an important  role  in the  establishment  and
entrenchment  of a Byzantine  regulatory  system,  even though  none  of them  seems
exceptionable  in  and  of itself.
Finally,  the  history  of ICC  transport  regulation  testifies  to the
benefits  of avoiding  administrative  complexity.  Administrative  procedures
need to be structured  so  as not  to create  a  barrier  to entry  or to threaten
the  viability  of smaller  firmst  the  adversarial  and  legalistic  approach
employed  in ICC  hearings  prevented  new  and/or  small  firms  from  exercising
their  full  rights. In regulated  industries,  access  to the  regulatory
apparatus  may be as important  to a  business'  success  and survival  as
production  efficiency  and good  marketing;  simple  and clear  regulations,
85 Unfortunately,  there  is a  potential  disadvantage  of government  capture
of economic  rents  through  auction  licenses  and  other  means:  if such rents  are
large  enough,  they  can  disguise  the  true  budgetary  costs  of the  regulatory
apparatus.- 69  -
elimination  of unnecessary  paperwork  requirements,  expeditious  handling  of
administrative  functions,  and  access  to regulatory  *ombudsmen'  can  all play  an
important  role in  ensuring  that  procedural  fairness  is not  just a fiction.
Last  but certainly  not least,  administrative  simplicity  greatly  facilitates
effective  oversight  and  evaluation  by  making  it  much  harder  to mask regulatory
misdirection  and  capture.
111.3  Airline  Transport  Regulation  and  Deregulation
The  U.S.  Civil  Aeronautics  Act of 1938  established  the  Civil
Aeronautics  Board (CAB)  and  gave  the  CAB  authority  to regulate  interstate
airline  fares,  to regulate  entry  into  the interstate  airline  transport  sector,
and to  provide  subsidies  to  promote  the  industry.
In this  section  we analyze  the  origins  and  consequences  of air
transport  regulation  and  deregulation  in the  United  States,  and derive  some
implications  for  regulatory  policy  planners. As in the  previous  cases  we have
examined,  we will argue  that  the  regulatory  apparatus  evolved  fairly  rapidly
into  a mechanism  whose  objective  function  was  weighted  heavily  toward
protecting  the  economic  rents  of incumbent  regulated  entities,  and  that
directive  regulation  ceased  to be  welfare  enhancing.
Why Regulate  Alrline  Transport?
The  early  motives  for  airline  regulation  differ  from  those  that
led  to  motor  or rail  regulation. In  particular,  air  transport  was viewed  as
an infant  industry  that  merited  government  assistances  air  transport  had- 70 -
obvious  military  applications,  and  there  was also  a link  between  private  air
transport  and  the  U.S.  Postal  System. Nevertheless,  the  CAD  was given  rate
regulation  authority  right  from  the  beginning. It is  probably  correct  to say
that  the  overall  regulatory  goal  was to encourage  the  growth  of the industry
by ensuring  that  suppliers  had adequate  financial  incentives  to provide  air
transport  services  while simultaneously  keeping  fares  low  enough  to  maintain
public  access  to air transport  (Breyer,  1982,  pp. 199-200).
Political-economic  conditions  were strongly  conducive  to the
establishment  of industry-promoting  regulation  of airlines:  the few  firms
involved  in the  air transport  sector  stood  to  gain from  such  regulation;  firms
in  other  transport  sectors  saw  no immediate  gain from  opposing  air  transport's
promotion  because  it  was still  very  much a  nascent  industry;  and for the  same
reason,  whether  or  not it  was regulated  and\or  promoted  was not of great
concern  to  most other  parties.  In addition,  as  we mentioned  earlier,  the
turmoil  of the  Great  Depression  created  a pro-regulatory  political
environment.
If the  objective  was to promote  air  transport,  it is not  obvious
why price  and  entry  regulation  were part of the  program. There  was fear  of
destructive  competition  in the  1930's,  and this  may  have played  a role.
However,  air  transport  in the  1930's,  like  trucking,  was not an obvious
candidate  for  such regulation:  air  transport  was not a natural  monopoly,
infrastructure  was funded  publicly,  and there  were relatively  low  sunk  costs- 71 
and  only  modest  economies  of scale 86 (Breyer,  p. 198).  It is possible  that
the  air  transport  industry  itself  favored  and  encouraged  price regulation,  in
much the  same that  Kolko (1965)  has argued  the  railroads  did.
Unlike  trucking,  for  air transport,  safety  is a  major  concern.
This  is certainly  a  legitimate  reason  for  regulation,  and  one that  perhaps
might  require  limits  on entry. 87 However,  it is  not clear  why prices  would
have tn be regulated  to  promote  safety.
How  Well  Did  Airline  Regulation  Function?
Determining  the  success  of airline  regulation  requires  a clear
statement  of the  regulatory  objectives. It is certainly  true that the  U.S.
air transport  sector  grew rapidly  in the  decades  after  1938,  although  we
cannot  know  how  much of this  can  be attributed  to the  effects  of regulation:
the second  World  War played  a very  powerful  role  in increasing  the  supply  of
personnel  skilled  in aircraft  design,  construction,  flight,  navigation,  and
maintenance;  technical  innovation  led  to declining  costs  of providing  air
transport  services;  and in addition,  secular  trends  in the  economy  greatly
increased  the  demand  for  rapid  long  distance  travel.
86  As in the  case  of trucking,  air transport  is characterized  by
economies  of density  and  perhaps  economies  of scope. It is  very doubtful  that
either  of these  played  a role  in the  decision  to regulate  air travel.
87  There  are  negative  externalities  affecting  safety  that  are  associated
with air  traffic  congestion;  these  could  require  limits  on entry  in some
circumstances. In  addition,  if  the supply  of personnel  to  monitor  safe-
practices  compliance  is fixed,  limits  on entry  might  be optimal  until  the
regulatory  personnel  constraint  is relaxed. As it  happens,  in the  U.S.,
regulation  of airline  safety  is carried  out  by the  Federal  Aviation
Administration,  a separate  agency  from  that  responsible  for  economic
regulation  (Breyer,  p. 199).-.  72 -
CAB regulatory  authority  was not limited  to assisting  in the
development  of air transport. Although  the  other  statutory  goals  of CAB
regulation  were somewhat  vague  and  in some  cases  contradictory 88, they  can
generally  be described  as the  followingt  encouraging  competition,  ensuring
that  carriers  provide  adequate  and efficient  service  at reasonable  prices,
avoiding  'unjust'  price  discrimination,  and  promoting  'sound  economic
conditions"  in  the industry. In addition,  the agency  itself  was expected  to
function  in a procedurally  fair  manner  (Breyer,  Chap.  11).
Air transport  regulation  was less successful  in contributing  to
these  other  regulatory  objectives. Assessments  of the  CAB regulatory
apparatus  range  from  mildly  to blisteringly  critical  (Dempsey,  1990;  Breyer,
Chapter  11).  Let  us begin  with the  goal  of encouraging  competition.
Competitive  forces  operate  through  price  and  quality  rivalry  of incumbent
firms,  through  the  price  and quality  offerings  of new finrs  that  enter  in
response  to  opportunities  for  profit,  and  through  the  threat  imposed  by
potential  entrants. Most of these  competitive  forces  were suppressed  by the
CAB.  In the  period  from  1950  to 1974,  the  CAB  did  not permit  one single  new
airline  to enter  the  market  for  scheduled  airline  service,  despite  receipt  of
almost  eighty  applications  (Breyer,  p. 205).  Even  existing  airlines  were
almost  never  granted  permission  to serve  new routes. Thus,  the  market
discipline  imposed  by actual  and  potential  entry  was eliminated.
88  An example  of contradictory  goals  might  be having  efficient  pricing
and  avoiding  price  discrimination;  depending  upon the time  frame  adopted,
promoting  competition  and  ensuring  that  each  carrier  be able to earn  a profit
if it  operated  efficiently  might  be another  example._ 73  -
Rivalry  between  the  10 to 20 incumbent  licensed  trunk  carriers
might  have provided  sufficient  competition  to the  industry,  but here  too the
CAB acted  to blunt  or distort  its  effect. As mentioned  above,  the  CAB almost
never  allowed  the incumbent  airlines  to invade  each others'  routes. In
addition,  i'ts  rate setting  policies 89 effectively  prevented  price  competition.
All of this suggests  regulatory  misdirection  if not  capture. The
CAB appeared  to  be more concerned  with  protecting  the  existing  competitors  in
the  market  rather  than  promoting  air transport  competition.
Interestingly,  the  CAB  did  not  attempt  to regulate  non-price
competition  that  took  place  within  the  constraints  of CAB route  assignments.
Even simple  models  such  as Chamberlin's  monopolistic  competition  mcdel
adequately  predict  the  consequence. With prices  held fixed  and 'entry"
permitted  in the  form  of greater  number  of flights  per route,  the  licensed
carriers  increased  capacity  to the  point  where  many planes  were flying  less
than  half-full. Other  forms  of  non-price  competition  also flourished,
including  provision  of lavish  food,  in-flight  entertainment,  and
extraordinarily  flexible  and forgiving  reservation  systems  (Breyer,  pp. 200-
206).  The result:  service  competition  exhausted  the  potential  profits.
89 One requirement  was that  carriers  had to submit  price  changes  to the
CAB  one  month  in advance  of their  taking  effect. This  was to allow  time  for
rivals  to file  challenges  and/or  for  the  CAB  to give regulatory  approval  or
denial;  in the  event  the  competitor  challenge  was plausible,  the  CAB  had to
suspend  the  new tariff. The transaction  costs  of requesting  a fare  decrease
combined  with the  unlikelihood  of its  receiving  approval  significantly  reduced
the incentives  for  fare  cutting. In  addition,  the  pre-notification  of the
rival  meant  that the  rival  could  respond  to the  price  cut  before  it took
effect,  substantially  reducing  the  benefit  from  the  price  cut (Breyer,  p.
210).- 74  -
Events  in 197190  suggest  that the  CAB's  failure  to regulate  non-price
competition  was not the result  of a positive  desire  for  such  competition  but
instead  the  consequence  of its  inability  to convince  the  carriers  to eschew
service  competition.
The  outcome  of this  system  was almost  certainly  inefficient  (if,
as discussed  below,  perhaps  not to the  point  of regulatory  failure). Because
the  services  provided  by airlines  in the  course  of their  quality  competition
all  had some  value  to consumers  (else  they  would  not  have been  vehicles  of
competition)  it is  difficult  to say  with certainty  that  the  service/price
equilibrium  reflected  excessive  levels  of both.  However,  revealed  consumer
preferences  do offer  fairly  convincing  evidence:  when consumers  were offered
lower-fare  no-frills  flights  following  deregulation  (or  in  unregulated
intrastate  travel  prior  to deregulation)  they  chose  them  in preference  to high
service/price  offerings  (Breyer,  p. 205).  If consumers'  marginal  valuation  of
service  was lower  than its  marginal  cost,  which  appears  to  be the  case,  the
regulated  outcome  was by definition  allocatively  inefficient. It is less
clear  that  airlines  were inefficient  in the  production  of airline  services,
i.e.  technically  inefficient,  but the  lack  of competitive  pressures  makes  it
rather  likely  to be the  case (Breyer,  p. 206).
Finally,  there  is strong  evidence  that  the  CAB  did  not function  in
a procedurally  fair  manner. In particular,  its  practice  of denying  entry
opportunities  to  new airlines  and its  method  of doing  so both  seem
90  In 1971  the  CAB permitted  the  licensed  carriers  to establish
agreements  restricting  the  number  of flights  on routes;  these  did succeed  in
reducing  excess  capacity,  but  did  not r-'ult  in lower  fares.- 75 -
inconsistent  with reasonable  standards  of regulatory  fairness  (Breyer,pp,  206-
209).
By the  mid-1970s  it  was  widely  apparent  that airline  regulation
was not functioning  as it should. Calls  for  deregulation  became  common,  and
the  Carter  administration's  choice  of Alfred  Kahn,  a strong  critic  of CAB
regulation,  to head the  CAB led  further  impetus  for  airline  deregulation. By
1977,  the  CAB  was relaxing  restrictions  of entry,  and in 1978  the  Airline
Deregulation  Act was  passed,  removing  most price  and  entry  restrictions  and
abolishing  the  CAB as of January  1985 (Kaplan,  1986,  pp.  50-51). Given  CAB
behavior,  for  all intents  and  purposes,  airline  deregulation  began  in 1977  or
1978.  Authority  for  regulating  airline  mergers  was transferred  to the
Department  of Transportation  effective  December  31,  1984  and to  the Department
of Justice  in 1989.
Effects  of Airline  Deregulations
Early  assessments  of airline  deregulation  tended  to be  very
positive. In the  early  years  of deregulation,  there  was a flurry  of new
entry,  and fares  fell  dramatically  (U.S.  General  Accounting  Office,  1985;
Dempsey,  1990,  pp. 1-5).  New  entrants  offered  low  cost "no-frills"  service
that  was extremely  popular; entrants'  share  of the  market  rose  dramatically,
and  established  airlines  responded  by cutting  prices  on full-service  flights
and by offering  more attractive  service\price  combinations  to consumers.
Airline  deregulation  was viewed  so positively  that  it played  a  significant
role in encouraging  deregulatory  legislation  affecting  many types  of
regulation  governing  diverse  sectors  of the  U.S.  economy.- 76 -
With the  passage  of time,  airline  deregulation  no longer  receives
ubiquitous  support. Some  of those  who have studied  airline  deregulation
remain  quite  positive  (Kahn,  1988;  Morrison  and  Winston,  1990)  while  others
feel  that it  has  already  led  to an outcome  worse  than the  regulatory  outcome,
or that  conditions  are  evolving  in a  way that  will  cause  this to  be true in
the  future  (Dempsey,  1990;  Brenner,  1988).91
Essentially,  the  issue  here  has to do  with the  contestability  of
the  air  travel  market  and  with airline  merger  policy. In the later  1970s  and
early  1980s,  economists  (and  those  they influenced)  viewed  air t)ansport  as a
*contestable  market,"  that is,  one in  which  there  were few  or  no sunk  costs
and  no significant  economies  of scale  (Kahn,  1988). Such conditions  imply
that  new competitors  can  enter  the  market  any  time  price  is above  marginal
cost,  and this,  by extension,  implies  that  even if  a route  has few  existing
firms,  or even  only  one,  the firms  have  no market  power,  and that  the
allocatively  efficient  outcome  will occur. Clearly,  under  such  conditions,
there  is no welfare  gain  from  regulating  airline  mergers,  and in fact,  the
U.S.  Department  of Transportation  (DOT)  approved  every  single  airline  merger
submitted  to it  after  December  31,  1984  when it assumed  responsibility  for
merger  oversight  (Dempsey,  1990,  p. 13),  even though  the  U.S. Department  of
Justice  recomnended  against  many  mergers  on the  grounds  that  they  would  prove
91  In fairness  to early  advocates  of deregulation,  it is important  to
note that  current  critics  of deregulation  do not  appear  to  be using  an
appropriate  counterfactual  with  which to compare  the  present  situation. CAB
regulation  was failing,  and  we do  not  know  how it  would  have changed  had
deregulation  not occurred. If the  history  of the  ICC  is any guide,  the
changes  probably  would  not  have been  fortuitous.- 77 -
anticompetitive.92
In retrospect,  the  air  travel  market  has  not proven  to be a
perfectly  contestable  one.  Several  factors  intervene,  and  most carry  lessons
for  deregulatory  programs. First,  many important  airports  are operating  at
capacity,  with all  desirable  landing  and takeoff  slots  already  allocated  to
existing  carriers. There  is  consequently  a significant  entry  barrier  because
entrants  must in effect  acquire  a slot  from  their  future  rival.
Second,  providing  air  travel  service  requires  more than  just  a
plane  and  a landing  slot,  and there  can  be significant  sunk  costs  in
establishing  ground  support  services,  reservation  systems,  and  marketing
efforts.
Third,  the  hub-and-spoke  system  adopted  by large  carriers
following  deregulation,  though  efficient,  also  offers  established  carriers  the
opportunity  to cluster  flights  around  those  of  would-be  competitors  so that
their  every  flight  faces  significant  competition.
A fourth  problem  is that  the  airline  computer  reservation  systems,
93 which  have become  almost  indispensable  to  air travellers  and travel  agents
92 The  U.S. Department  of Justice  assumed  responsibility  for  overseeing
merger  activity  on January  1, 1989,  and  has  more vigorously  regulated  airline
merger  activity  than  the  DOT.  However,  this  may be a case  of shutting  the
barn door after  the  horses  have left.
93  Without  them,  information  search  is simply  too  costly  to be practical,
particularly  in a system  in  which  there  are frequent  fare  changes. According
to Brenner (1988),  in 1988 there  were on average  40,000  daily  changes  in
airline  faresl- 78 -
are  owned  by  major airlines,  giving  them  an advantage  in selling  tickets. 94
The systems  can  be biased  to favor  one  airline  over  another  when route/fare
information  requests  are  made;  equally  important,  they  can  also  be used to
track  fares,  scheduled  flight  offerings  and ticket  sales,  allowing  the  owning
airlines  to determine  just  where to offer  discounts  so as to disadvantage
rivals  (Asch  and  Seneca,  p. 407).
Finally,  the largest  airlines  have substantially  increased  their
relative  advantage  over rival  firms  and  potential  entrants  through  widespread
use of "incentive  schemes"  such  as frequent  flier  programs  and travel  agent
bonus  systems. Airlines'  frequent  flier  programs  offer  travellers  free  or
discounted  travel  (including  car  rentals,  overnight  accommodations,  etc.)  if
they  accumulate  various  threshold  levels  of travelled  miles  on a particular
airline. Accumulating  small  amounts  of frequent  flier  miles on  many airlines
is  not as advantageous  to the  traveller  as concentrating  frequent  flier  miles
on one  airline;  consequently,  even  where fliers  might  find  a particular
fare/service  offering  by a small  or new  airline  to  be more attractive  than  a
large  incumbent's  offering,  the  difference  in the  value  of the frequent  flier
points  may tip  the  overall  advantage  to the  latter. A similar  mechanism
operates  in the  case  of travel  agent  bonus  schemes.
Ordinarily,  we might  not  expect  such  incentive  schemes  to  have
very  powerful  effects;  however,  two factors  operate  to  make their  effect
stronger  than  normal. Many of the  schemes  offer  rewards  that  increase  ron-
94 The  two largest  reservation  systems,  which  together  account  for  over
90?  of tickets  sold,  are  wholly  or partly  owned  by the  two largest  airlines,
United  and  American  (Dempsey,  1990,  p. 22).- 79  -
linearly  with "mileage  points." This increases  the relative  benefits  of
concentrating  travel  in one  or a few  airlines. Also,  because  there  is
imperfect  information  regarding  fares.  schedules,  etc.,  opportunities  exist
for  travel  agents  and/or  business  travellers  to select  the  airline/flight  that
benefits  them rather  than the  ultimate  payer  of the fare.  This  principal-
agent  problem  distorts  the relative  weights  that  would  ordinarily  be given  to
fares  and  mileage  points,  and functions  to increase  the  power  of the  incentive
schemes.
These  five  factors  together  give  large  incumbent  airlines  a
substantial  advantage  over smaller  and/or  newer  firms. In consequence,  what
was thought  to be a contestable  market  is  not.  Consistent  with the  hypothesis
that  air  travel  is  not a contestable  market,  studies  have found  that  decreases
in competition  lead  to increases  in fares (Morrison  and  Winston,  1990).95
The  DOT's  airline  merger  policies,  perfectly  sensible  in the
context  of contestable  markets,  are  not so  clearly  appropriate  under  the
actual  conditions  in the  market. The increases  in  market  concentratio.  since
the  period  immediately  following  deregulation--nationally,  and at  many
important  hubs (Brenner,  1988;  Dempeey,  1990)--suggest  that the  long  run
consumer  gains  from  airline  deregulation  may be substantially  less than  they
95  In the  very early  days  of deregulation,  there  was a enormous  amount
of  very visible  entry  into  the  airline  travel  market,  and this  appears  to  have
masked  the true  conditions  in the  market. Over  time,  the  advantages  of the
large  firm  have  had their  effect,  and  most of the firms  that  entered
following  deregulation  have since  gone  bankrupt  or  have averted  bankruptcy  by
being  acquired  by other  airlines. Since  deregulation,  200 airlines  have  gone
bankrupt,  and  only 74  carriers  remained  as of  early  1990 (Dempsey,  1990,  p.
11).- 80  -
originally  appeared  -o  be. 96 Airline  concentration  is  now similar  to  what it
was prior  to deregulation:  the  difference  is that the  market  is  no longer
regulated  (Dempsey,  pp. 16-21).
In assessing  airline  deregulation,  we must be careful  to avoid
focusing  on whether  it  has led  to lower  fares  (increased  consumer  surplus)  but
instead  consider  whether  it  has increased  total  surplus. 97 Even if  post-
deregulation  fares  are  higher,  efficiency  gains  may cause  total  surplus  to  be
greater.  Therefore,  a correct  evaluation  must examine  fares,  airline
profitability,  labor  gains  or losses,  and  gains  or losses  of other  parties.
Assessments  of the  consumer  benefits  of airline  deregulation
differ. Some studies  (Dempsey,  1990)  argue  that fares  are currently  on
average  higher  than  they  would  have  been  under  the  old regulatory  system.
Other,  more sophisticated  studies,  argue  that  fares  are lower  (Morrison  and
Winston,  1990). All agree  that fares  between  distant  large  cities  are lower
than  they  would  have been,  particularly  for  those  travellers  with flexible
schedules;  howe,-er,  many fares  between  smaller  and/or  less  distant
destinations  are  higher,  as are fares  on some  routes  fir  travellers  with
infl  .ible  schedules. There  has  clearly  been  a redistribution  of surplus
among  passe-gers. Fares  are  not the  only  factor  affecting  consumers. Travel
delays  caused  by greater  airport  congestion  at major  hubs  have probably
increased  the  less-easily  measured  costs  of travel,  and  these  costs  should  be
96  The iragile  health  of  many airlines  (Dempsey,  1990,  pp.  10-11)
suggests  that further  increases  in concentration  are  not  unlikely.
97  Dempsey's  (1990)  negatie evaluation  of the  effects  of deregulation
focuses  on fares.- 81 -
subtracted  from  gain  calculations. 98
The airlines  themselves  have not fared  very  well since
deregulation.  However,  we do  not  know the  counterfactualt  the  U.S. Federal
Trade  Commission's  study  of airline  deregulation  concluded  that it  had the
effect  of raising  profitability  relative  to the  counterfactual  (FTC,  1988,  p.
10);  others  (Dempsey,  1990)  have claimed  it  has lowered  profitability. It
does  not appear  that  deregulation  has simply  involved  a redistribution  from
consumers  to producers. The increased  use of hub-and-spoke  systems  has  almos.
certainly  led  to reduced  direct  costs  of air  travel,  and  this ehould  count
among  the deregulatory  gains.
Airline  labor  has  almost  certainly  suffered  losses  as a result  of
dexegulation. Due to the  more  competit  - environment  following  deregulation,
and the  fact  that  many of thi  new  entrants  to the  market  used  non-union  labor,
unions  were forced  to  make salary  and  workrule  concessions  (Hawk,  1989,  p.
271).  As in the  case of trucking,  however,  we may appropriately  ask  whether
preservation  of above-competitive  wages in  an industry  should  be a
desideratum
Interestingly,  travel  agents  appear  to have  benefited  from
deregulation. Commissions  were  e Eectively  deregulated  when the  airlines
were, and  as -ach  airline  made  efforts  to inducs  travel  agents  to book
customers'  flights  on its flights,  average  commissions  increased  dramatically
98  Even  here the issues  are  clouded. Air travel  has increased
dramatically  since  deregulation  (Hawk,  1989).  This in itself  would  increase
congestion  and  delays,  and  therefore  it is  difficult  to asses  deregulation's
contribution  to increased  delays.- 82  -
(Hawk,  1989,  p.  288).
All  this  raises a very interesting question.  If there were
increases  in total  surplus  consequent  to deregulation,  where  did they  go?
Consumers  as a group  enjoyed  only  modest  gains;  labor  suffered  losses;  travel
agents  gained,  but  this is  only  a modest  absolute  amount;  and  airlines  profits
appear  not to  have increased  substantially.  One  possible  answer  is that
deregulation  did  lead  to gains,  but they  are  modest. hnother  possible  answer
is that  gains  occurred,  but they  are difficult  to measure,  in large  part
because  of the  difficulties  of measuring  profits. If  airlines  recapitalized
folloding  deregulation  and increased  their  debt/equity  ratios  in the  process,
measured  profitability  would  be depressed  by the increased  interest  payments,
even if deregulation  had  caused  an increase  in *real profitability.
There  is controversy  over  whether  airline  safety  has decli.ed
since  deregulation. Some  claim  that safety  has dropped  as a result  of the
greater  financial  pressures  faced  by airlines  (Dempsey,  1990),  while others
have  argued  that  deregulation  has  improved  air  safety  (FTC,  1988,  pp. 86-
87).99  It is diffic-l1t  to  make comparative  assessments  of safety  before  and
after  deregulation,  however,  because  although  they  occurred  independently,
deregulation  coincided  with significant  personnel  reductions  and  turnover
among  air traffic  controllers. Total  airline  departures  have also increased.
The  safety  issue,  though  Puroly  an important  one, is therefore  unresolved.
99  With somewhat  reduced  constraints  on satry  into  new routes  under
deregulation,  incentives  to improvo  safety  could  conceivably  be enhanced  if
airline.'  safety  reputations  became  Important  in  marketing. LufthLnsa,  which
otrosses  the  noness  of its  planes  in its  advertilaments,  io an ezample  of
this.- 83 -
Lessons  from  Airline  Regulation  and  Deregulations
There  are  several  lessons  tihat  emerge  from  analyzing  airline
regulation  and  deregulation. The first  lesson  derives  from  the  fact  that
within  a relatively  short  time following  regulation,  the  CAB  acted  to protect
the  interestr  of a relatively  small  group  of incumbent  competitors,  not to
encourage  the  process  of competition. Regulatory  misdirection  clearly
occurred  in the  airline  industry,  as it did in  other  industries  we have
examined,  supporting  the  view that  this  behavior  should  not  be unexpected. 100
Hawk (1989)  and  many others  have argued  persuasively  that  the
extent  of  mergers  following  deregulation  has imperiled  the  gains (relative  to
the  regulated  outcome)  achieved  early  in  the  deregulatory  era.  The lesson
here is that  dismantling  of an industry-specific  regulatory  apparatus  should
not be accompanied  by an unwillingness  to apply  whatever  general  antitrust
regulation  governs  the  rest  of the  economy. 10 1 Producers  in regulated
industries  are frequently  exempt  from the  limits  on behavior  ordinarily
100  With demand  growing,  and  entry  of new firms  blocked  by the  CAB,  one
might  have expected  airline  industry  to have  earned  above  normal  returns. But
this  was not the  case in  airlines,  just as it  was not the  case  for railroads.
In effect,  economic  rents  were dissipated  through  forms  of competition  the
regulators  could  not control,  and  also as a result  of rent  capture  by labor
and  politically  powerful  3roups  of consumers. (As  was true  in the  case of
railroads,  airlines  were unabie  to  erit from  unprofitable  routes,  typically
small  communities  that  did  not generate  sufficient  business  to  warrant
frequent  service.)  The  airline  experience  suggests  that  comparing  producer
profitability  prior  to and  following  deregulation  is  not likely  to be very
informative  as a  measure  of either  regulatory  capture  or the  efficacy  of
regulation  in limiting  allocative  inefficiency.
101  Recall  that  our list  of recommended  antitrust  enforcement  activities
included  regulating  horizontal  mergers  in concentrated  non-trade@bles  markets
and also  prosecuting  price-fixing  agreements.- 84 -
imposed by antitrust.  There is no  reason  for this to persist after
deregulation,  however. In fact,  because  cooperative  behavior,  once
established,  tends  to persist,  the  collaborative  behavior  that is fostered
under  regulation  may  well extend  into  the  deregulated  environment,  suggesting
the  need for  vigilant  antitrust  enforcement  (Bradburd  and  Over,  1982).  This
is yet  another  hysteresis  effect  of regulation.
The  third  lesson  is that  deregulation  requires  careful  analysis  of
the  role  of various  economic  institutions  in the  regulated  market,  and that
successful  deregulation  may in some  cases  require  adjustments  in firms'  asset
ownership  patterns. As we have seen  in the  case  of the  airline  industry,  new
entrants  have to overcome  many advantages  enjoyed  by incumbent  firms.  In the
current  case,  these  include,  but  are  not limited  to,  the  large  airlines'
ownership  of computer  reservation  systems,  the  effects  of frequent  flier  and
travel  agent  incentive  schemes,  and  the  fact  that the  incumbent  airlines  own
the  landing  and  takeoff  slots  at airports. In the  case of landing  and  takeoff
slots,  for  example,  it  would clearly  be preferable  for  airports  to auction  off
temporary  rights  to landing  slots  rather  than  give  them  out on the  basis  of
'grandfathering"  as  has been  done in  many important  U.S. airports  (Hawk,  1939,
pp.  277-8). This  would  not only increase  the  efficiency  with which slots  are
used,  but  would  also remove  an important  impediment  to entry.  (One  might  well
ask the  rationale  for  grandfathering  of slots;  as so frequently  occurs  under
regulation,  it  would  appear  to be regulated  eutities'  property  rights  in the
status  quo.)
A final  lesson  conceriis  the  relation  between  regulatory
inefficiency  and  market  complexity. Stephen  Breyer  (1982,  pp. l96-99),  has- 85 -
argued  that  the airline  industry  was just  too  complicated  to regulate
effectively. Breyer  maintains  that  if it is  hard to regulate  electricity
production,  a single  homogeneous  product  produced  by a  monopolistic  firm  under
a relatively  constant  technology,  one  would  expect  it to be next to impossible
to  properly  regulate  air transport,  involving  as it does  many competitors,
hundreds  or thousands  of routes  each  with its  own demand  and  cost
characteristics,  and  changing  technology. The  airline  industry  is certainly
complex,  but it is  by no means  the  most complex  of industries. The  experience
of CAB airline  regulation  suggests  that  there  is only a limited  set  of
economic  activities  with fair  prospects  for  successful  traditional  regulation.
Recently,  there  have  been calls  for  re-regulation  of airline
transport. These  calls  have  come  partly  (and  predictably)  from  those  who have
experienced  losses  due  to deregulations  airline  labor  groups,  communities  that
have suffered  reduced  service,  business  traveilers,  and  travellers  on the less
densely  travelled  and served  routes. They  have  also  come from those  concerned
with the  evolution  of deregulated  monopoly. However,  we should  be wary of
pleas  for  re-regulation.  Those  who seek  regulation  (and  re-regulation)
frequently  make  mental  comparisons  between  an imperfect  market  and  perfect
regulation;  the regulatory  functioning  of the  CAB  was anything  but perfect,
and there  is no particular  reason  to believe  that 'new,  regulation  would
function  any  better  than  the  old.
Replacing  directive  regulation  with antitrust  regulation  may  not
yield  the  competitive  optimum,  but it is still  likely  to yield  a superior
outcome. If airport  landing  slot  rights  (for  finite  periods  of short
duration)  were allocated  to airlines  through  auction,  horizontal  mergers- 86 
creating  route  monopolies  regulated  through  antitrust, 102 and  perhaps  vertical
ties  between  airlines  and travel  agents  severed,  the  market  should  function  in
a reasonably  competitive  fashion. And of course,  there  would be far  fewer
opportunities  for  regulatory  misdirection  and  government  limitations  on the
power  of competitive  forces.
111.4  Telephone  Communications  Regulation  and  Deregulation 103
Telepnone  regulation  may be seen  as a system  that functioned  with
moderate  success  for  an extended  period,  but  that  gradually  became  too
difficult  to  maintain,  in  part due  to changing  technologies  and in  part due  to
the  cumulative  effects  of regulatory  decisions  that  undermined  the regulatory
system. We discuss  the  forces  leading  to telephone  regulation  in the  U.S.,
and  provide  an evaluation  of how  well the  regulatory  system  functioned. We
follow  this  with an analysis  of the  factors  leading  to the  partial
deregulation  of telephony  and  an assessment  of the  deregulatory  program. We
conclude  with the  policy  implications  of the  U.s. experience  with telephone
regulation  and deregulation.
We will argue  that  the  partial  deregulation  of the  19708  and 80s
have been  welfare  improving. Uncertainty  about  trends  in technology  and
competitive  conditions  suggest  that  neither  greater  deregulation  nor
reregulation  is likely  to be  welfare  improving  in the short  run.  However,  it
102 It  would  be difficult  to effectively  regulate  the  use  of incentive
schemes  for  travel  agents  and  frequent  fliers.
103  The  historical  material  in this  section  relies  heavily  on three
sources:  Asch and  Seneca  (1989),  pp. 411-434;  Breyer  (1982),  pp.  285-314;
Horwitz  (1989)  pp. 221-263.- 87 -
is  clear  that in  the long  run,  the  growing  product  and  process  complexity  of
the  market  will  make telephony  less  and  less  well-suited  for  traditional  rate-
and-entry  regulation.
Why Regulate  Telephone  Communications?
We limit  our  discussion  of the  telephone  communication  industry  to
the  provision  of telecommunications  services  among  households  and firms--
telephony. The  cost  conditions  of telephony  during  the  first  half of this
century  made it a classic  case  of natural  monopoly. The  marginal  costs  of
telephony  are quite  low,  but there  are  very  high fixed  costs  for
infrastructure--primarily  switching  systems  and transmission  lines. The
resulting  significant  economies  of scale  and  of density  made it inefficiunt  to
have two  or  more competing  firms  each  with its  own infrastructure.  The
quantity  and  variety  of signals  that  can  be carried  on telephone  equipment  is
such  that the  industry  appears  also  to be characterized  by economies  of
scope.104
Not  all  natural  monopolies  should  be regulated:  in some  cases,  the
market  is too  small  to  warrant  establishinrg  a regulatory  apparatus;  in others,
elastic  industry  demand  offers  the  monopolist  little  power  to capitalize  on a
its  position. Neither  of these  holds  true  in the  case  of telephony,  a vitally
important  industry  where  limited  substitution  possibilities  make the
elasticity  of demand  fairly  low.  On economic  grounds,  demand  and  cost
104Economies  of scope  describe  a situation  in  which a single  multiple-
product  firm  can supply  a group  of useful  goods\services  at lower  cost  than is
possible  with  multiple  single-product  firms.- 88  -
conditions  made and  make telephony  at least  a  plausible  candidate  for  classic
rate  of return  regulation.
Political  factors  may also  play a role in the  decision  to regulate
industries,  and as the  history  of telephone  regulation  indicates,  clearly  did
so in this  case.  'Affordable*  access  to a local  telephone  network  came to be
viewed  as an important  political/social  goal relatively  early  in telephony's
history. Price  and  entry  regulation  offered  a means  first  of promoting
"universal"  access--an  important  economic  and  political  externality--and
second  of subsidizing  users  of local  services--called  POTS for  plain  old
telephone  service.
Modern  telephone  systems  consist  of collections  of  neighboring
homes  and  businesses  connected  to  a local  switching  office. Switching  offices
are  connected  in community  and regional  networks. Finally,  the  regional
networks  are interconnected  into  national  and international  systems.
Telephone  service  in the  U.S.  was originally  provided  by local
operating  companies  whose (region-based)  markets  in the  main did  not
interconnect.  American  Telephone  and  Telegraph  (AT&T)  was formed  in 1885  as a
subsidiary  of  American  Bell,  and  we might  usefully  think  of the  telephone
system  from that  point  as consisting  of Bell operating  companies,  providing
POTS  and regional  service,  interconnected  through  Bell's  subsidiary  AT&T to
provide  long  distance  service.1 05
105  This is a simplification  of the  true  industry  structure. We are
ignoring  the  independent  or "non-Bellw  local  operating  companies,  whose
numbers  have at times  been  very large  but  whose importance  dwindled  over time;
we are  also ignoring  the  non-Bell  companies  providing  private-line  service  and- 89 -
Initially,  telephone  services  were regulated  by the states,  but
two  constraints  on state  regulators  coincided  to render  this  regulation
ineffective:  first,  the states  did  not  have jurisdiction  over interstate
telephony;  and second,  the  same  equipment  was used for  both local  and long-
distance  telephony,  and state  regulators  had  too little  information  and
expertise  to allocate  these  joint  costs  between  the  two  activities. In  part,
the  latter  problem  was due  to AT&T's  refusal  to provide  the  regulatork 
allocation  of the  joint  costs. However,  this  was not  a simple  case  of
information  asymmetry:  allocating  common  costs  in  multiproduct  firms  is not a
trivial  problem,  and it  is rendered  even  more difficult  when economies  of
scale,  density,  and scope  are  present  (Baumol,  Panzar  and  Willig,  1982).
In 1934  the  U.S. Congress  passed  the  Communications  Act of 1934,
creating  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  (FCC)  and  empowering  it to
regulate  both rates  and  entry  for interstate  telephony  while state  commissions
retained  intrastate  entry  and rate  setting  authority. This  was a critical
juncture  in the  history  of telephone  regulation:  With the  regulatory
responsibilities  now divided  in this  way, some  allocation  of joint  costs
between  local  and long-distance  service  was now  unavoidable.
Consistent  with the goal  of offering  affordable  access  to local  telephone
services,  the  joint-cost  allocation  process  disproportionately  assigned  joint
costs  to long  distance  service. Witt long  distance  rates  set  on the  basis  of
too-high  an assessment  of costs,  and  local  rates  on too-low  an assessment  of
costs,  local  telephone  service  was effectively  subsidized  by long  distance
general  long  distance  service. The importance  of the latter  increased  greatly
in  the 1970's.- 90  -
service. This  was to have a  profoumd  effect  on telephony  regulation  in the
United  States.
How  Well Did Telephone  Regulation  Function?
In assessing  the success  of regulation,  it is  necessary  as usual
to stress  both the  difficulty  of constructing  a convincing  counterfactual  and
the  importance  of recognizing  that  the  success  of regulation  must be judged  in
light  of its  objectives. The latter  is  particularly  significant  in this
instance,  because  the  importance  attached  to offering  near  universal  access  to
low-cost  residential  local  telephone  service  affected  the  entire  regulatory
system. The  framers  of telephony  regulation  failed  to articulate  guidelines
for  balancing  the  efficiency  promoting  goals  of rate  of return  regulation  with
the  necessary  inefficiencies  of cross  subsidization  strategies.
Whether  because  of or in spite  of regulation,  telephone
communicatione  grew  rapidly  as a sector;  further,  the  quality  of basic  service
was by  world standards  excellent. Regulated  telephony's  contribution  to
dynamic  efficiency  was  notable;  in  particular,  the  output  of basic research
was outstanding. The  record  on product  innovation  was  more  mixeds  the
experience  since  telephone  deregulation  suggests  that  regulation  may have
retarded  the  introduction  of new  products/services.  Without  questien,
regulation  reduced  ths  Bell System's  ability  to extract  surplus  from
consumers,  but  given  Bell's  ability  to devise  and implement  sophisticated
price  discrimination  schemes  in the  absence  of regulation,  it is  not clear
whether  the  extraction  of surplus  would  have  been accompanied  by large  welfare
losses.- 91  -
It is  almost  certainly  the  case that  regulation  led  to allocative
inefficiency  in the  use  of telephony  services. First,  regulatory  agencies
have tended  to be somewhat  unsympathetic  to  non-linear  pricing  schemes,  many
of  which  could  have been  welfare  enhancing. This  may  have occurred  because
such  schemes  rely  on sophisticated  economic  reasoning  with  which some
regulators  are  unfamiliar,  or possibly  because  regulators  may be conditioned
to  believe  that  anything  that increases  producer  revenues  must  make consumers
worse off.
Second,  as noted,  the  price  of local  telephone  service  was set
artificially  low  while that  of long  distance  service  artificially  high,  and
this  distorted  consumption  patterns  in a predictable  manner. Also, rates  for
business  telephone  service  were set  higher  than residential  service,  again  as
a  means  of subsidizing  local  residential  service;  however,  because  business
telephone  use  was bistorically  relatively  price  inelastic,  this  may  not have
produced  significant  welfare  losses. Nevertheless,  the  artificially  high
prices  for  long  distance  and  business  services  almost  certainly  retarded  the
pace of development  and  use of advanced  telephony  services,  creating
significant  welfare  losses  in the  process.
This  cross-subsidiz'ation  was facilitated  by technologically-driven
falling  costs  in all segments  o;'  the industry. It  is  much easler  for
regulators  to shift  the revenue  burden  to a class  of customers  by reducing  the
size  of price  cuts than  by inflicting  disproportionate  price  hikes. 106
1061n  fact,  costs  of providing  long  distance  and  busines services  fell
more rapidly  than  did costs  of providing  resldential  services.- 92  -
'Deregulationb  of  Telephone  Services
Unlike  the three  previous  case studies  we have presented,
telephone  regulation  was  not a  conspicuous  failure,  and  the  deregulation  that
occurred  did  not come  about  in response  to either  general  public  unhappiness
with regulation,  as in the  case  of trucking  and  airlines,  or the financial
failure  of the  regulated  producers,  as in  the  case  of railroads. Rather,  it
was brought  about  by the sometimes  myopic  response  of regulators  to changing
technologies  that for  the first  time  raised  the specter  of substantial  entry
into  telephony.
By the  late  1960's,  microwave  and  satellite  transmission
technologies  made it possible  for  small  firms  to undercut  AT&T's  prices  for
long  distance  services. Initially,  this  took  the form  of large  firms  setting
up "private  line"  services  connecting  field  offices  and  plants. However,  when
Microwave  Covmunicsations,  Inc. (MCI)  sought  permission  to provide  microwave
telecommunication  services  to other  companies  for  a fee,  it ,onfronted  the  FCC
with a dilemma. In effect,  MCI sought  to become  a  telecommunications  carrier,
albeit  a limited  one.
Did the  new technologies  eliminate  the  natural  monopoly
justification  for regulation  of telephony? Or,  did the  new technologies
merely  permit  HCI and  the  other *specialized  common  carriers'  to profitably
enter  the  industry  through  cream-skimming  strategies  that  were contingent  upon
AT&T's  regulator-enforced  high  prices.- 93  -
These  questions  have  not  yet  been definitively  answered. It does
not appear  that  either  FCC  or other  policy-making  bodies  made  much headway  in
answering  these  questions  during  the late  19709  and  early  1980s--the  period  in
which the  deregulatory  debate  took  place. Rather,  events  proceeded  in  an ad
hoc incremental  fashion.
There  is  no evidence  to suggest  that the  FCC intentionally
embarked  on a process  of deregulation  because  it reasoned  that,  given  its
marginal  rate  of substitution  between  cross-subsidization  to obtain
inexpensive  local  service  on the  one-hand  and  willingness  to accept  monopoly
in long  distance  service,  technological  changes  had shifted  the  optimal
equilibrium  toward  less  cross-subsidization  and  more competition. To  iJCC's
movement  toward  deregulation  in response  to technological  change  appears  more
inadvertent.
The  FCC  did recognize  that  AT&T s high  prices  for  long  distance
and  business  services,  and  the  profits  derived  from  them,  were essential  to
the  continued  subsidization  of local  residential  service. It is less  clear
that  it recognized  that  these  high  profits  encouraged  Ocreamskimming'
specialized  common  carriers'  to  enter  the  markets  for  these  very profitable
services,  and  that this  entry,  if it  continued  unchecked,  could  ultimately
reduce  AT&T's  profitability  to the  point  where  the subsidy  to local
residential  service  was no longer  sustainable.
AT&T still  retained  one  crucial  competitive  advantage,  howevert
its specialized  common  carrier  competitors,  though  capable  of skimming  off
business  in  AT&T's  most profitable  market  segments,  still  could  not interlink- 94  -
their  systems  with the  AT&T  network,  and  this  greatly  limited  the  market  for
their  services. Not surprisingly,  AT&T resisted  creating  such  network
connections.
Matters  came  to a  head in 1974  when  MCI sued  AT&T for  damages,
arguing  that  AT&T  had violated  antitrust  laws  in refusing  to allow  MCI to
interconnect  with its  system. The  Justice  Department  filed  an antitrust  suit
as  well,  charging  that  AT&T's  refusal  to interlink  other  microwave  telephony
carriers  with the  Bell system  violated  the  Sherman  Act prohibition  of
monopolization  (Section  2).  This set  the stage  for  the  famous  1982  consent
decree  under  which  AT&T agreed  to divest  itself  of its  local  operating
companies  (and  the  exclusive  right  to interlink  with them)  in return  for  the
right  to enter  the  computer  business. 107 Other  common  carriers  could  now
compete  with AT&T in providing  the  long  distance  links  between  local  operating
comp&nies,  and  MCI, Sprint  and  other  companies  soon  entered  the  market.
Popular  misconceptions  notwithstanding,  the  1982  consent  decree
did  not "deregulate"  telephone  service. The  local  operating  companiesl 08 are
still  regulated  by state  commissions  that  set  rates,  regulate  entry,  and  so
on,  as before,  and local  service  is still  subsidized,  though  to lesser  degree
than  before. And the  FCC continues  to hold  regulatory  authority  over
interstate  long  distance  rates. It  has tended  to view its  role  as standing  by
while  the industry  moves from  monopoly  to oligopoly. Initially,  it chose  tri
allow  the  non-AT&T  common  carriers  to set  their  own rates  in interstate
107  There  were some  other  matters  dealt  v'ith  in the  consent  decree,  but
they  need  uot concorn  us here.
108  Now  called  Local  Access  and  Transport  Areas,  or LATAs.95  _
service,  while  limiting  AT&T's  ability  to  raise  or  lower  rates.  In  the  past
year,  the  FCC  has  relaxed  some  of  the  constraints  on  AT&T pricing  of  long
distance  services,  moving  to  a  "Price  Cap" system  under  which  AT&T can set  its
own fares  subject  to a price  ceiling  set  by the  FCC. While  AT&T  has lost
market  share,  it remains  the  dominant  firm.
The  price  cap  system  now in  place  has the  advantage  of  not
constraining  rivalrous  pricing  (as  do FCC-set  rates)  while still  constraining
AT&T's  ability  to set  monopoly  prices;  it is likely  to lead  to lower  fares,  at
least  in the short  run. A second,  well-known,  advantage  of a price  cap  is
that  because  it  equalizes  marginal  and average  revenue  for  all  prices  above
the  cap, setting  the right  rate  will induce  the  monopolist  to  produce  the
socially  optimal  output. 109
Effects  of Telephone  uDeregulationm
The  partial  deregulation  of telephone  service  did result  in a
reallocation  of the  joint  costs  of long  distance  and  local  telephone  service,
placing  more of the  burden  of the  common  costs  on local  service  and  less  on
long  distance  service. This required  increases  in rates  for local  service.
Although  efficient  pricing  seemed  to suggest  adoption  of a two-part  non-
linear  tariff  with a  higher  access  fee  and lower  marginal  rates,  political
opposition  thwarted  implementation  of this  policy  in most states.
109  The  use of price  ceilings  to optimally  regulate  a monopoly  is
obviously  not a new idea.  The  trick  is to find  the right  price,  and  we thus
return  to the infozzation  i0 %es  addressed  by Stiglits  and Sappington  (1987).- 96 -
We would  have expected  deregulation  to be followed  by large
decreases  in rates  for  long  distance  telephone  services,  both  because  of the
lower  rate  base and  because  of heightened  competition,  and  significant  rate
reduction  certainly  occurred. 110 However,  rates  did fall  not as  much as they
would  have  with full  deregulations  the  FCC  was afraid  that  AT&T  would set
rates  that  would  drive  its  new rivals  out  of business  and therefore  did  not
permit  it to lower  its  long  distance  rates  as  much as it  wished  to.  This
relieved  AT&T's  rivals  of competitive  pressures  to lower  their  rates,  and
consequently  reduced  the  welfare  gains  obtainable  from  moving  closer  to
marginal  coat  pricing;  nevertheless,  long  distance  rates  did  drop,  and
improved  non-linear  pricing  schemes  were permitted  that  have led  to gains  in
allocative  efficiency.
In addition  to improved  pricing  policies  for  existing  services,
the  period  since  the  partial  deregulation  of telephony  has  also  been one  of
significant  product  innovation,  most notably  the  growth  of cellular  telephone
services,  customer  services  such  as call forwarding,  and  a variety  of business
telephony  services. The interfirm  competition  following  partial  deregulation
has apparently  played  a significant  role  in fostering  the  development  of such
services.
As in the  other  instances  of deregulation  we have surveyed,  labor
interests  have on the  whole  been  harmed. AT&T  and the  operating  companies
have laid  off substantial  numbers  of employees  and increases  in  pay  and
110  It is  worth  noting  that  because  of technological  change,  real  prices
of long  distance  telephone  service  were falling  consistently  long  before
deregulation.  See  Asch and  Seneca,  p. 430  for  data.- 97 -
benefits  have been slowed. These  effects  have  been offset  at least  partially
by the  expansion  of (generally)  lower  paying  jobs  with the  new entrants  into
telephony.
In sum,  the limited  telephone  deregulation  that  has occurred  to
date  has  been a  modest  though  not an overwhelming  success. However,  some
recent  regulatory  and  market  developments  suggest  that  the  current  state  of
affairs  is a fluid  one.
As we observed  earlier,  no one  knows  whether  microwave  and
satellite  technologies  are  capable  of transforming  the  industry  into  a
workably  competitive  oligopoly. Mergers  among  the second-tier  common  carriers
and  htints  that  Sprint  may exit the  market  raise  the  issue  of whether  multi-
firm  telephony  will prove  sustainable. However,  other  changes  in the
telephony  market  may  make it very  difficult  to establish  successful
regulation. The range  of telephone  and telephone-related  services  has
increased  greatly  in the  past  decade,  and if the  difficulties  encountered  in
airline  regulation  are any  guide,  a more  complex  telephony  services  market  is
a less  likely  candidate  for  welfare-increasing  regulation. In addition,  ths
pace  of product  and  process  innovation  appears  relatively  rapid  at present,
creating  a difficult  environment  in  which to  establish  and  maintain  a good
regulatory  system.
On the  whole,  the  pace of technological  change  in telephony,
particularly  developments  in  cellular  phone  technology  that  will substantially
lower  capital  requirements  for  entry,  suggests  a  continued  trend  away from  the
natural  monopoly  conditions  of the 50  years  ago.  Full  development  of the  new- 98  -
celluLar  technologies  would  require  adjustments  in,  and  regulition  of,  the
allocation  of broadcast  frequencies,  but this  may occur  in any  event  as the
lines  between  voice,  data,  video  and  audio  transmission  become  blurred.
There  have  been calls  for re-regulation  of the long  distance
telephone  market  recently. However,  barring  a significant  deterioration  of
either  the  level  of service  or the  financial  condition  of those  companies
providing  telephone  services,  AT&T's  continued  opposition  to re-regulation,
along  with that  of the local  operating  companies  and  business  users  of
telephony  services,  makes it  politically  unlikely. At the  same  time,  there
appears  to  be no movement  toward  deregulation  of intrastate  phone service.
This  hytbrid  telephone  system,  partially  regulated  and  partially  deregulated,
may persist  for  some  time.
Lessons  from  Telephone  Deregulation
It is  difficult  to draw lessons  from  the  regulation  and
deregulation  of the telephone  market  because  the  extent  of actual  deregulation
has been limited:  intrastate  service  has  not  been  deregulated,  and  even  within
the supposedly  deregulated  interstate  segment  of the  market,  the  dominant
firm's  rates  have been regulated  for  most of the  post Ideregulationm  period.
Nevertheless,  some lessons  emerge.
Unlike  our  other  case studies,  telephony  does  not appear  to be an
example  of regulatory  failure. This  is  not an insignificant  finding. Thus,
the first  lesson  from  the  telephony  regulation  experience  is  that in the right- 99 _
circ.notances,  regulation  can  t,  welfare  enhancing. 111
The lack  of regulatory  failure  does  not imply  that there  was no
regulatory  irefficiency,  however. Although  regulatory  reform  did  occur,  it
occurred  slowly. Further,  the  fact  that reform  did occur  may say  less  about
the importance  of regulatory  property  rights  as barriers  to  necessary  change
than it does  about  the role  of serendivity  in human  affairs. The initial  FCC
movement  toward  deregulation  appears  to  have been largely  inadvertent;  and  the
confluence  of the  Justice  Department's  involvement  in the  case  and  AT&T's
anxiousness  to enter  the  computer  market  (which  created  the  basis for  the
"settlement"  that  led  to deregulation)  is surely  not to be anticipated  in  most
regulatory  situations.
The second  lesson  is  that regulatory  systems,  like  markets,  must
be capable  of adapting  to changing  technological  and economic  circumstances.
Technclogical  developments  such  as  microwave  transmission  and satellite-based
telephony  can  alter  the  elasticities  of demand  and supply  in  ways that
severely  challenge  regulatory  systems,  or even  call into  existence  the  very
need for  their  existence. Regulatory  enabling  legislation  must have  built
into it  procedures  for  dealing  with fundamental  change. The characteristics
that  make a particular  market  a good  candidate  for  regulation  must be clearly
stated  at the  outset,  and  procedures  established  to  monitor  changes  in these
circumstances  from  within,  and  perhaps  outside,  the  regulatory  agency. There
Ill  It can  be argued  that  telephony  is a special  case  because  there  is
no competition  and  because  demand  is inelastic. However,  caution  is  necessary
here.  While demand  may be inelastic  for  some  services,  it is clearly  not
inelastic  for  all services. Even the  issue  of competition  is clouded  by
private  users'  ability  to use  microwave,  dedicated  line,  or other  technologies
to circumvent  telephone  company  monopoly  power.- 100  -
should  be the  presumption  that  the  occurrence  of certain  changes  would be a
signal  for  deregulation.
At  a  lower  level,  the  regulatory  mechanisms  established
administratively  must also  be sufficiently  flexible  to accommodate  less
fundamental  changes  in technological  and  economic  circumstances  such  as the
modest  year-to-year  changes  in  coats  that  accompany  productivity  growth.
However, .are  too,  there  must be periodic  review  to ensure  that  regulatory
changes  do not  create  a complex  system  whose  component  parts  are  more geared
toward  holding  each other  in check  and in  place  than  in actually  serving  the
original  regulatory  objective.
Third,  as is so clearly  demonstrated  by the  effects  of microwave-
telephony  entry  on FCC telephone  regulation,  regulatory  systems  are frequently
very fragile,  involving  complex  interrelationships  reminiscent  of ecologica
systems:  a modest  change  in one  aspect  of the  environment  can  produce  a
cascade  of effects  that  can  undermine  the  viability  of a  whole system. The
less  transparent  the  objectives  and functioning  of the  regulatory  apparatus,
the  less  easy it is to anticipate  the  systemic  effects  of  modest  alterations
in regulatory  practices  or general  market  conditions,  and  the  more vulnerable
the  whole  process.
A final  lesson  relates  to the  regulatory  weight  placed  on
encouraging  local  residential  access  through  long-distance  and business
telephony  cross-subsidies.  One  might  argue  that  this  encouragement  was an
explicit  political  regulatory  goal,  and  that  achieving  it cannot  be regarded
as  any sort  of regulatory  inefficlsncy  even  though  it  may have  produced- 101  -
allocative  inefficiency.  This  raises  an interesting  political  economy  issue.
Legislation  to  establish  regulation  frequently  embodies  multiple  objectives,
often  wit' an implicit  priority  ranking,  but (to  our  knowledge)  it  never
indicates  the  acceptable  limits  of trade-offs  among  them.  As a  consequence,
when economic  and technological  changes  occur  that  significantly  alter  the
opportunity  costs  of one  objective  ir terms  of the  others,  the regulatory
system  is  unlikely  to respond  appropriately.
Clearly,  it  would  be unrealistic  to expect  lawmakers  to draft
legislation  containing  marginal  rates  of substitution  among  objectives.
However,  periodic  reviews  of regulatory  objectives,  al.ternative  mays of
achieving  them,  and their  opportunity  costs,  could  be an effective
alternative.
IV:  LESSONS
Basic  microeconomic  theory  informs  us that imperfectly  competitive
markets  should  be regulated  to the  point  where the  marginal  costs  of  market
failures  are  equal  to the  marginal  costs  of the regulatory  efforts  employed  to
eliminate  them.  In some  cases,  this  will  make a laissez-faire  response
optimal¶  in  others,  a greater  degree  of intervention  will be warranted.
Ceteris  paribus,  factors  that  increase  the  welfare  costs  of market  failure
increase  the  optimal  level  of regulation;  factors  that  increase  the social
costs  of regulation  reduce  it.
In the  preceding  sections  we described  and  evaluated  the  major
components  of  antitrust  regulation  in the  United  States;  we also considered102 
four  case studies  of directive  regulation  and  deregulation:  railroad  freight
transportation,  trucking,  dir  passenger  service,  and telephone  communica.ions.
The  U.S. experience  with these  regulatory  .d  deregulatory  efforts  provides
guidance  for  establishing  policy  responses  co  imperfect  competition  in  LDCs.
Given  the  likely  relative  levels  of market  inefficiency  and
regulatory  inefficiency  in the  United  States  and  moat developing  countries,
4he  optimal  level  of government  regulation  in the  United  States  is arguably  no
lower  than  in  most LDCs  and  perhaps  significantly  higher. Although  demand  and
cost  conditions  in individual  markets  in the  Unitecs  States  may  make the
welfare  costs  of imperfect  competition  somewhat  smaller  in the  U.S. than in
most developing  countries' 1 2, the level  of regulatory  inefficiency  is likely
to  be substantially  lower. In the  U.S.,  the  government  can  draw  upon a large
pool of  highly  skilled  personnel  to  man its  regulatory  agencies;  accurate
information  on individual  sectors  of the  economy  is  easier  to obtain  than
almost  anywhere  in the  world;  and  bureaucratic  corrurtion,  at least  at the
federal  level,  is  relatively  rare.
Given  these  conditions,  if regulation  had not  been successful  in
the  United  States,  it is  unlikely  to be so in LDCs.  Our analysis  showed  that
regulation  of imperfect  competition  in the  U.S.  was excessive;  that regulatory
systems  were prone  to  misdirection  if  not capture,  often  in  ways that  are
difficult  to combat;  and  that  many regulatory  efforts  were so inefficient  as
to yield  a regulatory  failure,  i.e.,  a  regulatory  outcome  worse than  laissez-
faire.  This  suggests  that  LDCs should  be exceedingly  cautious  in
112  Here  we are  measuring  the  welfare  costs  of imperfect  competition
relative  to total  output.- 103  -
establishing  regulatory  institutions  intended  to reduce  welfare losses  from
imperfect  competition.
The lessons  of the  U.S. regulatory  experience  allow  us to identifv
some  general  conditions  that  tend  to foster  regulatory  misdirection  (and/or
capture)  and  hence  inefficiency.  Knowledge  of these  conditions  can  help
policy  planners  avoid  attempting  to regulate  sectors  where it is likely  to  be
welfare  reducing,  and  to design  mechanisms  of regulation  that  are least  likely
to suffer  from  misdirection.
We recommend  the  following  hierarchy  of regulatory  responses  to
imperfect  competition  in  LDCs:  First,  and  critically  important,  keep domestic
markets  open  to import  competition. Second,  determine  if  market  forces
themselves  (including  import  competition)  significantly  limit  the  welfare
losses  in  domestic  markets  whose structure  suggests  that  an imperfectly
competitive  market  equilibrium  is likely. If so,  eschew  regulatory  efforts
intended  to Oeliminate"  any remaining  welfare  losses.  Third,  if  market  forces
cannot  function  to effectively  limit  welfar.  losses  due  to imperfect
competition,  attempt  to  use antitrust  regulation  to create  and  preserve  market
structures  and  behavior  that  will do so.  Finally,  and only  as a last  resort,
in cases  where  demand  and cost  conditions  necessitate  natural  monopoly  or
tight  oligopoly,  policy  planners  should  consider  the  option  of directive
regilatory  institutions. 113 The remainder  of this section  discusses  each  of
these  options  in turn.
113  Consistent  with our  earlier  statements,  laissez-faire  may sometimes
be the  preferred  regulatory  option  even in  cases  of  natural  monoply:
directive  regulation  should  be employed  otly  under  conditions  that  make it
likely  to  be welfare  enhancing.- 104  -
IV.1  Intemnational  Trade  as  a  Reaulatory  Mechanisg
The  best of all regulatory  mechanisms  would  be invulnerable  to
regulatory  misdirection,  and  would  be able to eliminate  imperf  ct
competition's  welfare  losses  without  any  need for  resource  inputs. Such  a
mechanism  would  clearly  be ccst-effective,  and it  would also  preclude  the
problems  of regulatory  misdirection  that  so pervaded  the  U.S. regulatory
experience.
When  domestic  cost  and  demand  conditions  are  such  as to yield  a
purely  competitive  market  equilibrium,  the  market  itself  provides  this ideal
regulatory  mechanism. Unfortunately,  few  if any  industries  have domestic  cost
and  demand  conditions  consistent  with perfect  competition  or anything  close  to
It.  However,  as the recent  industrial  org. _zation  literature  informs  us, if
a  market  is perfectly  contestable,  entry  of  new firms  (or  the  threat  of it)
suffices  to ensure  that  allocatively  efficient  prices  are set (3aumol,  Panzar,
Willig,  1982).
If domestic  markets  are  kept freely  open  to import  competition,
domestic  monopolies  and  oligopolies  in  markets  for  tradeable  goods  face  an
effectively  limitless  number  of potential  entrants  whose  only  market
disadvantage  relative  to domestic  incumbents  is transportation  costs.1 14
It is true  that  no domestic  markets  are  perfectly  contestable  in
114  Even this  disadvantage  may be offset  by other  advantages  enjoyed  by
foreign  producers.- lOS -
LDCs;  however,  in the  case  of tradeable  goods,  opening  domestic  markets  to
imported  goods  limits  the  exercise  of dow-atic  market  power  almost  as
effectively  as  would  be the  case  under  perfect  contestability.
Import  competition  is not  only  very  powerful  as a 'regulatory'
device,  it is  very efficient  as  well.  Unlike  other  regulatory  mechanisms  that
drain  government  coffers,  consume  scarce  administrative  and  technical
resources,  are ineffective,  and are  constantly  vulnerable  to capture  by
regulated  entities  or by self-interested  regulators, 115 this  regulatory  device
operates  powerfully,  impartially,  and  virtually  costlessly,  and  it is
extremely  flexible  in the  face  of changing  market  conditioni  116  For
tradeable  goods,  import  competition  is  very  close  to the  regulatory  ideal.
Our  first  and  strongest  recommendation  therefore  is that  LDCs
resort  first  to open  markets  as a  means  of regulating  domestic  imperfectly
competitive  markets. Other  means  of regulation  should  only be considered  in
the  case  of non-tradeable  goods  or if there  is some  unbreachable  political  or
cultural  barrier  to import  competition. 117
115  For imports  to play  an effective  role  in  maintaining  competitive-
like  prices,  there  must be  no artificial  barriers  to engaging  in importing
activities. If foreign-produced  goods  must pass through  the  hands  of
monopolistic  or oligopolistic  importers  who themselves  are  protected  by entry
barriers,  import  competition  is  much less  likely  to play its  intended
beneficial  role.
116  Spiller  (1980  B, p.30)  discub.es  the  advantages  of an open economy
in reducing  domestic  monopoly  power,  including  those  associated  w4.th
flexibility. Of course,  for such  a policy  to function  optimally,  the  exchange
rate  must be the  correct  one.
117  It can  be argued  that  domestic  producers  are  hurt by import
competition. We will not reproduce  here the  well-known  arguments  concerning
the  costs  of  protecting  specific  industries  from  imports  or of using  general
import  tariffs  to protect  all  tradeable  goods  industries.- 106  _
XV.2 Antitrust;  Regulation
The  second  line  of  defense  against  domestic  monopoly  power  should
be  antitrust  regulation.  Antitrust  has  advantages  relative  to  more  intrusive
forms  of  regulation  that  make  it  preferable  to  them. First,  it  leaves  most
business  decisions  in  the  hands  of  those  with  the  informstion  and  incentive  to
make  them  intelligently.  Second,  because  it  is  a  genetal  set  of  rules
defining  the  permissible  limits  of  behavior  for  all  firms,  it  is  less  subjec
to  regulatory  misdirection  and  capture  than  industry-specific  directive
regulation.  However,  as  the  mixed  results  of  U.S.  antitrust  efforts  indicate,
antitrust  can  consume  scarce  financial  and  human  resources,  and  it  can  be
misguiided  in  its  thrust  and  misdirected  in  its  enforcement.  An  antitrust
system  has  to  be  cerefully  designed  iA order  to  be  part  of  the  solution  rather
than  part  of  the  problem.
Simplicity  is  the  key  to  successful  antitrust  regulation.
Antitrust  regulation  should  have  one  objactive:  efficiently  minimizing  welfare
losses  resulting  from  imperfect  competition.  It  should  be  enforced  by
economically  knowledgeable  personnel  in  a single  specialized  agency.  Further,
antitrust  regulation  should  focus  on  a  very  narrow  range  of  behaviors:  price-
fixing,  the  vertical  restrictive  practice  of  full-line  forcing,  and
horizontal  mergers  that  lead  to  very  high  domestic  concentration  in  markets
for  non-tradeables.  If  it  requires  a sophisticated  economic  analysis  to
determlne  whether  some  business  practice  is  welfare  enhancing  or  welfare
reducing,  that  practice  should  almost  certainly  not  be  regulated:  a
sophisticated  analysis  is  costly,  &nd  unless  it  is  performed  by  highly  skilled
personnel,  not  infrequently  will  arrive  at  an  incorrect  conclusion.- 107  -
's economize  on adjudication  costs  and  to reduce  the  uncertainty
faced  by businesses,  price  fixing  and full-line  forcing  should  be adjudicated
under  a per  se illegality  standard.  For  mergers,  a rule  of reason  is
appropriate,  with pre-notification  requirements  as in the  U.S.,  with published
guidelines  indicating  the  level  of concentration  and  other  market  conditions
that  would trigger  an antitrust  response,  and  with clear  limits  placed  on the
discretionary  powers  of the enforcement  agency.
To limit  the  potential  for  abuse  of the  agency9s  enforcement
powers  for  political  or personal  means,  penalties  for  antitrust  infractions
should  be limited  to fines. Finally,  to  ensure  that  the  budgetary  costs  of
antitrust  are  clearly  visible  and that  the  enforcement  agency  does  not become
an independent  power  center,  payment  of fines  should  be made directly  to the
central  treasury.
Taken  together,  these  recommendations  imply  a  minimalist  approach
to antitrust. We feel that  this  is appropriate  for  LDCs,  and quite  possibly,
for  industrialized  countries  as well.
IV.3  Directive  Regulation
There  are circumstances  in  which  antitrust  is either  powerless  or
inappropriate  as a  means of effecting  a competitive  market  equilibrium  or
something  close  to one.  Natural  monopoly is the  best  example  of this.  Undera  108  _
conditions  of  natural  monopoly 118 it is inefficient  to  have  more than  one  firm
in the  market;  and  yet  with only one  firm  in the  market,  the  competitive
equilibrium  output  will not in  generil  be produced.
Faced  with a  domestic  natural  monopoly  in  a non-tradeable  good,
policy  planners  have two  choices?  to  accept  any  welfare  losses  from  allocative
inefficiency  due to  monopoly  pricing,  or to establish  directive  regulation  of
the  natural  monopoly. Some  conditions  virtually  preclude  successful  directive
regulation;  in other  clrcumstances,  regulatory  systems  may be  welfare
enhancing  lf they  are  properly  deslgned  and  implemented. In the remainder  of
this  section,  we will consider  flrst  the  conditions  under  which acceptlng  the
welfare  losses  from  unregulated  natural  monopoly  is likely  to  be the
'optimally  imperfect,  outcome. Next,  we will dlscuss  how best to structure
regulatory  systems  so that  when used  in appropriate  circumstances,  they  can
best serve  the  long run  public  interest.
IV.3.1 CondLtions  Where  Unregulated  Natural  Monopoly  is 'Optimally  Imperfect'
Even the  most cleverly  designed  apparatus  for  directive  regulation
will entail  signlficant  costs. Dlrective  regulation  obviously  entails
bureaucratic  adminlstratlon;  it requires  'fair  hearlng'  procedures  for
consumers  and regulated  producers;  it requires  collection,  processing,  and
analysis  of infonmation  lnternal  and  external  to the  regulated  entities;  and
lt also  requlres  oversight  mechanisms. Clearly,  unless  the  natural  monopoly
118  A  sufficiently  concentrated  oligopoly  could  in some  circumstances
functlon  llttle  dLfferently  than  a  monopoly. Though  our analysis  is  couched
ln term  of a natural  monopoly,  lt  can apply  as  well to a natural  oligopoly.- 109  -
to be regulated  is an important  one in the  domestic  economy,  the  directive
regulation's  costs  are  likely  to outweigh  its  benefits,  and  it therefore  will
not  be the  optimal  policy  approach. 119
For  directive  regulation  to be  welfare  enhancing,  it is almost
certainly  a necessary  condition  that  the  natural  monopoly  to be regulated  be
economically  important;  however,  that  is not  a sufficlent  condition.
Regulation  cannot  be expected  to  be welfare  enhancing  unless  the regulatory
agencies  can  be staffed  by technically  competent  and  ncn-corrupt  personnel.
Absent  such  personnel,  regulation  should  not  be attempted.
Even if the  sector  to be regulated  is an important  one and
regulatory  personnel  requirements  can  be satisfied,  directive  regulation  still
may not  be optimal. Some  market  conditions  are  particularly  conducive  to
regulatory  inefficiency,  and  here too,  directive  regulation  is a  poor  policy
choice.
Efficient  directive  regulation  is  not easy  to achieve  even  in
industries  producing  one  or a  few  homogenous  goods  under  relatively  static
conditions. As our  case studies  of the  U.S.  air  passenger  transport  and
telephony  industries  illustrate,  it is almost  impossible  to effectively
regulate  industries  producing  a complex  mix  of products/services  or industries
119  For  example,  even if  provision  of cable  television  services  is  a
natural  monopoly,  LDCs  are  unlikely  to find  this  sector  to  be a good  candidate
for  directive  regulation.- 110  -
undergoing  rapid  changes  in cost  and/or  demand  conditions. 120 Directive
regulation,  by definition,  requires  that  the regulatory  authorities  set
regulated  producers'  price,  output,  and/or  level  of service. To set  the
values  of these  decision  variables  at allocatively  efficient  levels  requires
detailed  and  accurate  demand  and  cost condition  information  which  are  most
unlikely  to be available  given  the  problem  of information  asymmetry  and the
incentives  of regulated  entities  to distort  information  to their  own
advantage.
The  greater  the  number  and  heterogeneity  of the  goods  offered  in  a
market,  the  greater,  in effect,  is the  true  number  of *markets'  to  be
regulated. This implies  either  a great  expansion  of the  resources  devoted  to
regulation  or a reduction  in the  care  devoted  to  each regulatory  decision,  or
some  combination  of the two. The former  is associated  with inefficiently
excessive  regulation,  the latter  with  non-optimal  regulatory  decisions.
Rapidly  changing  cost  and  demand  conditions  also  wreak  havoc  with
efficient  regulation. Regulatory  agencies  need safeguards  to  ensure
procedural  fairness. They  must also  mediate  between  the  often-opposing
interests  of consumers  and  producers. Consequently,  regulators  must take
pains  to fully  document  their  decisions,  and  must try  to avoid  taking  action
on the  basis  of incomplete  information  that  unfairlys  disadvantages  either
producers  or consumers  or subsets  of each.  In practice,  this  means  that there
will always  be regulatory  lag  in responding  to changes  in  underlying  market
120  Cost conditions  can  change  due  to  product  or  process  innovation.
They can  also be variable  when the  prices  of important  inputs  fluctuate
significantly  over time.- 113.  -
forces.
As  the  pace  of  change  in  underlying  conditions  increases,
regulatory  decision-making  becomes  more  expensive  because  of  the  need  for
frequent  re-evaluation  of  regulatory  decisions.  In  addition,  because  of
regulatory  lag,  the  decisions  made  will  more  frequently  be  non-optimal.  Thus,
even  if  regulators  can  avo4d the  political  pressures  that  favor  maintaining
the  regulatory  status  quo  (which  is  difficult,  as  we  will  argue  below)
regulation  still  is  unlikely  to  be  successful  in  dynamic  industries. 121 For
example,  even  though  computer  production  might  be  a  natural  monopoly  in  some
countries,  the  unregulated  market  outcome  is  almost  certainly  preferred  to  any
attempt  at  regulation,  and  thus  would  be  considered  an "optimally  imperfect"
outcome.
IV.3.2  Design  of  Regulatory  Institutions  for  Important  Non-tradeable-Goods
Natural  Monopolies
Our  four  case  studies  of  directive  regulation  in  the  United  States
present  a sobering  picture  of  the  difficulties  of  designing  regulatory  systems
that  will  turn  out  in  practice  to  be  welfare  enhancing.  Misdirection  and
capture  are  a  constant  threat  to  any  regulatory  system.  Directive  regulation
is  a  potentially  powerful  vehicle  for  rent  extraction  and  redistribution,  and
producers  and  consumers--and  even  regulators--will  structure  their  individual
121 This  clearly  indicates  that  industry  regulatory  systems  should  not
be  established  in  response  to  conditions  arising  out  of  short  term
macroeconomic  events.  Macroeconomic  conditions  are  sure  to  alter  over  time,
but  regulatory  systems,  once  established,  are  highly  resistant  to  change.  The
U.S.  has  still  not  dismantled  all  the  regulatory  systems  established  in
response  to  the  Great  Depression.- 112  -
market  responses  and  group  political  responses  to it so as to acquire  and
defend  economic  rents. Because  information  is  costly  to obtain,  and  because
the  benefits  of  misdirected  and  captured  regulation  are  concentrated  and  the
costs  more diffuse,  it cannot  be presumed  that  opposing  interest  groups'
countervailing  power  will operate  to  prevent  misdirection. Thus,  no matter
how carefully  crafted  to  minimize  such  problems,  the  design  of directive
regulatory  mechanisms  should  reflect  the  presumption  that  sooner  or later,
regulatory  misdirection  or capture  will occur. The likelihood  and costs  of
regulatory  misdirection  suggest  a number  of important  desiderata  for
mechanisms  of directive  regulation.
Adequate  Compensation  for  Regulatory  Personnel
It is  essential  to provide  sufficient  compensation  to regulatory
personnel  to ensure  that  they  are  competent  and  to reduce  the  temptation  of
corruption. It is  better  to employ  a smaller  number  of  well-compensated
people  to competently  and  honestly  regulate  a small  number  of  markets  than  to
have a large  number  of ill-paid,  ill-trained  and  poorly  motivated  people
regulate  a large  number  of  markets.
Clear  and  Consistent  Goals
The  objectives  of regulation  should  be specific  and  very clearly
articulated. If there  are  multiple  objectives,  which  should  be avoided  if
possible,  they  should  be  mutually  consistent. Vague  and  inconsistent  goals
complicate  enormously  the  task  of monitoring  and  evaluating  the  efficacy  of
regulatory  activity,  and therefore  are  an invitation  to  misdirection  and- 113  -
capture  of the regulatory  apparatus.  If the  goals  of U.S. railroad
regulation  had been  clearly  stated  and  ICC  performance  subject  to periodic
review,  the  metamorphosis  of its  rail  regulation  would  not likely  have
occurred.
Clear  Statement  of  Regulatory  Rationale
If  directive  regulation  occurs  at  all,  it  should  be  in  response  to
some  clearly  identifiable  market  failure. The  enabling  legislation  should
contain  a statement  of exactly  what market  conditions  are responsible  for  the
occurrence  of  market  failure,  and  how they  bring  it about. These  conditions
should  be monitored  on a regular  basis  by both the  regulatory  agency  and
whatever  group  has oversight  responsibility.  If it is determined  that  the
market  conditions  that  led  to market  failure  have ceased  to exist,  there
should  be a presumption  that regulation  will be abandoned.
Avoid  Regulation  for  Redistributive  Purposes
Regulation  frequently  functions  largely  or purely  as a
redistributive  mechanism. This  may  be viewed  as occurring  as one  of the
legitimate  functions  of government  or as a response  to rent seeking  activities
by interest  groups,  although  the  formal  distinction  is not  clear. 122
122  Whether  or  not redistributive  regulation  is viewed  purely  as a
response  to rent seeking  activities  depends  upon  one's  view  of the  process  of
policy  formation. However,  with the  exception  of an absolute  ruler  with
unthreatenable  sovereignty,  any redistributive  act  by government  can  be viewed
as  a response  to either  direct  or indirect  pressure  by the interest  group
representing  the  redistribution's  recipients,  which pressure  must  be classed
as rent seeking.- 114 -
In some  cases,  the explicit  reason  for initiating  regulation  is to
shift  surplus  from  one  economic  interest  to another;  in  others,  a veneer  of
efficiency  arguments  overlays  the redistributive  intent  of the  enabling
regulatory  legislation,  making  otherwise  politically  difficult  redistribution
possible. There  is little  disagreement  among  economists  that  directive
regulation  is  not the  best  mechanism  for  income  redistribution:  it is almost
always  accompanied  by a non-trivial  regulatory  burden  of enforcement  and
compliance  costs,  and frequently  by costs  of  misdirection  and capture.
Sunset  Provisions
All regulatory  institutions  should  incorporate  a five-year 123
sunset  provision,  under  which renewal  of an agency's  regulatory  authority
requires  a  non-routine  positive  assessment  of its  activities  by an outside
agency. Sunset  provisions  ensure  that regulatory  systems  do not simply
acquire  a life  of their  own, effectively  immune  from  all  but perfunctory
outside  monitoring  except  in cases  of egregious  disregard  of their  regulatory
mandate.
The spirit  of sunset  provisions  is to shift  the  burden  of proof
from  having  to  establish  that regulation  is  welfare  reducing  in order  to
123  It  might  be argued  that in some  cases,  five  years  may  be too  short  a
time  to allow  proper  evaluation  of how  an agency  would  function  once it is 'up
to speed." The sunset  provision  period  could  be lengthened  if there  is  a
compelling  reason  for  believing  that  a longer  time frame  is appropriate;
however,  the  period  should  be as hort as  possible,  and  must be definit  and set
in advances  infant  agencies,'  like  infant  industries,  are likely  to be
always  just a  bit shy  of  maturity.- 115 -
eliminate  it,  to having  to establish  that it is  welfare  enhancing  in order  to
continue  it.  This is  an essential  feature  of sunset  provisions. It is  hardly
credible  that  ICC  trucking  regulation  would  have  persisted  as long  as it  did
in the  U.S. if legislators  had actually  been required  to  vote it into
existence  each  five  years  on the  basis  of  hearings  that  established  beyond
reasonable  doubt  that it  was  welfare  enhancing;  on the  other  hand,  the
persistence  of ICC  trucking  regulation  is quite  unsurprising  in the  absence  of
such  a requirement.
Another  advantage  of sunset  provisions  is that  they serve  to
reduce  the  extent  of regulated  entities'  property  rights  in existing
regulatory  institutions.  When  consumers  and  producers  make investment
decisions  predicated  on the  existence  of specific  regulations,  it  may seem  to
violate  the requirements  of procedural  fairness  to  make changes  in  the
regulations  that  impose  losses  on them  or threaten  their  economic  survival.
Sunset  provisions  make clear  that  the  government's  obligation  to  maintain  a
particular  regulatory  institution  is temporally  bounded.
Readily  Observable  Costs
Regulatory  costs  must  be on-budget  and readily  observed. This  is
particularly  important  in light  of the  typical  pattern  of concentrated
benefits  and diffuse  costs  of regulation. If regulatory  agencies  are self-
financing  through  receipts  of fees  from  producers  and\or  consumers,  or are in
some  other  way budgetarily  invisible,  pressures  for scrutiny  are  blunted  and
the regulatory  burden  of proof  becomes  that  of establishing  that  regulation  is
welfare  reducing. As we have indicated,  this is  not the  appropriate  standard.- 116  -
If those  who suffer  harm from  regulation  each  only lose  a small  amount,  they
are  unlikely  to  mount the  effort  necessary  to do this. 124
Regulatory  Simplinity
Regulatory  mechanisms  should  be as simple  and  transparent  as
possible. The importance  of this  is  made painfully  apparent  in our  case
studies  of U.S. directive  regulation.  Regulatory  simplicity  economizes  on the
need for  scarce  administrative,  economic,  accounting,  and  judicial  skills
within  the regulatory  agency,  an even  more important  factor  in  LDCs than in
the  United  States. Further,  it greatly  &educes  the risk  of regulatory
capture.
Oversight  is clearly  easier  wten regulatory  procedures  are  simple.
The  U.S. experience  with trucking  regulation  illustrates  this  clearly:  this
inefficient,  producer-captured,  and  quite  possibly  corrupt  system  persisted
for  decades  in  no small  part  because  the  very complexity  of the  regulatory
system  made it  exceedingly  difficult  to determine  how it functioned,  much less
to determine  if it functioned  to enhance  social  welfare.
Extremely  complex  regulatory  systems  not only  encourage  capture  by
blunting  oversight  capacities,  they  also  tend to  disenfranchise  smaller
producers  and potential  entrants  who lack  the  resources  to  pursue  their
124  The  U.S.  experience  with sugar  quotas  is instructive  here.  It is
difficult  to conceive  of a regulatory  program  achieving  a greater  level  of
misdirection,  and  yet  the  program  survives  to this  day.  The  fact that  the
program  is self-financing  through  sugar  import  duties  has  made it exceedingly
difficult  to  muster  sufficient  legislative  support  to eliminate  it.  See
Krueger  (1990)  for  an analysis  of the  U.S. sugar  program.- 117  -
interests  through  administrative  and  procedural  mazes.  ICC  trucking
regulation  vividly  illustrates  this  regulatory  problem  as well.
Complex  regulations  encourage  regulatory  misdirection  and  capture
in  yet another  way by fostering  development  of regulatory  specialists.
Regulators  with such  specific  human  capital  are likely  to resist  regulatory
reform. Worse still,  in these  situations,  regulatory  agencies  are  tempted  to
turn to the regulatee/regulator  revolving  door  in order  to find  personnel  who
can fathom  the functioning  of the  regulatory  apparatus. This  greatly
increases  the likelihood  of regulatory  capture.
Minimize  Rents  Conferred
Producers  and  consumers  will attempt  to defend  the  rents  they
receive  under  regulation. Further,  barring  the  unusual,  greater  rents  will be
defended  with greater  vigor. This suggests  that  regulatory  flexibility  can  be
better  maintained  if  mechanisms  of regulation  are  structured  so as to  minimize
from  the  very start  the rents  they  confer  on regulated  entities. Efforts  to
block  regulatory  reform  will decline  as regulated  entities  have less  to gain
from  them.
If it is essential  to control  entry  through  licensing
requirements,  operating  licenses  should  have the  shortest  duration  consistent
with achieving  regulatory  objectives  and should  be auctioned  off rather  than
given  away.- 118  -
Broad  Based  Oversight
We have emphasized  the  need for  each regulatory  system  to
incorporate  sunset  provisions  that  mandate  an impartial  evaluation  of its
performance  at regular  intervals. Fer  this  to function  as it should,  it is
clearly  essential  that  the  group  charged  with evaluation/oversight  itself  not
be captured  by any regulatory  interest  group.  This  suggests  the  need for
broadly-based  oversight  groups.
Oversight  is important  not  merely  to ensure  that regulation  is
necessary  and/or  efficient,  but  also  to safeguard  against  abuse  of regulatory
agency  power  for  political  or personal  purposes. Broad-based  oversight  is of
critical  importance  here.
Caution
Regulatory  capture  can  be contained  if the  will exists  to do so;
it  is  much  more difficult  to prevent  other  forms  of  misd,.rection.  Regulations
will never  be devised  using  perfect  information  and full  general  equilibrium
models;  regulators  will never  anticipate  all  exogenous  changes  in the  economy;
and  producers  and  consumers  are sure  to devise  strategic  responses  to the
regulatory  apparatus  that  its  architects  would  never  have anticipated.
Further,  regulators  are  most  unlikely  to abandon  the  notions  of procedural
fairness  that  provide  the  basis  for  producer  and consumer  regulatory  property
rights.
All of this suggests  that  dirertive  regulation  is  virtually- 11.9  -
certain  to function  imperfectly. Unfortunately,  as the  U.S.  experience  so
clearly  illustrates,  imperfect  regulation  can  be every  bit  as bad as imperfect
competition.
In a  world  in  which  producers,  consumers  and regulators  develop
property  rights  in regulatory  institutions,  it is exceedingly  difficult  to
effect  regulatory  reform. Thus,  there  are  great  advantages  to  proceeding
cautiously  in establishing  regulatory  institutions.- 120 -
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